



Winfried Schneider-Deters

## UKRAINE'S FATEFUL YEARS 2013–2019

*Vol. I: The Popular Uprising in Winter 2013/2014*

*ibidem*

**General Editor:** Andreas Umland,  
*Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, [andreas.umland@ui.se](mailto:andreas.umland@ui.se)*

**Commissioning Editor:** Max Jakob Horstmann,  
London, [mjh@ibidem.eu](mailto:mjh@ibidem.eu)

## EDITORIAL COMMITTEE\*

### DOMESTIC & COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Prof. **Ellen Bos**, *Andrássy University of Budapest*  
Dr. **Gergana Dimova**, *University of Winchester*  
Dr. **Andrey Kazantsev**, *MGIMO (U) MID RF, Moscow*  
Prof. **Heiko Pleines**, *University of Bremen*  
Prof. **Richard Sakwa**, *University of Kent at Canterbury*  
Dr. **Sarah Whitmore**, *Oxford Brookes University*  
Dr. **Harald Wydra**, *University of Cambridge*

### SOCIETY, CLASS & ETHNICITY

Col. **David Glantz**, *"Journal of Slavic Military Studies"*  
Dr. **Marlène Laruelle**, *George Washington University*  
Dr. **Stephen Shulman**, *Southern Illinois University*  
Prof. **Stefan Troebst**, *University of Leipzig*  
POLITICAL ECONOMY & PUBLIC POLICY  
Dr. **Andreas Goldthau**, *Central European University*  
Dr. **Robert Kravchuk**, *University of North Carolina*  
Dr. **David Lane**, *University of Cambridge*  
Dr. **Carol Leonard**, *Higher School of Economics, Moscow*  
Dr. **Maria Popova**, *McGill University, Montreal*

### FOREIGN POLICY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Dr. **Peter Duncan**, *University College London*  
Prof. **Andreas Heinemann-Grüder**, *University of Bonn*  
Prof. **Gerhard Mangott**, *University of Innsbruck*  
Dr. **Diana Schmidt-Pfister**, *University of Konstanz*  
Dr. **Lisbeth Tarlow**, *Harvard University, Cambridge*  
Dr. **Christian Wipperfürth**, *N-Ost Network, Berlin*  
Dr. **William Zimmerman**, *University of Michigan*  
HISTORY, CULTURE & THOUGHT  
Dr. **Catherine Andreyev**, *University of Oxford*  
Prof. **Mark Bassin**, *Södertörn University*  
Prof. **Karsten Brüggemann**, *Tallinn University*  
Dr. **Alexander Etkind**, *University of Cambridge*  
Dr. **Gasan Guseynov**, *Moscow State University*  
Prof. **Leonid Luks**, *Catholic University of Eichstaett*  
Dr. **Olga Malinova**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*  
Dr. **Richard Mole**, *University College London*  
Prof. **Andrei Rogatchevski**, *University of Tromsø*  
Dr. **Mark Tauger**, *West Virginia University*

## ADVISORY BOARD\*

Prof. **Dominique Arel**, *University of Ottawa*  
Prof. **Jörg Baberowski**, *Humboldt University of Berlin*  
Prof. **Margarita Balmaceda**, *Seton Hall University*  
Dr. **John Barber**, *University of Cambridge*  
Prof. **Timm Beichelt**, *European University Viadrina*  
Dr. **Katrin Boeckh**, *University of Munich*  
Prof. em. **Archie Brown**, *University of Oxford*  
Dr. **Vyacheslav Bryukhovetsky**, *Kyiv-Mohyla Academy*  
Prof. **Timothy Colton**, *Harvard University, Cambridge*  
Prof. **Paul D'Anieri**, *University of Florida*  
Dr. **Heike Dörrenbächer**, *Friedrich Naumann Foundation*  
Dr. **John Dunlop**, *Hoover Institution, Stanford, California*  
Dr. **Sabine Fischer**, *SWP, Berlin*  
Dr. **Geir Flikke**, *NUPI, Oslo*  
Prof. **David Galbreath**, *University of Aberdeen*  
Prof. **Alexander Galkin**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*  
Prof. **Frank Golczewski**, *University of Hamburg*  
Dr. **Nikolas Gvosdev**, *Naval War College, Newport, RI*  
Prof. **Mark von Hagen**, *Arizona State University*  
Dr. **Guido Hausmann**, *University of Munich*  
Prof. **Dale Herspring**, *Kansas State University*  
Dr. **Stefani Hoffman**, *Hebrew University of Jerusalem*  
Prof. **Mikhail Ilyin**, *MGIMO (U) MID RF, Moscow*  
Prof. **Vladimir Kantor**, *Higher School of Economics*  
Dr. **Ivan Katchanovski**, *University of Ottawa*  
Prof. em. **Andrzej Korbonski**, *University of California*  
Dr. **Iris Kempe**, *"Caucasus Analytical Digest"*  
Prof. **Herbert Küpper**, *Institut für Ostrecht Regensburg*  
Dr. **Rainer Lindner**, *CEEER, Berlin*  
Dr. **Vladimir Malakhov**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*

Dr. **Luke March**, *University of Edinburgh*  
Prof. **Michael McFaul**, *Stanford University, Palo Alto*  
Prof. **Birgit Menzel**, *University of Mainz-Germersheim*  
Prof. **Valery Mikhailenko**, *The Urals State University*  
Prof. **Emil Pain**, *Higher School of Economics, Moscow*  
Dr. **Oleg Podvintsev**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*  
Prof. **Olga Popova**, *St. Petersburg State University*  
Dr. **Alex Pravda**, *University of Oxford*  
Dr. **Erik van Ree**, *University of Amsterdam*  
Dr. **Joachim Rogall**, *Robert Bosch Foundation Stuttgart*  
Prof. **Peter Rutland**, *Wesleyan University, Middletown*  
Prof. **Marat Salikov**, *The Urals State Law Academy*  
Dr. **Gwendolyn Sasse**, *University of Oxford*  
Prof. **Jutta Scherrer**, *EHESS, Paris*  
Prof. **Robert Service**, *University of Oxford*  
Mr. **James Sherr**, *RIIA Chatham House London*  
Dr. **Oxana Shevel**, *Tufts University, Medford*  
Prof. **Eberhard Schneider**, *University of Siegen*  
Prof. **Olexander Shnyrkov**, *Shevchenko University, Kyiv*  
Prof. **Hans-Henning Schröder**, *SWP, Berlin*  
Prof. **Yuri Shapoval**, *Ukrainian Academy of Sciences*  
Prof. **Viktor Shnirelman**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*  
Dr. **Lisa Sundstrom**, *University of British Columbia*  
Dr. **Philip Walters**, *"Religion, State and Society"*, *Oxford*  
Prof. **Zenon Wasyliv**, *Ithaca College, New York State*  
Dr. **Lucan Way**, *University of Toronto*  
Dr. **Markus Wehner**, *"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung"*  
Dr. **Andrew Wilson**, *University College London*  
Prof. **Jan Zielonka**, *University of Oxford*  
Prof. **Andrei Zorin**, *University of Oxford*

\* While the Editorial Committee and Advisory Board support the General Editor in the choice and improvement of manuscripts for publication, responsibility for remaining errors and misinterpretations in the series' volumes lies with the books' authors.

# Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS)

ISSN 1614-3515

<p>Founded in 2004 and refereed since 2007, SPPS makes available affordable English-, German-, and Russian-language studies on the history of the countries of the former Soviet bloc from the late Tsarist period to today. It publishes between 5 and 20 volumes per year and focuses on issues in transitions to and from democracy such as economic crisis, identity formation, civil society development, and constitutional reform in CEE and the NIS. SPPS also aims to highlight so far understudied themes in East European studies such as right-wing radicalism, religious life, higher education, or human rights protection. The authors and titles of all previously published volumes are listed at the end of this book. For a full description of the series and reviews of its books, see <a href="http://www.ibidem-verlag.de/red/spps">www.ibidem-verlag.de/red/spps</a>.</p> <p><b>Editorial correspondence &amp; manuscripts</b> should be sent to: Dr. Andreas Umland, Department of Political Science, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, vul. Voloska 8/5, UA-04070 Kyiv, UKRAINE; <a href="mailto:andreas.umland@cantab.net">andreas.umland@cantab.net</a></p> <p><b>Business correspondence &amp; review copy requests</b> should be sent to: <i>ibidem</i> Press, Leuschnerstr. 40, 30457 Hannover, Germany; tel.: +49 511 2622200; fax: +49 511 2622201; <a href="mailto:spps@ibidem.eu">spps@ibidem.eu</a>.</p> <p><b>Authors, reviewers, referees, and editors</b> for (as well as all other persons sympathetic to) SPPS are invited to join its networks at <a href="https://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=52638198614">www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=52638198614</a>  <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/groups?about=&amp;gid=103012">www.linkedin.com/groups?about=&amp;gid=103012</a>  <a href="https://www.xing.com/net/spps-ibidem-verlag/">www.xing.com/net/spps-ibidem-verlag/</a></p>	<p><b>Recent Volumes</b></p> <p>245 <i>Oleksandra Keudel</i> How Patronal Networks Shape Opportunities for Local Citizen Participation in a Hybrid Regime A Comparative Analysis of Five Cities in Ukraine With a foreword by Sabine Kropp ISBN 978-3-8382-1671-3</p> <p>246 <i>Jan Claas Behrends, Thomas Lindenberger, Pavel Kolar (Eds.)</i> Violence after Stalin Institutions, Practices, and Everyday Life in the Soviet Bloc 1953–1989 ISBN 978-3-8382-1637-9</p> <p>247 <i>Leonid Luks</i> Macht und Ohnmacht der Utopien Essays zur Geschichte Russlands im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert ISBN 978-3-8382-1677-5</p> <p>248 <i>Iuliia Barshadska</i> Brüssel zwischen Kyjiw und Moskau Das auswärtige Handeln der Europäischen Union im ukrainisch-russischen Konflikt 2014-2019 Mit einem Vorwort von Olaf Leïße ISBN 978-3-8382-1667-6</p> <p>249 <i>Valentyna Romanova</i> Decentralisation and Multilevel Elections in Ukraine Reform Dynamics and Party Politics in 2010–2021 With a foreword by Kimitaka Matsuzato ISBN 978-3-8382-1700-0</p> <p>250 <i>Alexander Motyl</i> National Questions Theoretical Reflections on Nations and Nationalism in Eastern Europe ISBN 978-3-8382-1675-1</p> <p>251 <i>Marc Dietrich</i> A Cosmopolitan Model for Peacebuilding The Ukrainian Cases of Crimea and the Donbas ISBN 978-3-8382-1687-4</p> <p>252 <i>Eduard Baidaus</i> An Unsettled Nation State-Building, Identity, and Separatism in Post-Soviet Moldova With forewords by John-Paul Himka and David R. Marples ISBN 978-3-8382-1582-2</p> <p>253 <i>Igor Okunev, Petr Oskolkov (Eds.)</i> Transforming the Administrative Matryoshka The Reform of Autonomous Okrugs in the Russian Federation, 2003–2008 With a foreword by Vladimir Zorin ISBN 978-3-8382-1721-5</p>
--	--

Winfried Schneider-Deters

UKRAINE'S FATEFUL YEARS  
2013–2019

Volume I

The Popular Uprising in Winter 2013/2014

*ibidem*  
Verlag 

## **Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek**

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

Cover-picture: ID 87825923 © Panaramka | Dreamstime.com

ISBN-13: 978-3-8382-7725-7

© *ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart 2022

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und elektronische Speicherformen sowie die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronical, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

# Content

Preface to the English Edition: Ukraine's War of Independence .....	15
Foreword.....	53
Outline of the Content.....	53
Notes on Transliteration .....	60
List of Abbreviations .....	65
Sources .....	69
Bibliography .....	71
Author Information.....	82
 <b>I Brussels and Moscow Integration Competition over Ukraine</b>	
I.1 Outbreak of Latent Integration Competition.....	83
I.2 The "Strategic Choice" of Ukraine between European and Eurasian Integration.....	87
I.2.1 The Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine .....	87
I.2.2 Ukraine Facing an Existential Choice .....	88
I.3 "Füle's List": Brussels' Conditions for Its Signature under the Association Agreement.....	90
I.4 The "Eurasian Card" in the Game of Association Poker between Brussels and Kyiv A Bluff?.....	96
I.5 "Double Membership": The "3 plus 1" Formula .....	99
I.6 The 16th EU-Ukraine Summit Diplomatic Détente between Brussels and Kyiv .....	102
I.6.1 "Political Association and Economic Integration": The New Formula.....	102
I.7 Threats and Enticements: Moscow's Pressure on Kyiv.....	110
I.7.1 Russian "Concerns" .....	110
I.7.2 Import Barriers: A Counterproductive Bargaining Chip ..	113
I.7.3 The European Union's "Strong Message" .....	118
I.7.4 The Ominous "Complex of Measures" .....	119
I.7.5 The Communist Party: Moscow's "Fifth Column" in Ukraine.....	123

I.7.6	“We Are One People”: Putin’s Ethnic-Nationalist (“Völkisch”) Postulate.....	124
I.8	The “European Week” in Kyiv: President Yanukovych’s “Historic Decision for Europe” .....	127
I.9	The Ukrainian Dilemma of the European Union.....	131
I.9.1	“To Sign or Not to Sign...”: The European Union Facing a Historic Decision.....	131
I.9.2	Smouldering Dissent between the National Governments of the European Union.....	133
I.10	The Tymoshenko Problem: “Last Obstacle” on the Way to “Vilnius” .....	136
I.11	The Monitoring Mission of the European Parliament: A “Mission Impossible” .....	158
I.12	The Final Phase before “Vilnius” .....	163
I.12.1	The European Parliament: The Resolution of October 23, 2013 .....	163
I.12.2	The Final Performance in the Ukrainian Parliament Directed by the Presidential Administration .....	164
I.13	The Vilnius Debacle: The Failed “Historic Summit” of the “Eastern Partnership” .....	170
I.13.1	Termination of the Association Process by Ukraine .....	170
I.14	The “Open Door” of the European Union .....	179
I.14.1	The European Union: A Good Face for a Bad Game .....	179
I.14.2	Continuation of the “Dialogue” between Brussels and Kyiv “for the Sake of the Ukrainian people” .....	180
I.15	Reasons for Yanukovych’s Change of Mind.....	183
I.15.1	The Official Justification .....	183
I.15.2	President Yanukovych’s Signature: A Question of Money? .....	184
I.15.3	Yanukovych’s “European Integration Course”: A Deception? .....	190
I.16	Reactions to the Vilnius Failure.....	192
I.16.1	The “Party of Regions” Need for Justification instead of Mood of Victory .....	192
I.16.2	The Powerlessness of the Opposition: Demand for the Resignation of the Government .....	195
I.16.3	The European Union: Unconcealed Disappointment.....	197
I.16.4	Russia Concealed Satisfaction.....	199

I.17	In Retrospect: What Should Have Been Done.....	202
I.17.1	The European Union: Strategic Myopia .....	202
I.17.2	The European Union's Share of the Blame.....	203
I.17.3	Brussels Late Insight.....	205
I.17.4	Withheld Accession Perspective.....	208
I.17.5	"Arrangement" with Russia's Eurasian Integration Project.....	210
I.18	The "Trilateral Consultation Process": Renegotiations with Russia .....	213
I.18.1	Tripartite Consultations.....	213
I.18.2	Tripartite Negotiations on a Bilateral Agreement: The "Russian List" .....	214
I.18.3	The Search for "Practical Solutions" to Dispel Russian "Concerns" .....	217
I.18.4	Cancellation of the CIS Free Trade Agreement by Ukraine.....	222
I.19	After the Victory of the "Maidan": Signing and Ratification of the Association Agreement .....	225
I.19.1	Signing of the Political Part: Postponement of the Application of the Economic Part.....	225
I.19.2	Four Years after "Vilnius": The Association Agreement EU-Ukraine in Force.....	226
I.20	EU-Associated Ukraine: Dream and Reality .....	229
I.20.1	The Crisis in the Relations between the EU and Ukraine .....	229
I.20.2	Implementation of the Association Agreement.....	236

## **II "Maidan": The Popular Uprising against the Kleptocratic Regime of President Yanukovych**

II.1	Yanukovych's Change of Course: The "Murder of a Dream" .....	241
II.1.1	Yanukovych's "Biggest Mistake" .....	241
II.1.2	The "Euro-Maidan": A Protest Movement of the Academic Youth.....	242
II.1.3	The First "Viche": A Spontaneous Gathering of Citizens of Kyiv .....	243
II.1.4	The Unification of the Parliamentary and Extra- Parliamentary Opposition .....	245
II.1.5	The Day "After Vilnius": Crackdown on the Protest .....	248
II.1.6	The "Storming" of the Presidential Administration: Staged by Yanukovych's Regime?.....	254



II.1.7	The “March of Millions”: Occupation of Public Buildings in Kyiv .....	259
II.2	From Protest to Revolt: From the “Euro-Maidan” to “The Maidan” .....	264
II.2.1	People’s Anger: The “Nationalization” of the “Maidan” ..	264
II.2.2	The Failed “Storming” of the “Maidan”: Protest Camp by the “Berkut” Riot Police on December 11 .....	268
II.3	Solidarity of the “West” with the “Euro-Maidan” .....	270
II.3.1	The Diplomatic “Concerns” of the Europeans .....	270
II.3.2	“Visit of a European to Europeans”: The German Foreign Minister Westerwelle on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti.....	271
II.3.3	Sanctions: The Dilemma of the European Union .....	273
II.3.4	Disappointment with “Europe” .....	284
II.3.5	The European Council: The Ukraine Resolution of its Parliamentary Assembly of January 30, 2014 .....	285
II.3.6	“America Is with You!” .....	287
II.4	The “Euro-Maidan” from the Kremlin’s Point of View: A “Pogrom” .....	293
II.4.1	Moscow’s Visible Hand .....	293
II.4.2	The Statement by International Experts on Eastern Europe about the “Kyiv Euro-Maidan” .....	296
II.4.3	The “Maidan”: Not an Anti-Russian Movement.....	298
II.4.4	The “Maidan”: Not a Ukrainian “East-West Conflict” .....	299
II.5	The Attempt at a Violent Solution on December 11, 2013 .....	301
II.5.1	The “Kravchuk Table” .....	301
II.5.2	The Nocturnal Storming of the “Maidan” Protest Camp..	302
II.5.3	The “People’s Association Maidan”: The Civil Organization of the Popular Uprising .....	305
II.6	The “Emergency Legislation” of January 16, 2014.....	309
II.6.1	“Legalization of the Dictatorship” .....	309
II.6.2	Foreign Reaction to the Adoption of the “Laws of January 16” .....	313
II.7	The “January 19” 2014 Outburst of Violence.....	315
II.7.1	The “Peaceful Maidan” .....	315
II.7.2	The Eighth “People’s Assembly” on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti: Call for a “Leader of the Resistance” .....	315
II.7.3	The Street Battle in the Lower Hrushevskii Street .....	319
II.7.4	The First Fatalities.....	322

II.8	Sham Negotiations .....	325
II.8.1	President Yanukovich's Call for Dialogue: The "Group for the Regulation of the Political Crisis" .....	325
II.8.2	Negotiations with the President .....	327
II.8.3	Secret Preparation of a State of Emergency?.....	333
II.9	The Spread of the Insurgency .....	353
II.9.1	The "People's Council": A Parallel Parliament .....	353
II.9.2	Occupation of Administrative Buildings in Large Parts of the Country .....	354
II.10	The Partial Capitulation of the Regime: Resignation of Prime Minister Azarov .....	357
II.10.1	Withdrawal of the "Laws of January 16" .....	359
II.11	The Second "Amnesty Law" A Trap?.....	360
II.11.1	The Amendment of the First Amnesty Law.....	360
II.11.2	"Hostages" in Exchange for Buildings.....	364
II.12	Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the "Political Crisis"?.....	367
II.12.1	"Don't be Afraid!": Hardening of Resistance .....	367
II.12.2	Release of "Hostages" in Exchange for the Release of Occupied Buildings .....	369
II.12.3	Negotiations of the Opposition with Prosecutor General Pshonka .....	371
II.12.4	Conditional Release of the Kyiv City Hall .....	373
II.12.5	The "Viche" of February 16, 2014: The Last People's Assembly on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti .....	375
II.12.6	Return to the Constitution of 2004: A Possible Way out of the "Crisis"? .....	377
II.13	The Positioned Forces of the Opposing Camps before the "Final Struggle" .....	380
II.13.1	The Parliamentary Opposition to the Yanukovich Regime.....	380
II.13.2	The "Self-Defense of the Maidan" ("Samooborona") .....	384
II.13.3	The "Anti-Maidan" .....	387
II.13.4	The Regime's Security Forces.....	390
II.13.5	"Titushky" State-Licensed Hooligans as "Auxiliary Police" .....	392
II.13.6	The Army "Loyal to the People" or to the Regime?.....	398
II.14	The Bloody End of the "Maidan" .....	407

II.14.1	The Operational Planning for the Offensive of the Regime's Security Forces .....	407
II.14.2	The "Peaceful Offensive" of the Opposition in Parliament.....	409
II.14.3	The "Peaceful Offensive" of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition .....	411
II.14.4	The Violent Offensive of the Regime: The Street Battle in the Government Quarter .....	415
II.14.5	"Targeted Killing": Snipers Against Street Fighters .....	421
II.14.6	February 18: The Nighttime "Storming" of the Maidan Nezalezhnosti.....	423
II.14.7	Nocturnal Visit of the Oppositional "Troika" to President Yanukovych .....	428
II.14.8	The Bloody Interim Balance of February 18.....	431
II.14.9	"Oligarchs" Against Violence .....	440
II.14.10	The Counterattack of the "Defenders of the 'Maidan': Reconquest of Lost 'Maidan' Territory" .....	443
II.14.11	The Massacre of February 20.....	445
II.14.12	Use of Firearms by "Maidan" Defenders? .....	448
II.14.13	The "Heavenly Hundred": The Bloody Result of the "Three-Day War" in Kyiv's Streets .....	451
II.15	Crisis Diplomacy: The European Mediation Mission .....	453
II.15.1	European Union Sanctions .....	453
II.15.2	Conflict Mediation of the European Union.....	456
II.15.3	The Signing of the Agreement "on the Regulation of Crisis" .....	459
II.15.4	The Outcome of the Negotiations: A Sham Success of the Opposition? .....	462
II.15.5	Diplomatic Comments on the "Peace Agreement" .....	463
II.16	Yanukovych's Loss of Control in Parliament .....	467
II.16.1	The Defection of the Opportunists Changing Sides in the Verkhovna Rada .....	467
II.16.2	The Extraordinary Session of the Verkhovna Rada on February 20, 2014 Victory of the Opposition in Parliament.....	469
II.17	Rejection of the "Peace Agreement" by the "Maidan" .....	473
II.17.1	Negotiations Without the "Maidan" .....	473
II.17.2	The Justification Attempts of the Opposition Leaders before the "People of the Maidan" .....	475

II.17.3	The Sotnyk Parasyuk: The “Hero of the Day” .....	478
II.18	The Victory of the “Maidan” .....	485
II.18.1	The Capture of the Government Quarter by the Insurgents .....	485
II.18.2	The Withdrawal of the Regime’s Security Forces: An Orderly Desertion? .....	485
II.18.3	The Escape of the President’s Accomplices.....	491
II.18.4	The Escape of the President Yanukovych .....	493
II.19	The “Revolutions” of the Years 2004/2005 and 2013/2014 in Comparison.....	499
II.19.1	Incompleted Revolutions.....	499
II.19.2	The “Maidan”: Not a Political System Change.....	500
II.20	The “Maidan”: Rebirth of the Ukrainian Nation .....	503
II.20.1	Crisis of National Identity .....	503
II.20.2	Ukrainian Nationalism: A Defensive Patriotism.....	509

### **III The Parliamentary Change of Power in Kyiv**

III.1	A Parliamentary Seizure of Power.....	511
III.1.1	Change of Power by “Emergency Legislation” .....	511
III.1.2	Oleksandr Turchynov: The New President of the Verkhovna Rada .....	513
III.1.3	The “Removal from Office” of President Yanukovych .....	515
III.1.4	Parliamentary Safeguarding of Power.....	520
III.1.5	Oleksandr Turchynov Election as Interim President by Parliament.....	521
III.1.6	Repeal of the Language Law The “Original Sin” of the New Power .....	522
III.1.7	The “Peace Agreement” of February 21 Maculature .....	524
III.2	Yuliya Tymoshenko and the “Maidan” .....	526
III.2.1	“To the Ukrainian People”: Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Message from Prison.....	526
III.2.2	Yuliya Tymoshenko: The Ukrainian Hopeful of the European Union.....	527
III.2.3	Release of Yuliya Tymoshenko through Legal Amendment.....	528
III.2.4	“Freedom for Yuliya, but Not Power!”: Tymoshenko on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti.....	530
III.3	On the Political Stage: The Old Performance .....	534

III.3.1	The First Government of Prime Minister Yatsenyuk: A “Suicide Mission” .....	534
III.3.2	The “Maidan Quota” in the Government.....	537
III.4	The “Maidan” and the New Power .....	540
III.4.1	“The Moor May Go” .....	540
III.4.2	“Lustration!” .....	543
III.5	The International Reaction to the Change of Power in Kyiv .....	548
III.5.1	Prompt Recognition in the West.....	548
III.5.2	The Reaction in Moscow “Coup d’État” .....	549
III.6	The “Post-Maidan” Revolutionary Afterpains.....	557
III.6.1	The Tent Village on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti Shelter for the Homeless? .....	557
III.6.2	The Peaceful Evacuation of the Protest Village on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti .....	559
III.7	The Question of the Legitimacy of the “Maidan” .....	564
III.7.1	A “Revolution of Dignity” .....	564
III.8	The Democratic Legitimization of the “Maidan” through Elections.....	568
III.8.1	The Early Presidential Election of May 25, 2014.....	568
III.8.2	Petro Poroshenko The Real Winner of the “Maidan” .....	570
III.8.3	The Parliamentary Elections of October 26, 2014 .....	576
III.8.4	The “Maidan Parties”: Electoral Victories and Defeats in the Patriotic Camp .....	584
III.8.5	The “Anti-Maidan Parties”: In Opposition .....	590
III.8.6	From the Barricades to the Parliament: The ‘Children of the Revolution of Dignity’ .....	598
III.8.7	The Election Results in “the East” .....	602
III.8.8	The International Election Observation: “A Step Forward” .....	606
III.8.9	The European Union: “Victory for Democracy” .....	609
III.8.10	Moscow Putin’s Lament .....	609
III.9	The New Parliament of the VIIIth Legislature .....	611
III.9.1	Power Relations in the New Parliament: Number of Seats Held by Political Parties and their Factions .....	611
III.9.2	The New (Governmental) Coalition “European Ukraine” .....	612
III.9.3	The “Old Order” Restored.....	615

III.10 Solving the “Maidan Massacre”: Obfuscation by the New Government?.....	619
III.10.1 The “Maidan Massacre”: Unpunished.....	619
III.10.2 The Black Company of the Berkut Riot Police: The Main Suspect.....	623
III.10.3 Obstruction of Investigations “From Above”? .....	625
III.10.4 Fatal Shooting of Militiamen.....	642
III.10.5 Moscow’s Invisible Hand .....	647
III.10.6 The Council of Europe “No Substantial Progress” in the Maidan Investigations.....	650
III.11 The “Maidan Massacre”: A “False Flag” Operation? .....	652
III.11.1 The Disconcerting Impressions of the Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet.....	653
III.11.2 The “Story” of the British Journalist Gabriel Gatehouse...658	
III.11.3 The “Monitor” Report by Stefan Stuchlik Fake News in Germany’s Public Service Broadcasting .....	660
III.11.4 The “Maidan Massacre”: A “Planned Operation of the Opposition”: The Conspiracy Theory of the Ukrainian-Canadian Political Scientist Ivan Katchanovski .....	665
III.12 The “Maidan Criminal Case” Closing of the Investigation? .....	675
III.13 Addendum: The Prisoner Exchange of December 19, 2019	
Murderers for Political Prisoners .....	679
III.13.1 Exchange at the Expense of Justice? .....	679
III.13.2 The “Maidan Massacre”: Unatoned Forever?.....	684
III.13.3 “Revanchist” Attack on the “Maidan” Narrative.....	693



# Preface to the English Edition

## Ukraine's War of Independence

### February 24, 2022: Ukraine's Fateful Day

Since the victory of the “Maidan”, the popular uprising against the kleptocratic regime of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich at the end of February 2014, a Russian military invasion has hovered over Ukraine like a sword of Damocles. Eight years later, on February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin cut the silken thread; with an army of 175,000 men, he invaded Ukraine.

The long path from 2013 to February 24, 2022, the actual “fateful day” of Ukraine, is described in the present two volumes—“Ukraine's Fateful Years 2013–2019”—especially in Part VI of the 2nd volume: “Russia's Hybrid Aggression against Ukraine”. The goal of this path, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, was not predicted *expressis verbis* by the author, but this turn was also not entirely excluded—although he himself considered a different development more probable. (See Chapter VII.14 to Chapter VII.16).

The manuscript of the German version of “Ukraine's Fateful Years” was completed in February 2020; two years later there is war in Ukraine. All “Kremlinologists”, experts as well as politicians, Western as well as Ukrainian, did not expect such a military invasion. It surprised and shocked the whole world.

The U.S. had expressed concern about Russia's war preparations many weeks before Putin's declaration of war, but American warnings were disregarded.<sup>1</sup> On February 18, U.S. President Biden personally told the world that Putin had made the decision to invade Ukraine. But even Ukrainian President Zelensky did not want to hear the warnings about a Russian attack, as Biden himself told.<sup>2</sup>

The numerous conjectures—including those of the author—about the intentions of Russian President Putin proved to be wastepaper, when he decided to solve *his* Ukraine problem militarily (probably) in the fall of 2021. Since his plan—the author suspects—to influence Ukraine's internal and external orientation by implementing the “Minsk Agreement” (“Minsk II”<sup>3</sup>) did not work out,

---

1 Ever since the U.S. war of aggression against Iraq, which was justified by untrue claims, Europeans have distrusted “information” from U.S. intelligence agencies.

2 The Russian-Belarusian military maneuver “Zapad-2021” (“West”), which took place from September 10 to 16, 2021—without Western observers—could be recognized in retrospect, but also already in its course, especially in the Russian troop deployments after its official end, as a preparation for the war of aggression against Ukraine. A clear indication, among other things, was the provision of large quantities of blood reserves (blood bags) near the border.

3 Specifically, by enshrining extensive autonomy for the southeast of Ukraine's Donbas region, occupied by Russia (since 2014) but remaining part of Ukraine. In the “Minsk Agreement” (“Minsk II”), Putin had assigned to the two so-called People's Republics “DNR” and “LNR”



Putin lost “patience”; he is now attempting a violent achievement of his overall goal, namely the subjugation of Ukraine under Moscow’s rule.

Similarly to 2014 – when he took advantage of the temporary impotence of the Ukrainian state<sup>4</sup> and annexed Crimea without encountering serious counter-measures from “the West” – Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to have seized an opportunity in 2022 that he perceived as favorable. Speculative answers to the question “why now?” may lie in Putin’s presumed perceptions: The U.S. is weak, its president an old man. The withdrawal of the world’s most modern army from Afghanistan, where it could not defeat the Taliban in 20 years of war, was tantamount to an escape. And in general, the U.S. is tired of its role as “world policeman.”

NATO is “brain dead”, French President Emmanuel Macron had stated in an interview with the British magazine “The Economist” in November 2019. Yet Putin insists that Russian security interests are threatened as a result of NATO’s encirclement of Russia: In reality, the narrative of “encirclement” was merely a pretext for Russia’s planned westward expansion, specifically a pretext to justify the intended submission of Ukraine.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO seemed obsolete. Its eastward expansion did not pose a threat to Russia – at most, Moscow was (rightly) irritated by U.S. unilateral moves such as the planned construction of a *national* U.S. (not “Euro-Atlantic”) missile defense system in Poland (and the Czech Republic). This American operation was also carried out under a pretext, namely the defense against Iranian missiles. Yet 30 years after the end of the Cold War, NATO has regained its *raison d’être*, indeed existential necessity – revived by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; in itself, Russia should be interested in the slow demise of “brain-dead” NATO. In the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, NATO committed itself not to permanently station military forces in countries that would join NATO after 1999. Russia is now practically forcing NATO to revoke that commitment.

The European Union is divided. Euro-skeptical national populism is spreading in all member states. In the weeks leading up to the Russian military aggression, there was no clear commitment to support Ukraine in the case of invasion by the Russian army. Instead of deterrence, the EU’s leaders practiced “appeasement” – as the British and French prime ministers did in 1938 – appeasing the belligerent dictator in the Moscow Kremlin: for Putin, a demonstration of weakness. Faced with dissension and half-heartedness on the part of “The West”, Putin thought he could undertake a blitzkrieg – a “special military operation,” as he had the war officially called – without encountering serious Western opposition. The opportunity seemed favorable – as with the annexation of

---

in the Donbas the role of a team of two Trojan horses, which he wanted to use as levers of influence within the Ukrainian state in order to gain control over the whole of Ukraine.

4 As a result of the change of power in Kyiv and because of the scrapped state of the Ukrainian armed forces.

Crimea in 2014—especially since the “Beijing 2022 Olympic Games” (February 4–20, 2022) diverted the attention of the world public.

However, visible to the whole world, Putin achieved the opposite of what he expected to achieve through his war of aggression against Ukraine: The “aged” president of the “degenerate” (Adolf Hitler) USA, Joseph (“Joe”) Biden, turned out to be—despite initial restraint easing the anxieties of the American people (see below)—the most determined and energetic opponent of Putin and the “healer” of American-European “fractures”. The widespread critical attitude toward the U.S. in Europe until February 24, 2022 (to which, however, U.S. administrations, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon / because of the Vietnam War 1955–1975; George W. Bush / because of the war on Iraq and Donald Trump in every respect)<sup>5</sup> have made their contribution) gave way to a new unity in the face of Russia’s aggression. Putin’s expectation of being able to drive a wedge between Europe and America proved deceptive. Since taking office, U.S. President Biden has sought to close ranks with Europe once again. Transatlantic relations are now closer than at any time since the end of the Cold War; Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has welded the Atlantic defense alliance, which had become fragile, together again.

NATO proved far from “brain dead.” At its June 29, 2022 summit in Madrid, NATO updated its “Strategic Concept” (last time in 2010) with a fundamental shift in priorities and a new perception of threat: NATO identified Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to the peace and security of its member countries. China was classified as a “strategic challenge” for the first time. In the face of Russian aggressiveness, even Sweden, which has been neutral for 200 years, and Finland are taking refuge under NATO’s protective umbrella; both countries were welcomed in Madrid. And the European Union, which for two decades stalled Ukraine’s desire for membership—out of “consideration” for Russia—with hollow phrases such as that of the “open door” and “Ukraine belonging to the European family”, and which did not even want to give Ukraine the prospect of eventual membership in the preamble of the agreement on its association,<sup>6</sup> decided after the Russian invasion to give the victim the status of an “accession candidate”.

The “Euro-Maidan” in the winter of 2013 / 2014 was the most impressive demonstration “for Europe” in the entire history of the European Union. No candidate deserves admission to the EU more than Ukraine. At its summit on June 23, 2022, Ukraine (as well as Moldova) was officially accepted into the circle of accession candidates with the (long-overdue) unanimous decision of the 27 member states. President Zelensky had repeatedly demanded such a message

---

5 The author admits to having also been critical of U.S. global hegemony.

6 Reasons (some of them valid) were advanced, such as rampant corruption, which, however, was not an obstacle when Romania and Bulgaria were admitted. In reality, the issue was the shifts in the EU’s financial structure, which would result from Ukraine’s membership: net recipients would become net payers.

from the EU in view of the Russian war against his country – also to show the more than 40 million citizens of his country that the fight for freedom is worthwhile.

Apart from these misperceptions about the West’s unity and determination, Russian President Putin underestimated (as did the West) Ukraine’s will to resist, the fighting spirit and fighting strength with which Ukrainians are fighting back. In his assessment of the West’s reaction to his war against Ukraine, Putin was probably deceived by his experience in the case of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and in the following case of Russia’s covert aggression in the Donbas; both times the West contented itself with completely ineffective personalized and economic sanctions.

Regarding the hot “reception” of the Russian (“liberation”) army in Ukraine, Putin may have been a victim of misinformation by his advisors (e.g. Sergei Karaganov), his agents on the ground, and “pro-Russian” Ukrainian politicians (e.g. Viktor Medvedchuk). Self-deception cannot be ruled out either: his idea of Russians and Ukrainians being “one people” does not correspond to reality. Putin has probably never understood the changes in Ukrainian society since the independence of the Ukrainian state: The outward orientation of the majority of the Ukrainian population toward the West and the resulting turning away from Russia, the internalization of democracy – even if it is (still) deficient – are reality. Putin possibly believed himself that Ukraine wanted “reunification” with Russia, or he did not care, just as he does not care about the fate of the Russian people. And because Ukraine does not want to be the “smaller brother” (grammatically actually “sister”) of the “bigger brother”, Putin acts according to the motto: “And if you don’t want to be my brother, then I’ll smash your skull” (a German proverb), and pursues the subjugation of Ukraine with military force.

### **China: On Hold**

However, Putin did not become a “pariah on the international stage” as which Biden wants to see him. The “Global South” did not condemn Russia and did not join the sanctions of the West. With foresight, Russia revived relations with the “Third World” that had been severed after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 – and established a special relationship with China.

As a result of the severance of its relations with the West, Russia will inevitably become even more dependent on China, Estonian journalist Kadri Liik writes.<sup>7</sup> In order to achieve the subjugation of Ukraine, Putin has undermined his own future position in the global power structure, she argues. In fact, China dictates to the Russian Federation the price of the raw materials it imports from Siberia; the time will come when it will not pay for oil, gas – and wood – from neighboring Siberia at all, the author assumes. China does not invest in Russia

---

7 Kadri Liik is “senior policy fellow” at the “European Council on Foreign Relations”.

in technically sophisticated and promising areas; it contents itself to attack in rhetorical solidarity the West in unison with Russia.

The author sees “the West”, namely the European Union, and “the East”, specifically the Russian Federation, being pushed to the periphery of the “Middle Kingdom” in the course of the “Chinese Century” (See Part VII of Volume 2: “Pax Sinica” – the Pacification of Eurasia by China”). If the “descending” powers, the USA and the EU – together with the RF – do not unite to form an “anti-Chinese wall”, they will be dominated by the new world power. In the foreseeable future, China will be the decisive factor fomenting or ending regional conflicts such as the current renewed “East-West conflict” in its own interest.

The author sticks to his assessment that the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be the “Chinese Seculum” (See Part VII of the 2nd volume: “Pax Sinica”). In the Russian war against Ukraine, China is (still) holding back; this suggests that it does not yet feel sufficiently equipped for the role of “world policeman” – i.e., taking over the legacy of the United States of America. Obviously, however, the war of its Russian “partner” irritates the Chinese leadership, because it is setting back the peaceful conquest of the world through global infrastructure projects (“Belt and Road Initiative”; see Chapter VII.4 in Volume 2). Though China attaches great importance to a close political relationship with Russia (apart from Xi Jinping’s and Putin’s shared aversion to U.S. global hegemony), the importance of economic relations with the U.S. still seems to prevail. World domination by the “Middle Kingdom” is not “planned” until 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

### **Putin’s February 24 Declaration of War**

In the televised speech in which Putin announced the attack on Ukraine, he repeated the lie, that the Ukrainian government had been “mistreating and murdering” people for years.<sup>8</sup> The speech Putin delivered at 6 a.m. on February 24, 2022, is reminiscent of Hitler’s September 1, 1939 speech to the German Reichstag (Parliament), broadcast on Greater German Radio (“Grossdeutscher Rundfunk”), on the occasion of the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, thereby triggering World War II. Hitler justified the attack on Poland (“Since 5.45 a.m. we are now shooting back!”) by saying that the German minority living in Poland was being disenfranchised and mistreated. He stated that he had often tried to change these conditions by peaceful proposals. The parallels – like those to the “Sudeten crisis” of 1938 – are striking.

Putin expressed worries and concerns “about these fundamental threats that [...] are directed against our country by irresponsible politicians in the West. I am referring to the expansion of the NATO bloc to the east [...] the war machine

---

8 February 24, 2022, source: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843> ZEIT ONLINE; <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2022-02/wladimir-putin-rede-militaereinsatz-ukraine-wortlaut>.

is on the move, it is approaching our borders.” Over the past 30 years he had persistently and patiently tried to reach an agreement with the leading NATO countries on the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. Instead, Putin said, they have broken the promise to our country not to expand NATO an inch further east. [...] “They have created [...] on the territories adjacent to us—I emphasize, on our own historic territories—an ‘Anti-Russia’ hostile to us [...] placed under complete external control.” The West’s so-called “policy of containment” is “ultimately a matter of life and death for Russia, a matter of our historical future as a nation ...”.

The two Donbas People’s Republics, he said, have asked Russia for help. “Circumstances demand that we act decisively and immediately.” In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter—the right to self-defense—and in accordance with the treaties of friendship and assistance ratified by the Federation Assembly with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic, he had decided to conduct a “special military operation”. “We do not intend to occupy the whole of Ukraine, but to demilitarize it,” declared Putin, a notorious liar; experience shows that the exact opposite of what he says is the case. The goal of the Russian special operation, Putin said, is to protect the people who have been mistreated and murdered by the Kyiv regime for eight years. “To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine and bring to justice those who committed numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including Russian citizens.” Russia cannot feel secure, develop and exist if it is constantly threatened by Ukraine, Putin said—a *casus belli* that cannot be surpassed in absurdity. In reality, the point is that Russia cannot develop into a great empire again unless it recaptures Ukraine. “Russian policy is based on freedom,” says the man who tramples on freedom in his own country. “And we consider it important that this right can be exercised by all peoples living on the territory of today’s Ukraine.” Putin’s mendacity knows no bounds. Then Putin addressed the Ukrainian military: “The Ukrainian military has sworn allegiance to its people, not to the anti-people junta that is plundering Ukraine.” “Dear comrades!” he appealed to Ukrainian soldiers:

Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight against the Nazis to defend our common fatherland so that today’s neo-Nazis could take power in Ukraine. I urge you not to carry out criminal orders, to lay down your arms immediately and go home. All soldiers of the Ukrainian army who comply with this demand will be allowed to leave the war zone and return to their families without hindrance.

“We respect the sovereignty of all newly emerged countries in the post-Soviet space,” Putin declared; the “Newly Independent States” know, that Putin means the opposite. In the case of Ukraine, Putin has exposed his lie already by his invasion. In the spirit of Hitler, Putin calls for “cohesion of society, its willingness to consolidate and join all forces to move forward. Strength is always needed.” Hitler made it sound like this on September 1, 1939: “If we form this

community, closely conspired, determined to do everything, never willing to capitulate, then our will can master every adversity.”<sup>9</sup> The enemy, the United States, is an “empire of lies”, Putin said. “The heart of its politics is above all brute force.” And with unsurpassable hypocrisy, dictator Putin, who seeks to maintain his power through lies and violence, proclaims “that true power lies in justice and truth, which are on our side.”

Turning to the West, Putin threatened, “Now a few important, very important words for those for whom the temptation might arise to interfere in events from the side. [...] Whoever tries to obstruct us [...] must know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead to consequences that they have never experienced in their history.” Hitler was more restrained in this respect; in his declaration of war on September 1, 1939, he merely feigned “incomprehension” that the Western European states, meaning Great Britain and France, were “interfering in the conflict.”

### **Putin’s War in Ukraine**

The war in Ukraine is Putin’s war, just as World War II was Hitler’s war—quite different from World War I, when the political actors “sleepwalked” (Christopher Clark)<sup>10</sup> into the “primordial catastrophe” (George F. Kennan)<sup>11</sup> of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Before his assassination (February 27, 2015), Russian dissident Boris Nemtsov had collected material for a report on Putin’s readiness for war under the title “Putin. War”.

Putin’s war is a war of aggression, which is forbidden in principle under modern international law. (Briand-Kellogg Pact 1928; Article 2, No. 4 of the UN Charter of 1945; Rome Statute, legal basis of the International Criminal Court). Consequently, Ukraine is fighting a defensive war that is legitimate under international law. Putin’s war in Ukraine is not just a war of conquest; it is a war of extermination—like Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union. It is literally about Ukraine’s very existence; Ukraine is to be wiped off the European map, according to Putin’s will. Dmitrii Medvedev, currently Deputy Head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (sovet bezopasnosti R F) and former (interim) president, publicly expressed doubts about Ukraine’s future existence.

But it is not just about the Ukrainian state; it is about the national identity of Ukrainians. The goal of the war of extermination is the eradication of the Ukrainian language, the eradication of Ukrainian culture: a cultural genocide.

---

9 [https://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument\\_de&dokument=0209\\_pol&object=translation&l=de](https://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0209_pol&object=translation&l=de).

10 Christopher Clark: *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*; New York (Harper Collins) 2013. Sir Christopher Munro Clark is an Australian historian living in the United Kingdom. Professor Clark teaches modern European history at St. Catharine’s College, Cambridge.

11 In 1979, U.S. historian and diplomat George F. Kennan called World War I “the great seminal catastrophe of this century.”

Hence the targeted attacks on Ukraine's material cultural heritage, the destruction of churches, museums, archives and monuments. In Mariupol, after taking the city, the Russian occupiers burned books from the library of the Petro Mohyla Cathedral, among them unique Ukrainian-language works. The "book burning" took place at the behest of a Moscow delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church. Local collaborators were instructed to pray for the Russian soldiers.

Putin's war in Ukraine is also a colonial war in the tradition of the Russian Empire. In Putin's imagined world, Ukraine is part of the "Russian soil" (*Russkaya zemlya*) which Russia is "reclaiming" in this war, as he himself said in his speech at the launch of the Russian invasion on February 24. Putin's war in Ukraine is—also—a proxy war, a war against the U.S. and against the EU (which in his view is a collection of "satellite states of the U.S."). In an insolent letter to Washington, Putin called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, especially their nuclear weapons, from Europe. And Putin's war against Ukraine is also a war against the international order established after World War II, against the UN Charter and against international law—and against the European order established after the end of the "Cold War", as established in the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe"<sup>12</sup> on November 21, 1990. For German political scientist Herfried Münkler, it is clear that Putin "seeks a large-scale revision of the European order"; it is this motive that drives Putin above all others.

This war is a "clash of orders," a war by Russia against Western civilization, against the rule-based international order. It is a return to the "right of the stronger", juridically inflated in Carl Schmitt's concept of sovereignty: "Sovereign is he who decides on the state of emergency." Many Russian political scientists feel that Carl Schmitt had to be read in order to understand Putin's politics, says Russian journalist Maxim Trudolyubov.<sup>13</sup> Putin's "entire power is based on the state of emergency." The "sovereign" state does not need to abide by any rules.

### **No Choice between "War and Peace"**

After its hundred-year struggle for freedom against Poland and the "Soviet power" (*sovetskaya vlast*), Ukraine was virtually given independence in 1991 by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Now Putin's neo-imperialist Russia is imposing a real war of independence on Ukraine.

---

12 The "Charter of Paris (for a New Europe)" of November 21, 1990 is a fundamental agreement on the creation of a new peaceful order in Europe after the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War. It was signed as the final document of the CSCE Special Summit Conference by 32 European countries, including the Soviet Union, as well as the United States and Canada. The leaders of the participating states declared an end to the division of Europe, committed themselves to democracy as the only legitimate form of government, and assured their peoples that human rights and fundamental freedoms would be guaranteed.

13 Maxim Trudolyubov is a Senior Fellow at the Kennan Institute and Editor-at-Large of *Meduza*. *Meduza* is a bilingual (Russian and English) Internet newspaper based in Riga, Latvia. It was founded in October 2014 by the former editor-in-chief of *Lenta.ru*, Galina Timchenko, from his position of exile.

Ukraine does not have a choice between war and peace. For Ukraine, this war is about being or not being, literally about its existence. If Russia wins this war, Ukraine will not live on albeit amputated, as Germany did after the two lost world wars; Putin will wipe Ukraine off the map. And Putin is determined to win his war. He wants to finally eradicate Ukraine, the source of democratic infection, which has been a source of contagion for Russia since the Orange Revolution in 2004, threatening his regime; Putin is seeking a “final solution to the Ukraine question” — using a Nazi term. Therefore, Ukraine will fight as long as a Ukrainian men or women (10% of the fighting troops are female soldiers) are ready to fight with a weapon in their hands.<sup>14</sup> “Peace against land,” i.e., against land captured by the Russian army east and south of any cease-fire line, is not a sustainable “solution” for Ukraine, should it be forced upon it by war-weary Western allies. Putin would attack Ukraine again at the next favorable opportunity, which he would create himself; he will not stop conducting “special military operations” against Ukraine until he has brought the entire country under his control.

Western politicians repeat *their* war goal for Ukraine with the tautological formula: “Ukraine must not lose” or “Russia must not win.” If Putin succeeds with his war of aggression, then war will again become a “normal” foreign policy operation: the “continuation of politics by other means” (Carl von Clausewitz<sup>15</sup>). If Ukraine loses this war, Putin will carry his war to Moldova; Georgia will be the next target. Whether he will attack the Baltic states depends on the credibility of NATO’s deterrence. Putin’s army must be brought to a halt in the theater of war in Ukraine with the combined forces of Ukraine (fighters) and the West (weapons). “They (the West) want to defeat us on the battlefield [...] May they try” [...] we haven’t even really started yet”, Putin threatened.”<sup>16</sup>

If Russia “wins,” Ukraine will be literally “lost.” Putin will turn Ukraine into an “Archipelago GuLag” (Alexander Solzhenitsyn<sup>17</sup>). The number of refugees proves how real Ukrainians believe this prospect to be: as of mid-June 2022, 6 million Ukrainians, mostly women and children, have fled to the West;<sup>18</sup> by the end of 2022, the UNHCR expects the number to be 8.3 million: one-fifth of the country’s population.

Based on Putin’s military war goal, the subjugation of all of Ukraine, “winning the war” for Ukraine means preventing by any means Putin from bringing the country, even partially, under his control. From this war goal of Ukraine must follow the “war goal of the West” (USA and Europe, NATO): Complete

---

14 Of course, the Russian occupation forces will not lack “collaborators”.

15 Paraphrasing the title of subchapter 24, chapter 1, book 1 of Carl von Clausewitz’s (unfinished) magnum opus, *On War*: “War is a mere continuation of politics by other means”.

16 “My vzerez poka eshcho ne nachinali”; <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/07/7/7356907/>. Source: RIA novosti 07.07.2022.

17 Alexandr Izaevich Solzhenitsyn: *Archipelag GULAG*; first published in 1973.

18 Conscript men between 18 and 60 years old are not allowed to leave the country. Many who left the country before February 24 returned to fight.



ousting of all Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. NATO members simply cannot demand anything else from Ukraine, having repeatedly stated emphatically that they would defend every square inch of NATO territory against a Russian attack. This means a “limited” defeat of Russia, which for obvious reasons must not be followed by a Ukrainian counterattack on Russian territory — something Ukraine’s Western allies would hardly allow for fear of (nuclear) escalation. While Ukrainian President Zelensky has in mind Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory, Western allies leave open the question of which “border” they mean:

1. the status quo ante (before February 24, 2022) — i.e., the “line of contact” between the part of the Donbas that has remained under Kyiv control and the internationally unrecognized “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.”
2. recapture of the secessionist territories in the Donbas already occupied by Russia since 2014, the so-called “DNR” and “LNR”.
3. “recapture of Crimea” was mentioned by Ukrainian President Zelensky as a war goal. For this war goal, however, Ukraine is unlikely to find military support in the West; Crimea’s annexation by Russia will remain unrecognized under international law, as a *de facto* “frozen conflict”, especially since the goal of military “recapture” is unrealistic in the highest degree.

On the 135th day of the war, July 9, 2022, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov listed three possible scenarios for ending the war:

1. deployment of Ukraine’s armed forces to the positions they held until February 24 and negotiations with the Russian Federation on the status of “Certain Rayons of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts”<sup>19</sup> and Crimea — with the participation of the West.
2. attrition of the Russian army. In this case, the war would last until the end of 2022, possibly until the beginning of next year.
3. disintegration of the Russian Federation.

The —hoped for— third scenario is certainly the least likely. The price of recapturing territories lost to Russia is high: Zelensky himself cited the figure of 200 to 300 fallen soldiers — daily, and on this basis an estimated 1000 wounded. But in the event of a Russian victory, the number of soldiers and civilians killed would be many times higher. “Liberation” of Russian-speaking Ukrainians from the tyranny of Ukraine’s “Nazi” leadership does not mean “freedom” as promised in Russian war propaganda, but murder of civilians, destruction of their homes, bombing of civilian infrastructure.

---

19 Ukraine’s official language regime for the secessionist territories in Donbas: “Okremi raioni Donetskoyi ta Luhanskoyi oblastei” / ORDLO.

In areas conquered by Russian troops, "cleansing" ("chistka") is already taking place; politically disagreeable people, state officials, members of "patriotic" parties, etc., are being shot or deported. Russia has experience with deportation of whole peoples to Siberia and Central Asia (Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ukrainians (from Western Ukraine after the execution of Stalin-Hitler pact, Germans / Volga). Not only for the fight of the Ukrainian army against the Russian aggressor, the West must continue to supply weapons, but also for the protection of the civilian population from the Russian soldateska, which is moving, murdering, plundering and raping through conquered places (keywords: Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka). In the current situation, the delivery of weapons is "humanitarian aid" (as a Ukrainian journalist explained to her German colleague).

The West has a "responsibility" to protect Ukraine under international law. In view of the war crimes committed against the civilian population, the imperative of "humanitarian intervention" under international law applies. Only the delivery of modern weapons shortens the war – and thus saves lives.

### **"Rump Ukraine"**

Putin obviously counted on being able to capture the Ukrainian capital Kyiv in a "blitzkrieg," depose Ukrainian President Zelensky, bring about a pro-Russian change of government, and thus gain control over all of Ukraine. After the initial military failure, the Russian army conquered a land bridge between Russia (from Taganrog Bay in Rostov-on-Don Oblast in southern Russia to the regional capital city of Kherson through the complete capture and de facto annexation (military-civilian occupation administration) of Kherson oblast, located north of the Crimean Peninsula, which is separated by 300 kilometers of Ukrainian territory under international law.

Putin's further military goal in Ukraine, which has certainly not been abandoned, is to conquer the Odessa oblast and establish a land link as far as the Moldovan secessionist territory of "Transnistria", which has been under Russian control since its de facto independence (1992) (14th Russian Army). Since the withdrawal of Russian troops from the vicinity of Kyiv, Russian has focused on a war of attrition in eastern Ukraine, on the complete conquest of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Donbas (about a third of which had already been under Russian control since 2014). If the military situation were to change in Russia's favor, the conquest of all of Ukraine is on the horizon. Predictably, in the event of a Russian victory, Ukraine will be split into annexed parts in the east (possibly including Kharkiv) and south (possibly including Odessa) and pseudo-autonomous entities in "Rump Ukraine", which would be cut off from the sea.

As a next step the breakup of "Rump Ukraine" can be expected – just as the breakup of the "Rest-Tschechei" ("Rump Czechia") after the annexation of the Sudeten-Land by Hitler in March 1939.

## Russian War Crimes

“Victors are not judged,” Empress Catherine II is said to have said — a statement that holds true to this day.<sup>20</sup> The President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin has even awarded the unit of his army, that ravaged the small town of Bucha near Kyiv, with the honorary title of “Guard Unit” (“gvardeiskoi”) for its war crimes — officially “for heroism [...] in combat operations to protect the fatherland and state interests.”<sup>21</sup>

War crimes are part of Russian warfare. Targeted destruction of Ukrainian cities and burying their inhabitants under the rubble is part of the Russian “art of war”. War crimes committed by Russian soldiers, systematically and individually, condoned or ordered by officers, are part of the military “craft.” Murder and rape, robbery and looting<sup>22</sup> are part of the everyday military life of the Russian army in Ukraine.

Police found the bodies of 1314 civilians murdered by Russian soldiers in Kyiv oblast alone. In the towns of Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka, the Russian soldiery raged like lansquenets in the Thirty Years’ War; witnessed was rape and murder of parents in front of their children, violence against women and girls from eight to 80 years old — for fun and out of boredom.<sup>23</sup> The unit of the regular Russian Army involved in the atrocities in Bucha was identified: it is the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 35th Army (64-i otdelnaya motostrelkovaya brigada), troop unit 51460, stationed in the village of Knyaze-Volkonskoye in the Military District East in Khabarovsk oblast. This unit is notorious for suicides and desertions among conscripted soldiers in peacetime. In the port city of Mariupol, the Russian army killed 20,000 people in two months. The supreme war criminal in the Kremlin, President Putin systematically wages war against Ukrainian civilians. The daily death toll is not “collateral damage”; the attacks on civilian targets are carried out by precision-guided cruise missiles.<sup>24</sup> Moscow’s regular claims following these attacks, that these missiles targeted military objects, are lies.

---

20 Like Russia, the U.S. has not signed the “Rome Statute,” the treaty basis of the International Criminal Court. Like Russia, the USA, the initiators of the “Nuremberg Trials”, protect their own war criminals from international justice

21 <https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/512650-za-reznyu-v-buche-putin-prisvoil-zvanie-gvardeyskoy-64-motostrelkovoy-brigade-foto>.

22 Items stolen from Ukrainian houses and apartments in Kyiv oblast were hawked at bazaars in neighboring Belarus; via cell phone, women back home placed “orders” (for example, shoe size) to looting soldiers in Ukraine for stolen items to bring home. The Russian soldiers believe that Putin allowed them to loot, according to phone calls intercepted by the Ukrainian security service, SBU. In any case, they can be sure of complete impunity. One woman “allowed” her husband to rape Ukrainian women; however, he should use a condom. In the soldiers’ chats with their families, sentimentality mixes with cynicism.

23 “Vpershe take bachymo.” In Dekoder, 03.06.2022, referring to the Russian online medium “Holod”; <https://www.dekoder.org/de/article/krieg-ukraine-gewalt-folter-armee>.

24 Cruise missile: unmanned military missile that steers itself to the target, where it detonates a warhead.

Whether there will ever be a trial against the main war criminals, a “Nuremberg II”, is unlikely.<sup>25</sup>

### Defense of Europe through Military Support of Ukraine

The conquest of all of Ukraine is Putin’s ostensible military goal. But Putin wants more: he wants to destroy the European order that was established after the end of the Cold War – with Russia’s participation. He seeks Russian domination over all of Eastern and East-Central Europe, as it existed in the 19th century and in the wake of World War II. Therefore, the war in Ukraine is also a war against the European Union, in which the states of the former “Eastern Bloc” are united with “Western Europe”.

Having failed to reorganize Europe to include Russia in his interests – recall Moscow’s initiatives “Free Trade from Lisbon to Vladivostok” and “Pan-European Security Architecture from the Atlantic to the Pacific” (see Chapter VII.10 in Volume 2) – Putin now wants to ruin the European Union. By political and economic destabilization, by promoting national-populist movements, by propagating harmful fake news, by fomenting tensions between member countries, by indirectly promoting famine migration from Africa as a result of the war, and most recently by using natural gas as a weapon, he is pursuing the EU’s disintegration from within – just as his Soviet Union disintegrated three decades ago. During the war in Afghanistan (2001–2021), according to German Defense Minister Peter Struck (2002–2005), Germany was defended “in the Hindu Kush”; today, Europe is defended in Ukraine. Military support for Ukraine is an imperative of European security.<sup>26</sup>

Putin will wage war, no matter what the cost (to Russia). His paranoid mental state does not allow for retreat, let alone defeat. Therefore, the cost of war for Russia must be increased. Ukraine must be defended – “whatever it takes,” in the words of Mario Draghi, former president of the European Central Bank (2011–2019, who saved the Euro in its most serious crisis to date with this expression of determination in London in 2012). The West must maintain the supply of weapons to Ukraine “as long as it takes” (German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz).

Thus the West has not only a moral obligation to stand by Ukraine against the Russian aggressor; probably not for the USA, but certainly for the European Union its security is at stake, i.e. its very own vital interest. Shot down tanks and missiles had the slogan “On to Berlin! (“na Berlin!”) painted on them. Magomed

25 Christian Tomuschat: Russlands Ueberfall auf die Ukraine. Der Krieg und die Grundfragen des Rechts. (Russia’s Assault on Ukraine. The War and Basic Questions of Law), in: Osteuropa, Vol. 1-3, 2022, pp. 33-50, here: I, 2), pp. 41 ff.

26 After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Author published an article entitled: “The ‘Putin Doctrine’ – the End of European Security,” in Reiter, Erich (ed.): The Strategic Situation in the East of the EU; International Institute for Liberal Politics Vienna, May 2014, pp. 73–125; online publication; <https://docplayer.org/67125585-Erich-reiter-hg-die-strategische-lage-im-osten-der-eu.html>.

Daudov, the president of the parliament of the (autonomous) Chechen Republic, predicted a march to Berlin: “If Vladimir Putin doesn’t stop us, God willing, we will reach Berlin.” In the TV show “Evening with Vladimir Solovev” (“Večer s Vladimirom Solovevym”), Berlin is increasingly the target of Russian rhetoric: in 106 seconds, a nuclear missile would reach Berlin. Even if “Berlin” has not yet been named as a target by Putin, such statements reveal the spirit that prevails in Russia. The Berlin mantra—“Security only with, not against Russia”—no longer applies since February 24, 2022; now the task is to create “security against Russia”.

Ukraine is defending Europe on Ukrainian soil; by defending their freedom, Ukrainians are defending Europe’s freedom. And because the citizens of the European Union do not want to fight themselves, supplying weapons to the fighting Ukraine is the least the EU can do—and must do. All other aid, financial support for the Ukrainian budget, generous reception of Ukrainian refugees, and political support for Ukraine in international bodies, while important, are secondary as long as the war lasts.

### Nuclear Escalation

The fear in Europe—and also in the USA—of an escalation of the conventional war in Ukraine into a global nuclear Armageddon<sup>27</sup> is understandable. Inevitably, the question arises whether Putin is suicidal, whether he, who himself is rattling the nuclear saber, can be deterred by nuclear weapons, indeed whether the “balance of terror” still functions at all?<sup>28</sup> It is to be feared that Putin’s nature is similar to Hitler’s, who dragged Germany into his own downfall. A possible psychotic disturbance of his instinct for self-preservation could make Putin act according to the motto: “after me, the deluge.”

In Soviet times, the rulers in the Kremlin thought rationally in this regard; they were not suicidal. Today, paranoia reigns in the Moscow Kremlin; it is to be feared that the natural will to live is impaired. The West still hopes that Putin’s entourage is not tired of life, that for all the irrationality of their actions, there is still a vestige of sanity. Michael Gorbachev<sup>29</sup> declared in June 1991 that “the risk of global nuclear war has practically disappeared.” This specter has now been retrieved from the mothballs of history by Putin.

The West’s fear of nuclear escalation weakens its willingness to supply weapons to Ukraine; that is the purpose of Putin’s threats with Russia’s nuclear potential. But the conclusion to stop supplying weapons to Ukraine is wrong. Such a decision would not persuade Putin to end the war against Ukraine; on the contrary, it would encourage him to continue the conventional war.

---

27 Borrowing from Hebrew via Greek Harmageon. John, Apocalypse, chapter 16, verse 16.

28 MAD-Doktrine: mutually assured destruction.

29 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) from March 1985 to August 1991 and President of the Soviet Union from March 1990 to December 1991.

Claudia Major—the head of the security policy research group of the German “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik” / SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs) speaks of nuclear blackmail: already talking about nuclear weapons is a weapon. The nuclear threat is to be taken seriously, but no reason to panic. Nuclear weapons are not “weapons of warfare”, but “weapons of war prevention”. The use of nuclear weapons, even tactical ones, would be a “breach of civilization”. However, Putin is certainly not afraid of such a breach; the invasion of Ukraine already is a “breach of civilization”.

Putin has so far not “armed” Russian nuclear weapons—i.e., ordered the “stage 2” of combat readiness; he has so far not had the links in the chain of command, the “command links” established, in order to be able to give the launch order at all, to press the “red button,” explains Gustav Gressel, an expert on Eastern Europe and the military.<sup>30</sup>

Walter Slócombe, the former U.S. undersecretary of defense, does not consider such a “taboo-breaking,” the crossing of the “nuclear threshold,” entirely improbable in the event, that a military defeat poses an existential threat to Putin’s regime (“below 5%, but conceivable”). Putin might be inclined to shock Western public opinion with a demonstrative nuclear strike with limited damage.

### **Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Psychological Warfare**

A first use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia, Slócombe argues, must be followed immediately by a nuclear counterstrike—calibrated to reduce the risk of further escalation. If this did not happen, the credibility of deterrence, U.S. nuclear retaliation, would be weakened, not only among allies but also among Russians. And this would only make the feared nuclear war more likely. In this regard, a certain ambiguity in Western rhetoric is more deterrent than its unambiguity; ambiguity is called for regarding the nature and scope, conventional or nuclear, of the Western response to a Russian first strike.

The danger of Putin dropping tactical nuclear weapons—possibly as a threat over the Baltic Sea—is real. Richard K. Betts calls for planning for this contingency.<sup>31</sup> The danger would be highest if the war took a turn in favor of Ukraine. Betts also believes it is possible that, in order to avoid defeat, Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons against the Ukrainian army—“or set off a

30 Experte sieht bei “Illner” nur einen Ukraine-Ausweg—eine “krachende Niederlage” für Putin (Expert sees only one way out in Ukraine—a “resounding defeat” for Putin), in: Merkur.de. 20.05.2022; <https://www.merkur.de/politik/maybrit-illner-zdf-ukraine-russland-gressel-waffenlieferungen-eubeitritt-wiederaufbau-vonderleyen-zr-9156...>

31 Richard K. Betts: Thinking about the Unthinkable in Ukraine. What happens if Putin uses nuclear weapons? In Foreign Affairs, July 4, 2022; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-07-04/thinking-about-unthinkable-ukraine>. Richard Kevin Betts is an American political scientist (International Relations), currently “Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies” in the Department of Political Science and Director of the International Security Policy Program at the “School of International and Public Affairs” at Columbia University, New York.

symbolic explosion” over an empty space (the Baltic Sea?) to strike fear into the hearts of Ukrainians and its Western supporters. With the current Russian doctrine — “escalate to de-escalate” — Russia is imitating NATO’s Cold War concept of “flexible response,” which in principle was based on the option of intentional escalation—beginning with the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons as a means of stopping a Soviet invasion. Richard Betts advises against relying on Moscow’s restraint. Putin, a Russian, may be inclined to play “Russian roulette” with Washington, viewing a nuclear shock as an acceptable risk to end the war in Ukraine on his terms. To deter Putin from a nuclear gambit, the West must make it as credibly clear as possible that a Russian first use of nuclear weapons would not intimidate NATO but would result in a nuclear counterstrike, Betts advises. If the U.S. were to respond to a Russian first strike on Ukrainian territory with a more powerful counterstrike, it would inflict immense collateral damage on its Ukrainian “protégés”. (This was a serious problem for Germany during the Cold War.)

In the event of a nuclear first strike by Russia, NATO has two conflicting objectives: On the one hand, NATO will want to counter any strategic benefit Moscow might derive from a nuclear first strike. On the other hand, NATO will want to avoid further escalation. Hence the obvious need to maximally deter Moscow from a first use, Betts argues. NATO’s primary task, he says, is credible deterrence. Under no circumstances should the West show weakness. In doing so, however, Washington must keep threats vague enough to remain flexible. “Putin needs to be reminded again and again that nuclear war has no winner.”

The United States should make clear to the Kremlin that modern conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) precision weapons are superior to tactical nuclear weapons, because they can destroy Russian military objects in a more targeted manner than weapons of mass destruction. Direct *conventional* war between Russia and the United States appears weaker than nuclear retaliation, but it increases Russia’s fear of defeat rather than decreasing it. This would leave Russia’s eventual motivation for nuclear escalation unchanged. However, the advantage of a conventional option would be that the risk of nuclear escalation would be lower than with “inaction” or “nuclear retaliation” options, Betts concludes in his profound essay in *Foreign Affairs* in early July 2022.

### **Negotiations with Putin: A Foolish Hope**

Some Western politicians justify military support for Ukraine with the argument that it should enable Ukraine to gain a good negotiating position for an eventual peace deal. Anders Åslund, a vehement opponent of Western appeasement, calls the wish to negotiate with Putin “foolish”. Like Hitler, Putin feels no obligation to keep a promise. He justifies violations of international agreements with lies. Negotiations on territorial concessions are inevitable, says Charles Kupchan, special adviser to U.S. President Barack Obama. But cessions of territory are no guarantee against renewed Russian aggression, because Putin is not concerned

with territorial shares in Ukraine; he is concerned with the whole of Ukraine. Whenever Putin engages in negotiations, he does so “in bad faith,” with the intention of deception—as in Minsk in February 2015 (“Minsk II”<sup>32</sup>). He would indicate his eventual willingness to negotiate with the ulterior motive of softening the West’s resolve in supporting Ukraine.

The hope expressed by various quarters in the West—that the Russian war of conquest and annihilation can be brought to a face-saving end for Putin through territorial concessions in a negotiated peace—is an illusion, resulting from a false assessment of the ruler in the Kremlin. The Russian President’s Press Secretary, Dmitrii Peskov stated on July 3 (2022), that Kyiv must “accept (literally “ponjat’”, or understand) the conditions of the Russian Federation, agree with them and sit down at the negotiating table to fix them in a document. [...] It is the Western countries led by Washington that do not allow Ukrainians to even think about peace, let alone talk about peace...,” Peskov said. Commenting on Ukrainian President Zelensky’s call to the G-7 summit, on June 27, to do everything possible to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by the end of the year, Peskov said Ukraine could end the war within 24 hours if it laid down its arms and capitulated.

Mykhailo Podolyak, the adviser to the head of the Presidential Office (“OP”) of the Ukrainian President, commented that Ukraine would not end the war it did not start “by order.” Ukraine’s conditions for negotiations, he said, were an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of Russian troops (“Z troops”) from Ukraine, the return of abducted Ukrainian citizens, the extradition of war criminals, reparations, and recognition of Ukraine’s sovereign rights.

### **Appeasement: Dèjà Vu**

French President Macron’s ongoing telephone diplomacy and German Chancellor Scholz’ constant willingness to talk are counterproductive: they will not persuade Putin “to give in” (Angela Merkel). Appeasement did not dissuade Hitler from his intention to invade Poland back in 1939. After his attack on Poland, none of the appeasement politicians “talked” to Hitler again.

Before the Russian attack on Ukraine, and even after February 24, 2022, the leaders of Germany and France, the EU and the United States, and even the Secretary General of the United Nations, António Guterres, pursued classic appeasement policies toward Putin. Their leading representatives ignored the lesson of recent history, namely that appeasement of a belligerent tyrant only leads to the war, which it intended to be prevent. The memory of “Munich 1938” was as if erased. Out of “responsibility for the preservation of peace,” Scholz and Macron behaved like the British and French prime ministers in 1938, like Neville Chamberlain the one, and like Edouard Daladier the other.

---

32 See Chapter VI.12 to Chapter VI.19 in Volume 2.



French President Macron claimed that Putin was “isolated” (which is not at all the case in reality). Russia, he said, should not be “humiliated” so that “diplomatic talks” could take place once the fighting in Ukraine had come to an end.<sup>33</sup> In his closing speech at the conference on the future of Europe, President Macron said that Europe should never succumb to the temptation to humiliate Russia. “When peace returns to Europe, we must build a new security balance.” According to Zelensky, Macron had proposed to Ukraine to sacrifice part of its territory—in order to “help Putin save face.” “We want the Russian army to leave our country; we are not fighting on Russian soil. [...] We will not help Putin save face by paying for it with our territory,” the Ukrainian president replied to his French counterpart on the TV talk show “Porta a Porta” on Italian TV channel RAI.<sup>34</sup> The Elysée officially rejected Zelensky’s accusation, saying that the President of the Republic (Macron) had never discussed anything with Vladimir Poutine without President Zelensky’s consent, and had never demanded concessions from Ukraine. He had always said that it was up to the Ukrainians to decide on what terms they would negotiate with the Russians.

German President Steinmeier—as foreign minister an “appeasement politician” par excellence—apologized in a self-critical statement after Russia’s surprise invasion of Ukraine, while self-righteous former Chancellor Merkel saw no reason for self-criticism. In her first interview after leaving the chancellery with the “Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland” in early June 2022, she defended her Russia policy. In Bucharest in 2008, after the Russian-Georgian “Five-Day War,” she prevented the “NATO Action Plan,” i.e., candidate status for Ukraine, stating: “Criteria must be met by each state”, an unqualified justification; in reality, she was concerned with appeasing Putin, which the latter took for *carte blanche* for his “next target,” the annexation of Crimea.

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine opened Berlin’s eyes; but even after the “turning point” (“*Zeitenwende*”) proclaimed by the newly elected Chancellor Olaf Scholz, certain Berlin politicians still had sand in their eyes for a long time. At the Congress of German Catholics (“*Katholikentag*”) in Stuttgart on May 27, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz gave a speech in which he had called February 24, 2022, a “turning point in time.” But the awakening in German politics that this word promised, ebbed away in weeks of dithering over the supply of heavy weapons to Ukraine. Ahead of the summits of the EU (European Council on June 24 in Brussels), G-7 (on June 26 at Schloss Elmau / Bavaria) and NATO (on June 29 and 30 in Madrid), German Chancellor Olaf Scholz tried in

---

33 According to the French news magazine “Le Point” in an interview with the French regional press on June 3, 2022. <https://english.nv.ua/nation/macron-calls-for-not-humiliating-russia-speaks-of-isolated-putin-50247573.html>.

34 RAI Play, “Porta a Porta”, Intervista a Volodymyr Zelensky, 12/05/2022; <https://www.raiplay.it/video/2022/05/Intervista-a-Volodymyr-Zelensky---Porta-a-porta-12052022-84e5d3b3-012a-4842-b010-86>.

his government statement on June 22, 2022 to dispel the impression of hesitation he had created at home and abroad

Olaf Scholz' long-delayed visit to Kyiv finally took place—along with French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Romanian President Klaus Johannis—on June 16, 2022, the 113th day of the war. It probably took the devastation in the city of Irpin he visited—and pressure from Western allies—to finally persuade “Olaf Cunctator” Scholz to act more decisively on arms deliveries.

The concessions to the Kremlin that the West has made over the years have not prevented Putin from becoming the “greatest threat to world peace.” “The time has come to acknowledge the reality of the new Russia and abandon the path of appeasement,” Swedish economist Anders Åslund implores the West.<sup>35</sup>

### **“Blame the West”**

The widespread argument that the West is to blame, or partly to blame, for Putin's invasion of Ukraine is malicious. It is true that “The West”, the USA with the EU in tow, made many mistakes in dealing with Russia after the end of the Cold War. And Yes, the U.S. has waged wars of aggression that were not covered by the World Security Council. And Yes, the U.S. has committed war crimes—unpunished—in Vietnam, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. “In general, one has the impression that almost everywhere [...] where the U.S. goes to impose its order, bloody, non-healing wounds, boils of international terrorism and extremism are left behind” Putin said in his televised address on February 24, 2022—not entirely wrongly. But: all this does not justify Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine. “The misconduct of the West is not a justification of Russian misconduct,” explains German legal scholar Stefan Oeter (University of Hamburg); and “the violation of international law by certain Western countries does not entitle Russia to break international law by violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine,” Theodore Christakis, Professor of European and International Law, University Grenoble-Alpes, declares.

### **“Neutralization” of Ukraine**

Ukraine has been neutral since its state independence, i.e. for 30 years. It had no prospect of membership in NATO, and a majority of the population was opposed to joining NATO—until February 24, 2022. Putin was able to invade Ukraine precisely because it was not a member of NATO. On this point, Egon Bahr wrote back in 2005: “Historical experience teaches us that a power-political vacuum remains a vacuum only for a limited time, until it comes under the attraction of a stronger entity.”

---

35 Chairman of the International Advisory Council at the Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), Warsaw; former Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Finland and Sweden have drawn the consequences of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and abandoned their neutrality. German political scientist Herfried Münkler called for a neutral Ukraine with European security guarantees. But what are "European security guarantees" worth if Europe cannot guarantee itself security, and is still dependent on the U.S. umbrella of protection.<sup>36</sup> Only NATO can give Ukraine guarantees.

### German Appeals for Surrender

On April 29, 2022, the feminist and "Putin-understanding" Alice Schwarzer published in the magazine *Emma*, which she edits, an open letter from 28 cultural figures to Chancellor Scholz, in which they urge him to "do everything to ensure that a ceasefire can be reached as quickly as possible [...] and a compromise that both sides can accept." The letter reveals political naiveté: negotiations with Putin would be a mere sham; he would only be concerned with "reassuring" the West so that it would restrict arms deliveries to Ukraine and pressure Ukraine to surrender. "Resistance has limits" – in "political ethics," the authors of the letter believe, and point to the "level of destruction and human suffering among Ukrainian civilians. "Even justified resistance to an aggressor is at some point unbearably disproportionate," they opine. This is a "perfidious sentence" (so the musician Wolfgang Müller): Even with a reduction of resistance to a "tolerable ratio" – "the level of destruction and human suffering" will not stop. After a capitulation of Ukraine and the following occupation of the whole country by the Russian army – because that is what the demand to Chancellor Scholz amounts to – the destruction of residential buildings will stop, but the human suffering will be many times higher. The population in the areas already occupied by the Russian army are subjected to a so-called "filtration" ("filtratsiya"), reminiscent of the "selection", the segregation for "special treatment" on the railway ramps of German "concentration camps" of a time believed to be past. One fifth (8 million) of the Ukrainian population will not survive this "cleansing" ("Chistka"), especially if Russian troops were to conquer western Ukraine, whose population they sweepingly denigrate as "Nazis". According to Mykhailo Podolyak, an advisor to President Zelensky, Russia was planning a genocide in Ukraine. The Russian occupiers carried mobile crematoria to cover up the killing of civilians; they had 40,000 body bags in their luggage – hardly for their own fallen soldiers; they certainly did not expect so many of their own dead. That the Russian army committed "genocide" in the Ukrainian port city of Mariupol" is beyond any

---

36 In spite of the invoked equality of all NATO partner states, only the American flag flew at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers at the U.S. airbase Ramstein on April 25 and 26, 2022. It demonstrated on whom Europe still depends in case of war.

(legal) doubt.<sup>37</sup> Men who refuse to “renounce” Ukraine, i.e. the Ukrainian language, end up in so-called “filtration camps” (reminiscent of “concentration camps”) where they are tortured and shot.

Another fifth of the Ukrainian population will be deported to “punishment camps” in Siberia—with the prospect of forced permanent “settlement” upon release. They are intended to compensate for the declining numbers of the Russian population in the territories east of the Urals—a covert war goal one can assume. As of the end of June 2022, an estimated 300,000 children have already been abducted from the occupied territories, along with one million adults.

One-fifth of the population will manage to escape to the West. How many of the women and children who fled will return to Ukraine, is uncertain and depends on the outcome of the war (able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 60 are prohibited from leaving).

The housing left behind by the refugees will be assigned to Russian soldiers—just as in Hitler’s Germany houses and apartments of deported and murdered Jews were assigned to “Aryan” Germans. The remaining part of the Ukrainian population, 15 / 16 million, will have their “brains washed”, i.e., emptied and filled with Putinist thought garbage, as has been happening for years with the Russian population. The Russian population has been morally depraved by years of hate-mongering on state TV channels, comparable to the state agitation against Jews in Nazi Germany, which turned “normal people” into mass murderers.

In view of the murderous methods demonstrated by KGB officer Putin in the second Chechen war (Grozny) and in the Syrian civil war (Aleppo), it is immoral for the 28 cultural leaders to request that Ukrainians who are staking their lives for their freedom—who are prepared to die rather than live under Moscow’s thumb—should “compromise” with the Russian president. Putin does not want “compromise,” he wants submission; anyone who grants him the ability to compromise is politically naïve.

In the letter of the “28,” Ukraine is implicitly made jointly responsible for the war: It is a “mistake that the responsibility for the danger of an escalation to a nuclear conflict concerns only the original aggressor and not also those who provide him with a motive for a possibly criminal action” — the “most perfidious sentence in this letter”, as the musician Wolfgang Müller opines. It means that Ukraine itself is also to blame for Russia’s invasion. This is a perverse perpetrator-victim reversal. Wolfgang Müller compared this infamous argument with the regulars’ table joke according to which a woman is to blame for her own rape because she wore a skirt that was too short.

---

37 Otto Luchterhand: Völkermord in Mariupol’. (Genocide in Mariupol. Russia’s Warfare in Ukraine), in: OSTEUROPA, 72. Jg., 1-3 / 2022, pp. 65-85. Christian Tomuschat: Russlands Überfall auf die Ukraine (Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. The War and the Basic Questions of Law), in: OSTEUROPA, 72. Jg., 1-3 / 2022, pp. 33-50.

In the letter to Chancellor Scholz, the authors demand that no weapons be delivered to Ukraine so as not to give the Kremlin a pretext for nuclear war. But Putin constructs his own pretexts for his war, varying according to the war situation, from the grotesque “denazification” reason to the “liberation” of the Donbas. Putin’s threat of nuclear weapons serves to agitate Western public opinion to pressure governments to stop supplying arms to Ukraine. With the “Letter of the 28,” Putin has achieved this in Germany: the 28 “cultural leaders” have made useful idiots of themselves.

### **Philosophical Support for the German Defeatists**

German philosopher Jürgen Habermas commented on the open letter in a guest article for the German newspaper “Süddeutsche Zeitung.” He criticized the “morally indignant prosecutors” who demand greater support for Ukraine, including heavy weapons, and praised the “restrained German government” for not wanting to make Germany a party to the war—a policy which is, according to Habermas, “morally well founded.” Habermas fails to recognize that the primary issue is not morality but law. Putin has for the first time violated what has been considered immutable in Europe since the end of World War II: the territorial integrity of states. Above all, however, it is a matter of security—including the security of Europe.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz never tires of declaring that Germany must not become a party to the war. But whether Germany is a party to the war is not decided by Scholz, but by Putin, as Habermas himself rightly states: “When the West crosses the threshold defined by international law, beyond which Putin regards military support for Ukraine formally as the West’s entry into the war, is decided by Putin.” Habermas, a philosopher, not a psychologist, sees in Putin—despite everything—predictability; an agreement with him is possible. Habermas wants to change the paranoid aggressor’s mind with “weighing reason” and advises a “rational assessment of his [Putin’s] interests.”

Thomas Schmid, the former editor of the German daily newspaper *Die Welt*, quotes for the understanding of Habermas’ position from his main work, *Theory of Communicative Action*: nobody can “escape the gentle force of the better argument”. What an unreal theory! The world has experienced terrible figures (like Hitler), Thomas Schmid comments, who “could not be captured communicatively even with the most beautiful flute notes”.

Walter Slócombe declares: “The relevance of reason-driven action has massively lost its power since March 2022.” The “sense of belonging is more powerful than even economic interests.” The risk of nuclear war leaves “no room for risky poker playing,” Habermas writes. But the West should also “not allow itself to be blackmailed at will.” It is difficult to distill practical political guidance from this double insight of the philosopher. Leaving Ukraine to its fate would be “not only a scandal from a political and moral point of view, but also not in Europe’s own interest. [...] Who would be next?” Habermas rightly asks.

Habermas advocated military support for Ukraine – “up to the point of immediate involvement.” *Expressis verbis*, he declared “that Ukraine must not lose the war.” He rightly criticizes the Russia policy of former Chancellor Merkel and (her then) Foreign Minister Steinmeier, without naming them, with the words: “Political misjudgements and wrong course set by previous federal governments.” From his correct analysis, Habermas draws the wrong conclusion, that negotiations must be held with Putin about the “end of the war, at least about a cease-fire.” Habermas speculates about Putin’s motivation, noting a “inquietude about political protest in the progressively more liberal-minded circles of his own society.” Apart from Habermas, no one sees “progressively more liberal thinking circles” in Russian society; this is philosophical wishful thinking.

While philosopher Habermas merely rebukes Zelensky’s distress call to the German Bundestag (Parliament) as “moral blackmail,” philosopher Peter Sloterdijk says the Ukrainian president is trying to “talk the West into war.” Commenting on criticism concerning the open letter of the “28” he said: “Think of the unfair way in which attempts were made to discredit the initiators of Alice Schwarzer’s open letter.” “Supplying heavy weapons would, after all, be more or less tantamount to openly entering the position of a war party.” The West has long been a “war party” – not in the sense of international law, but in Putin’s eyes.

### **“Ceasefire Now!”**

After Emma, the renowned German weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* published the appeal “Ceasefire now!” by 21 German intellectuals (among them the initiator of the appeal, philosopher and publicist Richard David Precht), who call for an end to the war in Ukraine through negotiations. The “21” suppose that Ukraine will decide how long the war will last. Certainly, Ukraine could surrender and the war would end. To be sure, the “21” concede, it is up to Ukraine to decide whether to continue the war until it recaptures the territories Russia has occupied since 2014 or since 2022. But the West would have to decide whether to support it.

Ukraine does not need the defeatist advice of German intellectuals who seem indifferent to the future fate of the Ukrainian people under Russian occupation. With their implicit appeal to the West to stop supplying weapons to Ukraine, they stab Ukraine, which is willing to defend itself, in the back.

The German intellectuals’ call on the West to “create conditions under which negotiations are possible” is nonsense. Arms deliveries to Ukraine are preconditions for negotiations, not the implicit demand for surrender. The “21” call on the West to end the Ukraine war through negotiations. “Continuing the war in Ukraine is not the solution to the problem,” write the authors of this appeal. What “problem” do they mean? The problem that the paranoid neo-impe-

rator has with Ukraine? At most, Putin may be indicating his readiness to negotiate—and only in appearance—if he cannot win militarily. And that will only be the case if the West continues to supply (heavy) weapons.

The “21” have discovered “an initial readiness for a compromise” in Moscow. This is a statement of incredible naiveté. The demanded “inclusion” of Putin in a strategy “for gradual de-escalation” is downright absurd. The messages of the “21” may be valid in times of peace; in times of war they are dangerous because they cloud the sense of reality. Europe, they say, faces the “task of restoring peace on the continent.” But the decision about peace rests exclusively with Russian President Putin, who launched this war. “Western countries providing military support to Ukraine must ask themselves what exactly their goal is and whether (and for how long) arms deliveries continue to be the right way to go,” the signatories of Precht’s open letter opine. Continuing the war with the goal of Ukraine’s complete victory over Russia means thousands more war casualties dying for a goal that does not seem realistic. Implicitly, the “21” call on Ukraine to give itself up so that “the humanitarian and economic emergencies around the world” will stop. The West, they say, must do everything it can to help the parties reach a negotiated settlement. It alone can prevent a war of attrition lasting for years, with its fatal local and global consequences, as well as a military escalation that could go as far as the use of nuclear weapons.

Anticipating sure-to-be-expected objections, the authors assure that the goal is not “to dictate a surrender to Ukraine.” Negotiations do not mean, as is sometimes assumed, dictating a surrender to Ukraine, the authors affirm. There should be no dictatorial peace by Putin. Negotiations also do not mean deciding something over the heads of the parties involved. “The West must make every effort to influence the governments of Russia and Ukraine to suspend hostilities.” In real terms, this means influencing Ukraine, because the West cannot influence Putin, as the many appeasement attempts and visits to the Kremlin have proven. It is not the “suspension of hostilities” that creates the precondition for negotiations, but a military stalemate in which Putin is forced to think of an exit strategy. The conquest of the entire Donbas, including the part that was under the control of the Ukrainian central government before February 24, may even be such a face-saving exit option. It is amazing how easily the German “intelligentsia” —after the “28” now the “21”—has made itself Putin’s “useful idiots.” The call for a ceasefire is understandable but short-sighted. Hoping for a negotiated peace fails to recognize Putin’s character. “The only way to end the war is a decisive Ukrainian victory that forces Russia to acknowledge its defeat” (Anders Åslund).

It is hard to imagine that this will happen. It would already be a “Ukrainian victory” if Russia withdrew its troops from Ukraine and stopped firing missiles at Ukrainian cities from Russian territory —without acknowledging its “defeat.” One guarantee that Russia would not then descend on Ukraine again at a new opportunity would be Ukraine’s admission to NATO.

### **"Heavy Weapons Now!"**

The "Appeal of the 21" remained not without opposition: Under the title "Heavy Weapons Now!" Andreas Umland of the Stockholm Center for East European Studies initiated an answer to the open letter "Ceasefire Now!" in the German Internet magazine "Zeit online" of June 29, 2022, which—unlike the appeals of the "28" and the "21"—was signed by about 100 Russia and Ukraine experts (including the author).<sup>38</sup>

The signatories of the two open letters by "Eastern Europe laymen" (the "28" and the "21") are recommending "the continuation of a Western policy toward Russia that has brought us to the present predicament," i.e., the ill-advised "appeasement policy" of the period before February 24, 2022, the Eastern Europe experts argue. The authors (of the two appeals, in "Emma" and in "Zeit online") have—beyond their ignorance—a moral deficit: they consider the war crimes of the Russian occupation forces, the systematic murder and deportation of civilians in the territories newly occupied since the beginning of the war, to be beside the point.

### **"Capable of Peace in Times of War": The Expert Opinion of German Peace Researchers**

In their 150-page expert report "Friedensfähig in Kriegszeiten" ("Capable of Peace in Times of War") of June 21, 2022, the leading German peace research institutes consider arms deliveries to Ukraine ("We welcome the arms deliveries") as well as sanctions against Russia to be correct. At the same time, however, they warn against nuclear escalation.

In order to prevent a "nuclear escalation," it is necessary to "drive on sight"; "step by step" it should be examined what effect the delivery of certain weapons systems" would have—a completely unrealistic recommendation by the scientists. They consider the German government's "double strategy" to be correct: supplying weapons, signaling a parallel willingness to talk. This is a misjudgement of Putin. The German professors look at the Moscow Kremlin from an "ivory tower." The German peace researchers recommend conveying to Moscow that sanctions would be lifted if Russia withdrew its troops from Ukraine—oh sancta simplicitas!

---

38 96 Eastern Europe experts worldwide demand in open letter: Heavy weapons now! Replica of "Ceasefire Now!" in FOCUS online, Tuesday, July 19, 2022. [https://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-krise/96-osteuropa-experten-weltweit-fordern-schwere-waffen-jetzt\\_id\\_119428660.html](https://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-krise/96-osteuropa-experten-weltweit-fordern-schwere-waffen-jetzt_id_119428660.html). Jan Emendörfer: "Naive Pacifism": Eastern Europe Experts Criticize German Intellectuals for Ceasefire Appeal. Replica on Appeal in "Zeit," in: RND, R4edaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland, 19.07.2022; <https://www.rnd.de/politik/osteuropa-experten-fordern-schwere-waffen-jetzt-fuer-die-ukraine-RSDUPTGGBHAZH2JHNJTQCCR7Y.html>.



### **“Putin-Understanding” Americans**

U.S. intellectuals such as John Mearsheimer and Noam Chomsky have been right in many respects in their criticism of Washington in the past; but they are completely wrong in their assertion that the war of aggression on Ukraine is merely Russia’s reaction to NATO’s expansion. Probably their mindset, narrowed to permanent fundamental criticism of Washington, does not allow even an exceptional recognition of their government’s policy regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine—blindness that obscures their view of Putin’s motives.

Political scientist John J. Mearsheimer caused outrage with his “morally perverse” (Nick Burns) claim that the United States and its European allies are primarily to blame for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Noam Chomsky criticizes President Biden’s policy of leaving Putin no way out; this leaves him (Putin) with only one option: to destroy Ukraine.<sup>39</sup> It does not occur to Chomsky that this might have been precisely Putin’s cherished goal for many years. Chomsky proposes to accept a status for Ukraine like Mexico, Austria or Finland. Finland, meanwhile, fails as an example of neutrality; after decades of neutrality, Finland seeks protection in NATO in the face of the aggressiveness of its large neighbor. For the “eastern region” (the Donbas?) he suggests “some kind of Minsk II style arrangement,” with a “high level of autonomy within a federal settlement”, as well as “recognizing the reality that Crimea is off the table.” Chomsky himself ignores reality: for seven years, the implementation of “Minsk II” was the content of the mantric chant between all parties involved, Russia, Ukraine and the West. The “Minsk diplomacy” did not banish the threat of Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, but only postponed it for seven years.

Putin himself candidly acknowledged, and thus disavowed his apologists in the West, that he was waging a neo-imperialist war of conquest in Ukraine: “It is our destiny” to retrieve Russia’s previous conquests—i.e., not to defend Russia against NATO, as his U.S. apologists claim.

### **President Biden: Appeasing the American People**

The Biden Administration, in order to reassure the American people, is letting Russia know what it is doing—and what it is not doing and will not do. Washington is making public the sums of financial resources and the quantities of weapons delivered and promised, as well as the sanctions imposed. But Washington is also sending another message to Moscow—a false one, the American historian Timothy Snyder warns:<sup>40</sup> The U.S. will not send ground troops to

---

39 Noam Chomsky: A left Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Interview by Bill Fletcher, Jr., April 8, 2022; <https://therealnews.com/noam-chomsky-a-left-response-to-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine>.

40 Timothy David Snyder is an American historian specializing in the modern history of Central and Eastern Europe. He is Richard C. Levin Professor of History at Yale University and a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. An expert on the Holocaust,

Ukraine, will not send aircraft, will not establish a no-fly zone, will not deliver artillery with a range of more than 45 miles. According to Snyder these announcements are a serious mistake. By doing so, Washington has ceded escalation dominance to Moscow.

Berlin is not the only capital bearing concerns; Washington is also hesitant and intimidated by Moscow's threats of escalation. Washington's hesitancy is harming its own American national security interests, Snyder argues. As early as 2018, it had been recommended that Ukrainian pilots be trained on NATO fighter aircraft. Nothing had been done, he says. The transfer of Polish fighter jets to Ukraine after the invasion, which Washington refused, could have had a huge moral boost for the Ukrainians and a demoralizing effect on the Russians.

Under the title "Biden's Risk Aversion is Escalating Putin's War," Rebecca L. Heinrichs, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, criticized Washington's appeasement policy toward Putin. As Russia massed troops in preparation for an invasion of the Ukrainian border, Biden withheld sanctions to "give diplomacy a chance". In response to Russian nuclear saber rattling, the Biden administration announced it was exercising restraint. A U.S. government official stated that the United States would not share intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) information with Ukraine "lest Russia think we are helping Ukraine too much." Biden himself repeatedly tweeted that the U.S. "would not wage war against Russia in Ukraine. So Putin could rest assured.

White House proclamations directed at domestic audiences claimed that President Biden's actions would prevent escalation. Just the opposite was true, writes Rebecca Heinrichs: Biden's unwillingness to support Ukraine to a "reasonable degree" encouraged Putin to escalate the war. The U.S. must replenish NATO's weapons arsenals in Poland, Romania, and in the Baltic states, Heinrichs urges: "Russia needs to know that NATO will not lose defensive power by helping Ukraine defend itself."

### **Revisionism: Russia's "Versailles Syndrome"**

The vast majority of Russians "support" Putin's war against Ukraine out of a perverse "love for Russia." Their "patriotism" commands them to approve the war atrocities committed by their soldiers in Ukraine.

Rüdiger Fritsch, German ambassador to Moscow until 2019, notes a "Versailles syndrome" in Russia, an imperial reflex. The "ordinary" Russians need the "old grandeur of empire" to compensate for their meager existence. And the return of Ukraine under the rule of Moscow is for them the criterion for this "greatness".

---

Snyder is on the Committee on Conscience of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Self-elevation out of foreign humiliation, the conceit of uniqueness and specialness, is a psychological phenomenon that is only too well known from German history. In Russia, the myth of the mysterious “Russian soul” corresponds to the “German essence” (“das deutsche Wesen”), the cultural arrogance in Germany; it (the soul) was insulted by the West (Svetlana Alexievich<sup>41</sup>), and is now taking revenge with a murderous war on Ukraine.

In order to free themselves from backward-looking thoughts and feelings and to be able to look forward, the Russians, who have been condemned by Putin to a loss of reality, need something like a compulsion to recognize reality. A military defeat in Ukraine could bring about such a “reality gain.” Putin is waging a “final battle against reality,” says Maxim Trudolyubov. All around him, he says, is only “imitation and facade—a world of lies.”

The Russians should not be spared the farewell to empire, said Ralf Fücks<sup>42</sup> at the annual conference of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde / DGO (German Association for East European Studies) in Bonn on June 17. Russia needs a military defeat to let go of its world power delusion—as Germany did in 1945, he said, adding that Russia, too, must face up to its history—as Germany did. “Russia needs a culture of guilt,” says Ukrainian historian Andriy Portnov<sup>43</sup>. But mental changes in the Russian population, overcoming the imperial phantom pain, will probably not happen, because Russia does not have to fear military defeat on Russian soil due to its arsenal of nuclear weapons and intercontinental launchers.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union” was for Putin (in the year 2000) the “greatest catastrophe of the 20<sup>th</sup> century”, not World War I, not World War II with its 25 million dead Soviet soldiers and civilians, certainly not the “Shoah”, because as a result of the independence of 14 “Union republics” (Ukraine, Baltic, Central Asian, South Caucasus states) “millions of Russians live outside the Russian state”, he explained in a following sentence. Putin’s explanation is never quoted: it is a ethno-nationalist argument. That Russians had previously been deliberately settled in these countries to push the native population into minority status, Putin did not say.

It was a “historical mistake” of Lenin’s to establish the USSR in 1922 as a union of equal republics; the right to secede was even enshrined in the 1924 constitution. This “time bomb” (Putin) exploded when the iron security bracket, namely the “leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union / CPSU broke (from within). In particular, Ukraine’s independence is a thorn in Putin’s side. The Russians by majority, not only Putin, have never come to terms with Ukraine’s separation from Russia.

---

41 <https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/aus-den-feuilletons-die-russische-seele-ist-beleid-igt-100.html>.

42 Ralf Fücks is founder and director of the think tank, Zentrum Liberale Moderne, Berlin.

43 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20.07.2022; <https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/russland-braucht-eine-schuldkultur-ld.1693068?reduced=true>. Portnov is Professor of “Entangled History of Ukraine” at the European University Viadrina, Frankfurt / Oder.

Putin is wedded to a backward-looking imperial worldview. Instead of modernizing Russia, he is taking his country back to past times. He has not accepted Germany's offer of a "modernization partnership." Its goal was to overcome Russia's status as a commodity-exporting "Third World" country and transform it into a globally competitive industrial and technological nation—following China's example.

The revisionist Putin thinks in the categories of the 19th century. He pursues regressive neo-imperialist goals: The restoration of the Tsarist / Soviet empire, not only as a great power, but as a world power, with exclusive "zones of influence" in the neighborhood, i.e., vassal and satellite states. Delusions of grandeur also afflicted the Chairman of the Parliament of the Russian Federation, Vyacheslav Volodin: Threateningly, he reminded the U.S. that its 49th state, Alaska, once belonged to Russia.

### **Russian "Reconquista"**

The tactics of the Russian reconquest are:

1. the "military factor" ("voennyi faktor") in foreign policy, i.e., the threat of war, even nuclear war, a very effective tactic, as shown by the open letters of the "28" and the "21".
2. the "controlled reaction" ("kontroliruemaya reaktsiya") of the adversary; for Putin these are the US and the EU, which stand in the way of the realization of his "dream" of the restoration of the Russian empire. "Controlled reaction" means Russia's exertion of influence on the societies of adversary states in such a way, that their reaction to it benefits Russia's interest, specifically Putin's interest.

According to Herfried Münkler, "revisionist powers" are the greatest challenge to any peace order. They must be weakened so that they are incapable of a factual revision. After its total defeat in 1945, Germany was incapable of a revision of the results of World War II (Oder-Neisse border)—apart from the nuclear stalemate of the victors formerly allied against Germany. The Russian Federation under Putin pursues a revisionist policy. According to Münkler, there are three methods of dealing with revisionist powers:

1. "buying off" revisionist desires through transfer of wealth. Germany was pacified in this way.

Russia did not suffer military defeat; its Soviet empire disintegrated. In Russia's case, the attempt by Germany and the European Union to appease Russian national pride through material prosperity did not work: the memory of former greatness did not fade, and Putin systematically cultivates it.

2. appeasement through political accommodation; the Western "appeasement policy" has not worked in Russia's case either.

3. military “deterrence through the buildup of superior military capabilities and unquestionable readiness to use them” remains as the third option. Attempting military defeat of Russia on Russian soil is prohibited because of the risk of nuclear escalation.

Putin will not pause until he has subjugated all of Ukraine – and totally destabilized the European Union. Therefore, Russia must be militarily defeated in Ukraine, i.e., militarily weakened to the point where it is no longer capable of continuing the war.

### **Putinism: Russian Fascism**

Putinism is an externally aggressive and internally repressive,<sup>44</sup> ethnic (“völkisch”), neo-imperialist nationalism without (programmatic) anti-Semitism; behind the mask of proclaimed “anti-fascism” is hidden a new “Nazi state,” Putin’s Russia. His state has almost all the elements of Nazi Germany, except for open anti-Semitism. An official emblem was created especially for the war of extermination against Ukraine: a Latin (not Cyrillic) Z, which sensibly resembles an inverted “half swastika.”

Putin is a revisionist like Hitler, who was dominated by the “Versailles complex” of the Germans after 1918 (Gerd Koenen). Putin is dominated by a “Russian Versailles complex” as a result of the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. In an interview with Jochen Bittner for the German weekly *Die Zeit*,<sup>45</sup> Timothy Snyder said, “Germans were always very interested in Ukrainian fascism, which was a completely marginal phenomenon, and completely disinterested in Russian fascism, even though it was increasingly taking possession of the Russian state.” On Twitter, Snyder wrote, “For thirty years, Germans lectured Ukrainians about fascism. When fascism actually came, Germans financed it while Ukrainians died fighting it.” In an op-ed for *The Moscow Times*, Snyder cites three criteria for his conclusion that Russia is a state with a fascist government:

- the cult of leadership around Putin;
- the cult of the dead around the victims of World War II;
- the cult of the past around a golden age of imperial greatness that must be restored by means of “healing violence.”

---

44 There is a connection between domestic order and foreign policy: the more aggressive the foreign policy – the more repressive the domestic policy and vice versa. Manfred Sapper, Volker Weichsel: Editorial, in: *OSTEUROPA*, 72. Jg., 1-3 / 2022.

45 Jochen Bittner: Warum so wütend, Herr Snyder? Interview mit Timothy Snyder (Why so angry, Mr. Snyder? Interview with Timothy Snyder), in: *Die Zeit*, May 22, 2022.)

"Fascism was not defeated as an idea [...] It returned, and Russia became the country waging a fascist war of extermination"<sup>46</sup> says Snyder. "The similarity between what happened then and what Putin is doing now is striking." Only reluctantly is today's Russia considered fascist, because the Soviet Union presented itself as anti-fascist. Putin has built a "historical myth of Russia's innocence and lost greatness," Snyder said: "Russia wants to have a monopoly on sacrifice and victory."

"Russia is innocent because of its past" is an argument completely missing the reality. In reality, "Russia" is guilty in the highest degree, not only because of Stalin's murderous terrorist system, but also because the Soviet Union helped to cause World War II by the pact that Stalin concluded with Hitler, which was to keep Germany's back free from attack in the East, while Hitler attacked in the West, and because both of them together invaded Poland (Stalin with a two-week delay). As an example of the shift in the conceptual coordinate system, Snyder cited the claim by Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian Security Council, that Russia was under attack from "neoliberal fascism."

Russia's whole "reasoning" would be comical if it were not propagated against the background of a real war. For example, the Russian-appointed deputy head of the captured southern Ukrainian city of Kherson, Kyryll Stremuziv, said Kherson was an originally Russian city where there had never been fascism; the city "had its own history." Russia is preparing to annex the Ukrainian oblast of Kherson; this region is therefore cleared of accusations of Ukrainian fascism.

The Deputy Head of the Russian Mission to the United Nations, Dmitrii Polyanski convened an informal ("Arria formula") meeting of the UN Security Council on July 11, 2022, in order to denounce alleged "neo-Nazism" in Ukraine, and to justify Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine to the world public opinion. The theme of the event was "Neo-Nazism and Radical Nationalism: Examining the Origins of the Crisis in Ukraine."

It was the height of audacity that the "Nazi state" of Russia, whose fascist character can no longer be denied, and which surpasses Nazi Germany in terms of destruction of Ukrainian cities, should call the victim of its war of aggression "neo-Nazi" in New York.

### Blatant Analogies

"We Should Say It. Russia Is Fascist," wrote Timothy Snyder, one of the most renowned historians of Eastern Europe and the Holocaust in the United States (Yale University) in The New York Times.<sup>47</sup> "Rushism" (Russian Fascism) is the popular description of the specific brand of fascism in Putin's Russia.

---

46 Peter Jungblut: Experte: Das spricht für Faschismus in Russland (This speaks for fascism in Russia), BR 14, 21.05.2022; <https://www.br.de/nachrichten/kultur/er-heilt-mit-gewalt-das-spricht-fuer-faschismus-in-russland,T6T5MNa>.

47 The New York Times, May 19, 2022.

Using Facebook, the Russian political scientist Grigorio Golosov has accused Snyder's thesis of being unscientific; scientific, he says, is to work out the similarities and differences, namely, the characteristics of the original, Italian fascism, and the national specifics of the varieties of fascism in other countries. Golosov prefers the term "personalized dictatorship" – which is an inadmissible belittlement of "Putinism."

In public discourse in Germany, too, the permissibility of equating "Putinism" and "fascism" is questioned, especially by those who call themselves "anti-fascists", and who like to beat political opponents with the "fascism club" and thereby lay claim to the sole right of disposal over this political weapon.

It does not matter whether the term "Russian fascism" is scientific or not; as long as "Putin's war" in Ukraine lasts, it is about the public effect of this term. After the war, historians and political scientists may take care of its scientific classification. The use of Putin's comparison with Hitler is important as a counter-propaganda figure to the grotesque Russian propaganda in which Ukraine is described as being ruled by a "fascist junta", which came to power in an armed coup, and from which Ukraine must be liberated by war.

The "junta" is presided over by the "Jewish Nazi" Zelensky, whom, by the way, the Ukrainian electorate voted into the office of president in May 2019 with 73% in free and fair elections. In Russia's abstruse propaganda, the paradox that a Jew presides over Ukraine's "Nazi junta" proves, that the Ukrainian state is unreal, does not exist. Putinism is not simply an "authoritarian regime," but a fascist movement driven by imperialist impulses and a state waging a war of aggression – preparing for "total war" (Goebbels). The analogy to "Hitlerism" is evident.

Comparisons between Putin's Russia and Hitler's Germany are means of propaganda defense, as Russian sociologist Grigori Judin states ("New People Make Old Experiences"). "The most obvious analogy to today are the years 1938 / 39," Judin said in an interview early in March 2022–shortly after "February 24."<sup>48</sup> On July 7, 2022, Putin ranted about the "rotten West."<sup>49</sup> He declared that "the West wants to fight with us (the R. F.) – to the last Ukrainian".<sup>50</sup>

### **Putin: Hitler's Reincarnation**

Putin is a "reincarnation" of Hitler; parallels between the two are obvious: Their domestic and foreign policies are similar. both use the same demagogic rhetoric and the forms of their rule are similar in many respects (with the difference that

---

48 Original: "Not simply an authoritarian regime" on the newly established independent portal Re:Russia, 25.05.2022,

49 The "rotten West", "Wrotten West" (Russ.: Zagnivayushchij / Gniloj Zapad) is a cliché that emerged in the 19th century in the Russian Empire in the dispute between "Slavophiles" and "Westerners". It is being used propagandistically again in Putin's Russia.

50 "Zapad khochet voevat s nami do poslednego ukrainsa." Putin quotes retired American ambassador Chas Freeman ("fight to the last Ukrainian").

the “Fuehrer” Adolf Hitler did not have to secure the loyalty of his “sub-leaders” through material corruption; the same ideological sentiment made them stick to him). The comparison of Putin with Hitler – both names casually combined into “Putler” in Ukrainian media – is justified: Putinism is Neo-Nazism, a new variant of the original Italian fascism that were politically “in vogue” in the 1920s and 1930s, even in England (Oswald Mosley) and in the United States.

“The political instrumentalization of a real or perceived defeat and the self-stylization as a victim of powerful enemies: this is what connects these (otherwise) so different political leaders,” states German historian Heinrich August Winkler.<sup>51</sup> “Many commentators have recently pointed to striking parallels between Hitler’s policies in 1938 and 1939 and Putin’s current policies. The “Anschluss” of Austria, the annexation of the Sudetenland to the “Greater German Reich,” the secession of Slovakia from the Czechoslovak Republic and the “breakup of the Rest-Tschechei” (“Rump Czechia”) at that time – the annexation of Crimea, the separation of the capitals of the two oblasts of the Donbas and their surrounding areas from Ukraine, and the Russian war of aggression today: “The analogy of action is striking” (Winkler). “And not only the deeds are similar, but also the words”: Hitler insulted the Prague government under President Edvard Beneš as “terrorist”; Putin insults the Kyiv government under (the Jewish) Volodymyr Zelensky as “Nazi.”

On September 6, 1938, at the Congress of the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) in Nuremberg, Hitler invoked the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” (Latin: *Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicae*), to which Bohemia and Moravia had belonged for centuries. On April 28, 1939, Hitler justified the establishment of the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia” before the “Greater German Reichstag” by invoking the “Monroe Doctrine”<sup>52</sup> of 1823. “Exactly the same doctrine we Germans now advocate for Europe, and in any case for the sphere and concerns of the Greater German Reich.” Claiming a sphere of influence in which the European Union, the United States and the United Nations have no business, the Russian president postulates a quasi “Putin Doctrine.”

“Putin thinks in the same categories as the most prominent German state and international law expert of the interwar period, Carl Schmitt,” Winkler states. Two weeks after the establishment of the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,” on April 1, 1939, Schmitt held a lecture in Kiel with the significant title: “Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte” (“Order of greater spaces under international law with prohibition of intervention by external powers”). Schmitt justified the German

51 Heinrich August Winkler: Was Putin mit Hitler verbindet (What Putin has in common with Hitler), a guest article by Heinrich August Winkler, updated March 12, 2022, in: *Die ZEIT* Nr. 11/2022. Winkler is Professor Emeritus of Modern History at the Humboldt University in Berlin.

52 Named after U.S. President James Monroe, according to which European powers were not to interfere in the affairs of North, Central, and South America.



claim to rule over the Czechs on the basis of the special rights resulting from the fact that Germany was not an ordinary nation-state, but an empire from time immemorial.

Like Carl Schmitt—and like Hitler—Putin underpins Russia's claim to a geopolitical zone of influence and to the restoration of the Great Empire, with the historical greatness of the Russian Empire. In his July 2021 article "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," Putin invoked Vladimir (Ukr.: Volodymyr), the Grand Prince (Velikii knyaz) of Kyiv (and Prince of Novgorod), who was baptized in 988.

The thesis of the common origin of Russians, Ukrainians (and White Russians) in medieval "Kyivan Rus" is not wrong; however, the line of common proto-statehood was cut in 1240 by the invasion of Mongols and Tatars (and the destruction of Kyiv). In the following centuries, Russians and Ukrainians developed apart. Putin assumes a transfer of the medieval state of "Kyivan Rus"—in the sense of a profane "Translatio imperii"—to the Russian Empire. In Putin's understanding of history, there is a thousand-year continuity of "Russian" history with imperial and autocratic tradition. The autocrat in the Moscow Kremlin claims the Kyiv historical heritage for himself—and the right to rule over Ukrainians. "As a representative of politics of history, Putin comes across as a diligent disciple of Adolf Hitler" (Winkler). In his notorious mendacity, Putin declared "that Ukraine can achieve real sovereignty only in partnership with Russia." Winkler comments, that since February 24, 2022, "we know what Putin means by 'partnership' and 'genuine sovereignty'".

### **Putin's Motives: Modern "Kremlinology"**

Until February 24, 2022, there has been speculation in the West in every conceivable direction about Putin's motivations and intentions: Most tangible, and most "understandable" in the West was the assumed goal of preventing NATO's eastward expansion to Russia's western border by admitting Ukraine. Also "understandable" in the West was Putin's presumed fear that his autocratic regime was threatened by the living democracy in the post-Soviet neighboring country, that is to say, by the transmission of the "revolutionary virus" from Ukraine to Russia ("Maidan on the Red Square" in Moscow).

In the West, Putin's openly stated revisionism—his aspiration to resurrect Russia within the borders of the Russian (Imperial) Empire<sup>53</sup> or the Soviet Union by reconquering the territories "lost" as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, especially Ukraine—is considered "illusionary." Indeed, it is becoming increasingly clear that Putin is not concerned with legitimate Russian security interests; this argument, which is being circulated by "Russia-understanders"<sup>54</sup> around the world, is merely a pretext: the point is that Ukraine's membership in

---

53 Russ.: (Vse-)Rossiiskaya imperiya.

54 "verstehen", "to understand" in the sense of to approve.

NATO and the EU, indeed its general “westward orientation,” is hindering Putin’s effort to pull Ukraine back into Moscow’s orbit.

State propaganda portrays Russia as a “besieged fortress.” Foreign enemies and their domestic agents want to keep Russia down, to prevent its resurgence to former greatness. “For many scholars, this narrative forms the central basis of legitimacy for the Putin system,” Trudolyubov states. The so-called “Crimean consensus” has worn thin. To legitimize its power internally, the regime needs the external enemy; to ward it off, the country must be kept in a perpetual state of emergency – a central concept of Carl Schmitt’s political theory.

### **Putin’s “Destiny”: Contemporary “Collector of Russian Lands”<sup>55</sup>**

On June 9, 2022, on the birthday of Peter I (“the Great”), Putin gave a pseudo-historical lecture to young entrepreneurs: When Peter I conquered the land around the Baltic Sea, Putin claimed, he did not take anything away from anyone, but only took something back. Slavs had lived there as well as Finns. Today, too, it is a matter of taking back something that belongs to Russia; that is “Russia’s most important task now”.

Putin’s self-identification with Peter I is paradoxical: Peter I wanted – as the saying goes – to “open a window to the West,” whereas Putin is closing this window again. The founder of the empire, Peter I, wanted to modernize his state along Western lines, whereas Putin is leading Russia backwards into the past. In modernizing Russia, Peter I enlisted the services of a Ukrainian theologian named Feofan Prokopovi. The Ukrainian had studied at the Collegium Russicum in Rome in his youth and later graduated from the Mohyla Academy in Kyiv (organized on the Jesuit model by Metropolitan Mohyla), where secular subjects such as reading and writing were also taught – “godless arts” that are of the devil. For the Orthodox Church, Peter I was the “Antichrist.” The (probably atheist) “KGBist” Putin uses the teachings of the unenlightened Russian Orthodox Church as the ideological superstructure of his (indeed unideological) rule, while his idol Peter I promoted Western early enlightenment.

Putin sees himself as the successor to the two “great” tsars, Peter I and (the German-born) Catherine II. Unlike the two conquerors, Putin claims that he is only “collecting Russian lands”, that is to say reclaiming old Russian land. He is concerned with “reunification,” not conquest; in fact, he is concerned with “re-conquest.” As the German philosopher Sloterdijk put it: Putin “is fabricating a history [...] on the level of Hitler’s rabulistic table talks”.

Providence” – Hitler’s conception of a “higher being” – has destined Russian President Vladimir Putin to “make Russia great again” after the defeat in the Cold War, just as it had destined the German “Führer” Adolf Hitler in the

---

55 Putin does not name him, but probably has him in mind, the historical “collector of Russian soil”: Ivan III the Great (Ivan / Ioann III Velikij). He was Grand Duke of Moscow from 1462 to 1505. During his reign the Russian Empire was created by conquests, which shook off the Mongolian rule and became a great European power.

last century to make Germany a great power again after it had lost the First World War. Putin's delusions of Russia's—and his own—greatness are ruining not only Ukraine, but also Russia itself.

### **Putin's "True Nature"**

Anders Åslund states that the war in Ukraine revealed a "fundamental failure" of Western politicians to assess the "true nature" of Russian President Putin. Many still assume that Putin is a rational actor. Understanding Putin properly is the key to effective Western policy on Russia and Ukraine, he said.<sup>56</sup>

Åslund strips Putin of his professed political ambitions—such as restoring Russia's greatness or preventing NATO from further eastward expansion—and shows him as he really is. In Åslund's opinion, Putin is an authoritarian kleptocrat who does not care about Russia's national interest, and is only fixated on his power (and his wealth). According to Åslund, the autocrat in the Kremlin hides his self-interest behind a revisionist-nationalist facade, which secures him the support of the nationalistically incited Russian population. Putin's interests have nothing to do with Russia's interests, states Moscow-born American historian Yuri Felshtinskii.

A major problem in dealing with Putin is the West's fear of a nuclear escalation of the war in Ukraine, of which Putin is fully aware. The West should not try to avoid escalation, Åslund demands, but demonstrate that it is ready for escalation itself. The Western fear of "provoking Putin" only encourages him. The view that the West must allow Putin to save face—after killing tens of thousands of Ukrainians and destroying entire cities—is absurd; "Putin must be defeated," Åslund demands.

### **Neo-Realist Lack of Explanation**

The U.S. political scientist, John J. Mearsheimer, belongs to the "neo-realist" school of international relations, which considers only the strategic interests of the great powers in international relations, not moral and emotional considerations. He is the leading theorist of "offensive realism," a variant of the "neo-realist school" that emphasizes the drive of great powers for hegemony as a means of maintaining their power. Russian "leaders" have repeatedly rejected NATO's eastward expansion, Mearsheimer wrote in 2014, "making it clear that they would not stand idly by while their strategically important neighbor is transformed into a Western bastion."

In a March 1, 2022 interview with *The New Yorker* magazine, Mearsheimer declared that "the transformation of Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy" posed an "existential threat" from the Russian perspective. In reality, this is not an "existential threat" to Russia, but a potential threat to the autocratic

---

56 Anders Åslund: Western advocates of appeasement need a crash course in Putinology, in: *Ukraine Alert*, online publication of the Atlantic Council, May 15, 2022.

regime of Russian President Putin, whose fall would be a blessing to Russia. Accepting a Russian sphere of influence in Europe, the “offensive realist” Mearsheimer states according to R. Nicholas Burns,<sup>57</sup> that by not ruling out Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO, as well as by its funding of pro-Western organizations inside Ukraine, the U.S. has challenged Russia’s strategic interests in its own sphere of influence; now the Ukrainians will suffer the dire consequences.<sup>58</sup> “But understanding Russia’s war in Ukraine requires considering more than strategic calculations,” R. Nicholas (“Nick”) Burns writes in *The New Statesman*.<sup>59</sup>

Burns cites as a classic example the Greek historian Thucydides’ description of the fate of the Melians, the inhabitants of the Greek island of Melos. The “Melian Dialogue,” a passage from his *History of the Peloponnesian War*,<sup>60</sup> sums up the views of the neo-realist school of international relations: “The strong do what they will, while the weak endure what they must,” Burns writes.

The Melians wanted to remain neutral in the war between Athens and Sparta. When the hegemonic power of the time, Athens, gave them the choice of submission to the “Attic Naval League” or death, the Melians replied that they loved their freedom, which shook the Athenians, since this was in their opinion a decision of the Melians against their own “interest”.

The story ends tragically. The “interest” of the Melians would have been to ensure their survival, but they were motivated to resist by their “morality”, their love of freedom and their fear of God. This cost all the men their lives; for all the women and children of the island of Melos, the struggle for freedom meant enslavement. Had the Melians understood their true “interest,” they would have surrendered and remained alive. Their belief in divine assistance was irrational, yet a reality.

The decision of states is more complicated than the “neo-realists” understand. States sometimes decide seemingly against their “interest”—interest equated with survival. Mearsheimer advises Ukrainians to make their “decisions according to a dispassionate assessment of their interests.” Burns counters: To fully understand the war in Ukraine, its causes and its effects, one would need to consider the emotions of the “participants”: Putin’s ambitions, the outrage of the West, the hopes of Ukrainians—not just strategic calculations.

Transferred to today’s situation in Ukraine, it could be said, that the Ukrainians are acting against their true “interest” (in the sense of the neo-realist school); they are staking their lives for their freedom (trusting in God), instead

---

57 R. Nicholas Burns is a U.S. diplomat. Between 2005 and 2008 he was United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs at the United States Department of State.

58 Nick Burns: What realists get wrong about Putin, in *The New Statesman*, UK Edition, March 10, 2022. <https://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2022/03/what-realists-get-wrong-about-putin>.

59 Ibid.

60 Book 5, Chapter 84-116.

of saving their lives by giving up their resistance against militarily superior Russia. The Ukrainians are the modern-day Melians.

### **“After Putin”: False Expectations**

Hopes for peace in the West are pinned on the time “after Putin”, because one thing is certain: as long as Putin rules the Kremlin in Moscow, there will be no peace in Ukraine. About what will happen “after Putin”, one can only speculate.

Russia’s relations with the West will not be quickly restored even under Putin’s successors. The head of the National Security Council of the Russian Federation, Nikolai Patrushev, is Putin’s alter ego; if he succeeds Putin in the Kremlin, there will be no improvement in Russia’s relations with the West.

“Shche ne vmerla Ukrayina” — “Ukraine has not yet died” — says the original version of the Ukrainian national anthem, by poet Pavlo Chubynskyj from 1862 (!). Instead of hoping for “better times”, the West must support Ukraine in its defensive war against the aggressor Russia with all means at its disposal, but especially with modern weapons,<sup>61</sup> to ensure that Ukraine does not lose this war and Russia does not win it.

Winfried Schneider-Deters

Heidelberg, October 2022

---

61 Hopeful news came (virtually) from the U.S. Air Base in Ramstein, Germany, on July 20, 2022, the 147th day of the war. In his opening speech (“Ramstein 4”), U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said, that the U.S. and other countries would increase their weapons assistance to Ukraine.

## Foreword

This book is not theory-based, but rather a narrative analysis of events in and around Ukraine from 2013 to 2019.<sup>62</sup> It draws from academic literature, official documents and publications, and a variety of current news in print and digital media. (The statements about events during the “Maidan” are also based on the author’s own experiences, who was himself on the ground from the beginning of the popular uprising until its bloody end). No attempt has been made to force the empirical material and its analysis into the closed theoretical framework of competing doctrines of neo-realists, neo-classical realists, neo-institutionalists, liberal and social constructivists etc. in the field of international relations. Nor is the work purely chronological; the chronological sequence is frequently interrupted thematically.

The author assumes that the reader possesses a minimum of prior information through serious media.<sup>63</sup> A detailed table of contents and numerous cross-references allow the book to be used as a reference work. For this purpose, the full forms of abbreviations, translations of Ukrainian and Russian terms, etc. are given not only the first time they appear, but repeatedly throughout the text. This means redundancy is intended.

## Outline of the Content

The years 2013 to 2019 (especially the years 2013, 2014 and 2015) were “fateful” for Ukraine and of almost equal importance to the attainment of state independence in 1991; for in those years Ukraine was in danger of losing again its independence, which had fallen into its lap without armed struggle as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

An initially peaceful but ultimately bloody popular uprising – the “Maidan” – toppled the kleptocratic regime of President Viktor Yanukovich; had it continued, Ukraine would have once again fallen under Moscow’s curatorship. After the “Maidan”, Ukraine was threatened with division by a secessionist movement of the majority Russian-speaking urban population in the east and south of the country, instigated and controlled by Moscow. In a coup that violated international law, the Russian Federation annexed the (hitherto) “Autonomous Republic of Crimea”, whose affiliation with Ukraine is legally guaranteed both internationally and bilaterally.

---

62 In a temporal dimension, this book is the continuation of the author’s book published in 2012: *Die Ukraine – Machtvakuum zwischen Russland und der Europäischen Union* (Ukraine: Power Vacuum between Russia and the European Union), Berlin (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag) 2012.

63 He does not have only experts on Eastern Europe in mind.

What remained of the failed secessionist project “New Russia” (“Novaya Rossiya”) are two self-proclaimed “People’s Republics” on Ukrainian territory in the Donbas region, which are not recognized even by Moscow – the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublika” / “DNR”) and the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“Luganskaya Narodnaya Respublika” / “LNR”). The two so-called “People’s Republics” have been transformed through total russification into an exclave of the Russian Federation, which is administered like an occupied zone with local collaborators. In Donbas, the Russian Federation, together with local auxiliary forces, is waging an undeclared war against the Ukrainian army. The hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation in the Ukrainian Donbas stages the modern script “On hybrid war” written by the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov.

Up to the present, Ukraine has stood – and continues to stand – on the brink of a real war with Russia. The feared military invasion has so far not taken place, but Moscow’s threat of war (“voennij faktor”) as an instrument of its “Europe policy” is producing the intended effect in Ukraine: a permanent fear of war.<sup>64</sup>

President Putin’s justification for military support of the Iridentia in Crimea and for the threatened military invasion of Ukraine, namely the alleged threat to the ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainian (!) population in the eastern and southern parts of the country by “fascist terrorists” from western Ukraine, is a “Big Lie”.<sup>65</sup> Lev Gudkov, the director of the respected independent polling institute “Levada Center” said that in the whole post-Soviet period he had not seen anything that equals in intensity and aggressiveness of the propaganda in the state-controlled (Russian) media.

The “fateful years” from 2013 to 2019 are told in two interrelated volumes. While the first volume deals with the history and background of the popular uprising that started in 2013 on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv, the second volume is dedicated to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in Donbas. Thematic extensions reach into the year 2019 – and end in the first quarter of the year 2020, in which the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic forms a “natural” caesura.

---

64 In the capital city of Kyiv and in the center of the country, invading Russian soldiers would not find support among the population; in western Ukraine, a new “UPA”, a “Ukrainian Insurgent Army”, might be formed, which would unleash a partisan struggle against a Russian occupation. The historical “UPA” fought in World War II against the Red Army (and against the German Wehrmacht) and until 1954 against the NKVD. Whether enough Russian-speaking Ukrainians and ethnic Russians could be found in the east and south of Ukraine to give a Russian invasion army the appearance of a “protection force” is by no means certain – and rather unlikely.

65 Here fits the frequently quoted insight of the master of lies: “If you tell a big lie and repeat it often enough, people will believe it in the end.” Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf*, 10th chapter, *Causes of the Collapse*, p. 252. Zentralverlag der NSDAP., Frz. Eher Nachf., G. m. b. H., 851.-855. edition, Munich 1943.

This first volume is divided into three parts: from the open competition between the European Union and the Russian Federation for Ukraine's integration in 2013 in Part One, to the "Maidan", the popular uprising against the Yanukovych regime in Part Two, and to the subsequent parliamentary change of power in Part Three.

The first part of Volume I, **"Brussels and Moscow – Integration Competition over Ukraine"** deals with the "integration competition" between the European Union and the Russian Federation over Ukraine, which broke out openly in 2013.<sup>66</sup> After tough negotiations over the European Union's conditions for signing the Association Agreement—initialed back in the first half of 2012—Ukrainian President Yanukovych made a surprising about-face a few days before the planned signing in Vilnius in November 2013 after several secret meetings with Russian President Putin: President Yanukovych had his Prime Minister Mykola Azarov halt preparations for the signing ceremony.

Almost to the end, President Yanukovych himself had advocated the "historic decision for Europe" and sworn the parliamentary faction of his Russophile "Party of Regions" to the association of Ukraine with the European Union—whether out of conviction or to preserve his independence from the Kremlin is not clear.

The Russian President Putin had "bought off" his Ukrainian colleague with a short-term loan of 15 billion U.S. dollars—and saved his government from the feared "defolt" (default<sup>67</sup>), international insolvency. What "thumbscrews" the former intelligence officer Putin secretly applied was not disclosed. In any case, Ukrainian President Yanukovych demoted himself to the status of Russian President Putin's deputy in Ukraine—and Russia seemed to have won the integration competition with the European Union over Ukraine.

Ukraine—despite rhetorical assurances to the contrary—was practically presented by the European Union with the "strategic choice" of deciding between European and *Eurasian* integration. On the part of Brussels, no attempt

---

66 For a detailed description of the European Union's "Ukraine policy" and Ukraine's "euro integration policy" from mid-2012 to mid-2013, see: Winfried Schneider-Deters: Die Ukraine im Zentrum jeder Osteuropapolitik (Ukraine at the Center of Every Eastern European Policy), in: Erich Reiter (ed.): Die strategische Lage im Osten der EU (The Strategic Situation in the East of the EU), Vienna (International Institute for Liberal Politics / IILP), May 2014, pp. 35–72. Internet book: Die strategische Lage im Osten der EU.pdf (The Strategic Situation in the East of the EU.pdf). Project: Die gestalterischen Möglichkeiten der EU, Österreichs und der ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten angesichts der strategischen Lage im Osten der EU. Internationales Institut für Liberale Politik / IILP; Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik des sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitischen Beratungsorgans des Bundesministers für Landesverteidigung und Sport, des Generalstabschefs des Österreichischen Bundesheeres und anderen Dienststellen des Ministeriums. (The formative possibilities of the EU, Austria and the East-Central European states in view of the strategic situation in the East of the EU. International Institute for Liberal Politics / IILP; Directorate for Security Policy of the Security and Defense Policy Advisory Body of the Federal Minister of Defense and Sports, the Chief of Staff of the Austrian Armed Forces and other services of the Ministry).

67 The English term has entered the Ukrainian (and Russian) language as a common foreign word.



had been made to take Russia's legitimate economic interests in Ukraine into account – let alone to overcome the conflict of interests through a pan-European “synthesis,” that is, through a common free trade area between the European Union and the Russian Federation or Moscow's Eurasian constructions – “from Lisbon to Vladivostok”.

In 2013, Kyiv was exposed not only to economic threats and enticements from Moscow, but also to reservations about Ukraine's association on the part of some EU member states because of the massive democratic deficits of the Yanukovych regime – particularly because of the “Tymoshenko case”. This political judicial scandal threatened to derail the signing on the part of the European Union, i.e., the European Union was also faced with the historic decision “to sign or not to sign ...”. Almost to the end, the question was not whether President Yanukovych would sign the Association Agreement in Vilnius, but whether the European Union would do so. The final phase “before Vilnius” was an association poker between Kyiv and Brussels.

However, the “historic summit” in Vilnius on November 29, 2013, failed due to the cancellation of Ukrainian President Yanukovych. It was with this “murder of a dream” (Mustafa Naiyem) of Ukrainian youth, that Yanukovych triggered the “Euro-Maidan”.

The protest against the “turning away from Europe” quickly turned into a popular uprising against the kleptocratic regime of President Yanukovych – the initial “Euro-Maidan” became the “Madan” (See the second part).

The Association Agreement with the economic “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” (“DCFTA”) was signed and ratified in stages after the victory of the “Maidan” and after the flight of President Yanukovych to Russia.

In the second part, **“The popular uprising ‘Maidan’”** – the emergence and development of the “Maidan movement” – is described and evaluated.<sup>68</sup> The initially peaceful “Maidan” came to a bloody end on February 18 and 20, 2014, when snipers deliberately shot at street fighters – armed with plywood shields and wooden clubs. The conclusive investigation of the massacre failed due to the inability – or unwillingness? – of the Ukrainian investigative authorities.

The “(Euro-)Maidan” began absolutely peacefully on November 21, 2013; only on January 19, 2014, after the imposition of “emergency laws,” did violence break out. That day also saw the first deaths among the insurgents. On the night of November 30 to December 1 (2013), about 300 youth demonstrators held out on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti, the Independence Square, where a large protest demonstration had taken place that day against the failure to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. The young people were beaten up with brutal force by the “riot police” – the so-called “Berkut” – in the night

---

68 Hardly any political event has been so completely documented in pictures (photos and videos) as the “Maidan”. For all the author's statements about the street battles in this text, a myriad of pictorial evidence can be found on the web.

hours. The streamed videos of these bloodied “children” outraged the Kyiv population, which then gathered by the hundreds of thousands on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti to protest against “the gang” (“banda”), against Yanukovych and his henchmen. The uprising spread throughout the country – but especially in the west and center of Ukraine.

While official representatives of the European Union and the United States showed solidarity with the “Euro-Maidan,” Russian President Putin called the popular uprising a “pogrom”. But the “Maidan” was not an anti-Russian movement: “We love Russians but despise Putin” was proclaimed by a large poster (hung on the “iron fir tree” on the “Independence Square”, the Maidan Nezalezhnosti). On January 28, 2014, a partial capitulation of the regime occurred with the resignation of Prime Minister Mykola Azarov; the “emergency laws” that had been whipped through parliament on January 16, 2014, were withdrawn.

The “peaceful offensive” of the extra-parliamentary opposition on February 18, 2014, called to by opposition politicians, was answered by the regime with a violent offensive by the “Berkut,” the militia’s (barracked) special unit, which led to a street battle in the center of Kyiv. On the night of February 18/19, the “Berkut” stormed the barricaded tent village on the Maidan (the “Independence Square”) and burned half of it to the ground. Unidentified members of the militia or “internal troops” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs set fire to the top floor of the “House of Trade Unions” located on Independence Square, where the “Maidan”-Movement had its “headquarters”—and where dozens of wounded “defenders of the Maidan” lay. On February 18 and 20, snipers shot and killed about a hundred “defenders of the Maidan” on Instytutska Street (leading to the Independence Square)—honored later as the “Heavenly Hundred” (“Nebesna Sotnya”).

The use of massive violence by the Yanukovych regime prompted the governments in Paris, Berlin and Warsaw to intervene in Kyiv. Through their mediation, a “peace agreement” was reached between President Yanukovych and the leaders of the three parliamentary opposition factions. Immediately after the agreement was signed, President Yanukovych fled the city by helicopter. Immediately, the—now former—Opposition (with the votes of defectors from Yanukovych’s Party of Regions) implemented in the “Verkhovna Rada” the most important point of the agreement: the return to the 2004 constitution, but not the participation of the “Party of Regions” in a coalition “government of national reconciliation,” as envisaged by the “peace agreement.”

After President Yanukovych fled (via Crimea to Russia), a decisive change of sides took place in the Verkhovna Rada. Large parts of the deputies of the previous (regime-) “Party of Regions” voted with the previous Opposition, resulting in overwhelming majorities of up to three-quarters of the votes for the urgent laws legitimizing the change of power.

The “people of the Maidan”, the insurgent crowd on Independence Square (the Maidan Nezaležnosti)—where on the day of the “peace agreement” there was mourning over the “Heavenly Hundred”, the nearly one hundred “defenders of the Maidan” shot by snipers—rejected the “peace agreement” negotiated by the parliamentary opposition politicians.

The extraordinary session of parliament on February 20 immediately halted the “anti-terrorist operation” (“ATO”) launched by the regime against insurgents throughout the country. The withdrawal of the regime’s security forces from the center of Kyiv resembled an “orderly desertion,” allowing the insurgents to capture the government quarter without a fight.

After the president had fled, his accomplices also fled abroad in droves. The pathetic television appearance of the fugitive President Yanukovych in Rostov-on-Don (Russia) testified to his total loss of reality.

The third part, **“The Parliamentary Change of Power”**, deals with the seizure of power by the previous parliamentary Opposition. The change of power in Kyiv was a “regime change,” but not a “coup d’état,” as the Russian side persistently claims. In fact, it was a “parliamentary seizure of power” that was legitimized by the Verkhovna Rada after the flight of President Yanukovych, and by emergency legislation with a “constitutional,” (i.e., constitution-amending) two-thirds majorities. A key legislative act was the return to the parliamentary-presidential constitution of 2004.

The West promptly recognized the new power in Kyiv, while Russia discredited it as a “junta” (albeit without breaking off diplomatic relations). The early presidential election on May 25, 2014, and an early parliamentary election on October 26, 2014, gave democratic legitimacy to the “new power” in Kyiv. The elections were “a step forward” in the judgment of Western international election observers and a “victory for democracy” in the assessment of the European Union.

The magnate Petro Poroshenko—a man with exceptional political instincts—was elected president in the first round of voting. In the election to the Verkhovna Rada, the “patriotic camp” won, with a majority taken by the newly formed “Petro Poroshenko Bloc” / “BPP”. The “Maidan parties” formed a governing coalition in parliament called “European Choice” and elected the leader of the “Popular Front” party, Arseniy Yacenyuk, as prime minister (“a suicide mission,” as he himself called it). The “Oppositional Bloc,” in which the “regionalist” politicians of Yanukovych’s regime “Party of Regions” gathered—homeless after the flight of “their” president—had already announced their future role by their naming before the election.

The clarification (in fact rather an obscuration) of the—until today unpunished—“Maidan massacre” by the newly staffed authorities was sabotaged by the escape of the perpetrators, the destruction of evidence, and the obstruction of the investigation. An “International Advisory Panel” to the Council of Europe

concluded in its March 31, 2015 report, that the investigation failed in many respects to meet the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The question of the legitimacy of the "Revolution of Dignity," as the "Maidan" was called after its victory, is idle: the uprising was the exercise of "just violence" against an unjust regime by the sovereign, by the "demos" – the people.

The "Maidan," like the "Orange Revolution" ten years earlier, was an unfinished revolution; although the formal democratic order was restored, the victory of the popular uprising did not result in a change of system, but only in a change of power within the political class. Nevertheless, for Ukraine – which is not an "artificial" nation, as even renowned German politicians and historians see it, but a nation 'in statu nascendi' – the "Maidan" meant a self-assurance of its national identity, a push in its "nation building" process. President Putin, who called Ukraine "a mistake of history," was, contrary to his intention, "obstetrician" in the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation.<sup>69</sup> The "Ukrainian nationalism" that he and the Russian media incessantly warn against, is defensive patriotism; and the allegedly threatening "Ukrainian fascism" is a Russian bogeyman.

Moreover – and contrary to the trend in the European Union – the Ukrainian national feeling awakened in the course of the "Maidan" does not contradict the sense of belonging to Europe of the majority of Ukrainians.

Winfried Schneider-Deters

Kyiv and Heidelberg, October 2020

---

69 See the author's essay: Der "Euro-Majdan" – Neugeburt der ukrainischen Nation (The "Euro-Maidan" – rebirth of the Ukrainian nation, in: Ukraine-Nachrichten, 09.04.2015; [https://ukraine-nachrichten.de/euro-majdan-neugeburt-ukrainischen-nation\\_4242](https://ukraine-nachrichten.de/euro-majdan-neugeburt-ukrainischen-nation_4242)).

## Notes on Transliteration

In transliterating Cyrillic letters into Latin letters (Romanization) of Ukrainian and Russian names and terms the author uses the modified (simplified) Library of Congress (LC) transliteration – without diacritics.

Exceptions:

The author uses British Standard literation<sup>70</sup> in the following cases:

Ukrainian **є**

LC (with ligature):    **ie**

Brit. Standard:        **ye**

Ukrainian **ї**

Brit. Standard:        **yi**

Ukrainian **ю**

LC (with ligature):    **iu**

Brit. Standard:        **yu**

Ukrainian **я**

LC (with ligature):    **ia**

Brit. Standard:        **ya**

Russian **ю**

LC (with ligature):    **iu**

Brit Standard:        **yu**

Russian **я**

LC (with ligature):    **ia**

Brit. Standard:        **ya**

Uniquely Ukrainian letters:

**є** (see above)

**і**        LC:    **i**

**ї**        LC:    **i**

**ґ**        LC:    **g**

Uniquely Russian letters:

**э**        LC:    **e**

---

<sup>70</sup> In these cases the British Standard literation seems more adequate.

є	LC:	e
ѣ	LC:	y

Different transliteration of letters, that are the same in Ukrainian and Russian:

г	Ukrainian	LC:	h
	Russian	LC:	g
и	Ukrainian	LC:	y
	Russian	LC:	i

but the same transliteration despite different pronunciation:

е	Ukrainian	LC:	e
	Russian	LC:	e [ye]

The vowel > e < should be transliterated from Russian as > ye <. However, the author transliterates the Russian-Cyrillic > e < into the (the same looking) Latin > e <, in order to preserve the more familiar looking capital > E < in the frequently used word “Evropa” / “Evraziya” – true, an extravagant exception from the Library of Congress and from the British Standard rule; (the BGN/PCGN allows the iotation of > e < at the beginning of a word: > ye <). (Yevropa is transliterated from Ukrainian with the front vowel > € <.)

The letter > ъ < common to both languages, is transliterated into Latin > i < from Ukrainian and from Russian; this results in endings on two i: > ii < for certain Russian adjectives. The author considers the transliteration of the Cyrillic letter > ъ < into Latin > i < inadequate.

Украинан:	LC:	i
Русиан:	LC:	i

For the following letters the LC transliteration is the same in Ukrainian and Russian:

ж	CL:	zh
ш	CL:	sh
щ	CL:	shch
ч	CL:	ch
ц	CL:	ts

Transliteration from Cyrillic into Latin for two languages in one and the same text is confusing. For example: The Cyrillic letter > и < is transliterated into Latin > y < from Ukrainian; into Latin > i < from Russian.

The author hopes, that the reader will not pay much attention to it and concentrate on the text.

## Adopted Ukrainian Words

### *Maidan*<sup>71</sup>

The Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Russ.: Ploshchad Nezavisimosti), the “Square of Independence”, is the central square in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. “The Maidan”, as the square is called for short, was the scene of the popular uprising against the kleptocratic regime of President Yanukovych in the winter of 2013 / 2014, for which the name “Maidan” (originally “Euro-Maidan”) quickly became established.

The author uses the word Maidan without quotation marks—or the long form Maidan Nezalezhnosti—for this square in Kyiv; put in quotation marks the word “Maidan” stands for the uprising. (This distinction cannot be maintained stringently, but is nevertheless helpful.)

### *Raion*

(Ukrainian and Russian), plural raions. The territorial-administrative unit “raion” comprises a varying number of local administrative entities (villages), but also parts of larger cities. It is often (adequately) translated as “district”; the author prefers to use the Ukrainian (and Russian) term raion.

### *Oblast*

(Ukrainian and Russian), plural oblasts. An oblast is Ukraine’s primary territorial administrative unit, which comprises a varying number of raions. The word “oblast” is often translated as “region”, which does not do justice to the matter, because its meaning is too diverse.

### *Verkhovna Rada*

Verkhovna Rada” (“Supreme Council”) is the proper name of the (one-chamber) national parliament of Ukraine. The author uses this name—alongside the word (national) “Parliament”, comparably to the use of the proper names “House of Representatives” or “House of Commons” of the USA or the UK respectively.

## Geographical Names

The tenth United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names (held in New York from July 31 to August 9, 2012) recommends in its Resolution X/9, “Romanization of Ukrainian geographical names”, to adopt the “Romanization system in Ukraine” as an international system for transliteration of Ukrainian geographical names.<sup>72</sup>

71 The word Maidan is an Iranian loanword in Arabic; it found its way into the Ukrainian language via Turkey and the Crimea khanate.

72 United Nations: Tenth United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names, New York, July 31-August 9 2012; [https://mfa.gov.ua/mediafiles/files/misc/2018-10-01/2018-10-01\\_£\\_CONF101\\_144.pdf](https://mfa.gov.ua/mediafiles/files/misc/2018-10-01/2018-10-01_£_CONF101_144.pdf).

The Law on Geographical Names of May 31, 2005 provides the legal framework for the use of geographical names. By the Decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 55 "On normalization (sic, meaning standardization) of transliteration of the Ukrainian alphabet by means of the Latin alphabet" of January 27, 2010 the "Table of transliteration of the Ukrainian alphabet by means of the Latin alphabet" was approved. Since then, these unified rules of transliteration have been used for official documents, etc.

#### *Kiev*

transliteration according to the "Law on Geographic Names" (traditional spelling: **Kiev**).

In October 2018, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the #CorrectUA campaign to enforce the spelling Kyiv instead of Kiev in English-speaking countries: "Official guidance on the correct spelling and usage of Ukrainian place names. In accordance with the 10th United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names, we politely request all countries and organizations to review and where necessary, amend their usage of outdated, Soviet-era place names when referring to Ukraine."

For all geographical names the official Ukrainian transliteration is used.

#### *Donetsk and Luhansk (Russ.: Lugansk)*

The cities of Donetsk and Luhansk are the (administrative) capitals of the two oblasts of the same name, which form the coal and steel region, "Donbas".

Currently, both cities are the "capitals" of the—internationally unrecognized, self-proclaimed—"people's republics" (the "Donetsk People's Republic" / Russ.: "Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublika" / "DNR" and the "Lugansk People's Republic" / "Luganskaya Narodnaya Respublika" / "LNR", each of which covers about one third of the territory of the oblast in question).

The city of **Dnipropetrovsk** was renamed "**Dnipro**" in 2017.

#### *Odesa*

(Russ.: Odessa)

#### *Donbas*

(Russ.: Donbass)

### **Names of Persons**

#### *Ukrainian presidents:*

Leonid Kravchuk  
Leonid Kuchma  
Viktor Yushchenko  
Viktor Yanukovych



Petro Poroshenko

Volodymyr Zelenskyi (Ukr.)

(Zelensky is the transliteration commonly used in American media, among others by The Washington Post; the White House spells Zelenskyy.)

*Russian presidents:*

Mikhail Gorbachev

Boris Yeltsin

Vladimir Putin

Dimitrii Medvedev

For ethnic Ukrainians, the transcription is based on the Ukrainian Cyrillic spelling, e.g. Tymoshenko (not Russ.: Timoshenko). For them, the Ukrainian version of given names (e.g.: Ukr.: Mykola instead of Russ.: Nikolai) is used. For Ukrainians of Russian origin some ambiguity is inevitable. Occasionally, either the Russian or Ukrainian spelling respectively is placed in parentheses after a name.

In the case of Vitali Klitschko, the German DUDEN-Transliteration is used, which he uses himself.

In quotations and in the bibliography, the names of Ukrainian and Russian authors are reproduced as they appear in their publications.

## Chinese Names

In Part IV, Chinese names and terms had to be romanized. In the People's Republic of China, the official phonetic transcription of Chinese names is "Hanju Pinyin Fang'an" (Hanyii Pinyim Fang'an),<sup>73</sup> which is based on High Chinese putonghua and is increasingly gaining international acceptance against older transcriptions (not Mao Tse-tung but Mao Zedong) – without a hyphen and without an aspiration sound after the initial > ' < (e.g. Mao's wife's name is not Chiang Ch'ing, but Jiang Qing). Exceptions are well-known historical personalities such as Sun Yat-sen (instead of pinyin: Sun Zhongshan) and Chiang Kai-shek (instead of Pinyin: Jiang Jieshi), whose earlier transcription is based on the South Chinese pronunciation.

---

73 Pinyin is registered with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as ISO 7098:1991 (second edition after 1982) and thus recognized as an international standard. It has prevailed over Tongyong Pinyin (Tongyong Pinyin). Pinyin is syllable-based, because Chinese characters usually write one syllable. In multisyllabic words, if the second syllable begins with a vowel, it is separated from the preceding syllable by an apostrophe (e.g. in the city name Xí'ān).

## List of Abbreviations

AA / DCFTA	Association Agreement / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AECR	Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists
AI	Amnesty International
AIIB (A.I.I.B.)	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATO	Anti-Terrorist Operation, (Ukr.: Anty-Terorystychna Operatsiya)
BCIMEC	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CCD	Community of Common Destiny
CEDH	Cour Européenne des Droits de l'homme
CEPS	Centre for European Policy Studies
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of the Independent States
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CRI	China Radio International
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DAPD	German News Agency, Berlin
DBR	Ukr.: Derzhavne byuro rozsliduvan (Ukr.: State Bureau of Investigation)
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
“DNR”	Russ.: „Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublika” („Donetsk People’s Republic”)
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EAS	European External Action Service
EurAsEC	Eurasian Economic Community
EAES/EaES	Russ.: Evraziyskoe Ekonomicheskoe Soyuz
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ECRML	European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
EDG	European Democrats Group

EEAS	European External Action Service
EEP	Russ.: Edinoe Ekonomicheskoe Prostranstvo
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EIB	European Investment Bank
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy (former name: the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy)
ESDU	European Security and Defense Union
EPP	European People's Party
EU	Europäische Union
TEU	Treaty on the European Union (Treaty of Maastricht)
EvrAzES	Russ.: Evraziyskoe Ekonomicheskoe Soobshchestvo
ECRL	East Coast Rail Link
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FTA	Free Trade Area
GBR	Russ.: Gosudarstvennoe byuro rassledovani
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDE	Groupe Démocrate Européen
GRU	Russ.: Glavnoe razvedyvatelnoe upravlenie ("Voennaja razvedka"),
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
GTS	GasTransit System (ukr.: GazoTransportna Systema Ukrayiny)
HDI	Human Development Index (UNDP)
HPU	Ukr.: Heneralna Prokuratura Ukrayiny (The Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine)
HR / VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vicepresident of the European Commission
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HUBOZ MVS	Ukr.: Holovne upravlinnya borotby z orhanizovanoyu zlochynnisty Ministerstva vnutrishnikh sprav
INTERPOL	The International Criminal Police Organization
INEA	Innovation and Networks Executive Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOEM	International Election Observation Mission
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
JIT	Joint Investigation Team (MH 17 case)
KMDA	Ukr.: Kyivska miska derzhavna administratsiya
KGGA	Russ.: Kievskaya gorodskaya gosudarstvennaya administratsiya
KMIS	Ukr.: Kyivskyi mizhnarodnyi institut sotsiologii
„LNR”	Russ.: „Luganskaya Narodnaya Respublika” („Lugansk People's Republic")

MAP	Membership Action Plan
MERICs	Mercator Institute for China Studies
MID	Russ.: Ministerstvo inostrannykh del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MRA	Mutual Recognition Agreement
MZS	Ukr.: Ministerstvo zakordonnykh sprav (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MVD	Russ.: Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del (ministry of internal affairs, home affairs)
MVS	Ukr.: Ministerstvo vnutrishnikh sprav (ministry of internal affairs, home affairs)
NBU	Ukr.: Natsionalnyi Bank Ukrainy (National / Central Bank of Ukraine)
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission (P.R. China)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSDC	National Security and Defense Council
ODA	Ukr.: Oblasna derzhavna administratsiya
OGA	Russ.: Oblastnaya gosudarstvennaya administratsiya
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)
ODKB	Russ.: Organizatsiya Dogovora o Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OOS	Ukr.: Operatsiya Obyednannykh Syl (Operation of the United Forces)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OBOR	One Belt, One Road
OP [U]	Ukr.: Ofis Prezydenta Ukrainy
ORDLO	Russ.: Otdelnye raiony Donetskoy y Luganskoy oblastey
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PASD (S&D)	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSA	Production Sharing Agreement
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty
RNBO[U]	Ukr.: Rada Natsionalnoi Bezpeky i Oboroni Ukrainy (Russ.: Sovet nacionalnoi bezopasnosti i oboriny Ukrainy; Engl.: National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine)
SBA	Stand-by Arrangement (IMF)
SBU	Ukr.: Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrainy
SDR	Special Drawing Rights (IMF)
SNG	Russ.: Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv
START I	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I

SWIFT	Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
SREB	Silk Road Economic Belt
TEN	Trans-European Networks
TEN-T	Trans-European Transport Networks
TFEU	Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
TCG	Trilateral Contract Group for the peaceful settlement of the situation in eastern Ukraine
TS	Russ.: Tamozhennyi Soyuz
UA	Internet-TLD of Ukraine
UAH	Hryvnia (or Hryvna, ISO-Code of the national currency of Ukraine)
UCCA	Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
UDO	Ukr.: Upravlinnya derzhavnoi okhorony
UGO	Russ.: Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Okhranu
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	ISO-Code of U.S. Dollar
USUBC	U.S.-Ukraine Business Council
VO	Ukr.: Vseukrayinske obyednannya (All-Ukrainian Union)
WB	Worldbank
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
WP5D	Working Party 5 D (International Telecommunications Union)
YES	Yalta European Strategy

## Sources

The author obtained the vast majority of his information from Internet editions of periodical publications, whose coverage was followed on an ongoing basis; the details of these sources can be found in footnotes to the current text. The sources listed below were predominantly used – and others occasionally (mentioned in footnotes).

### Periodical Ukrainian and Russian Language Sources

- Ukrayinska pravda (Ukrainian-language edition) / Ukrainskaya pravda (Russian-language edition); Ukrainian Internet magazine;
- Yevropeiska pravda (Ukrainian-language edition) / Evropeiskaya pravda (Russian-language edition); Ukrainian Internet magazine;
- Dzerkalo tyzhnya. Ukrayina (Ukrainian-language edition) / Zerkalo nedeli. Ukraina (Russian-language edition); weekly printed newspaper; ZN, UA Internet edition;
- Den (The Day); Ukrainian daily newspaper; edited in three languages: Ukrainian, Russian and English.
- Kommersant-Ukraina; Russian-language Ukrainian daily newspaper;
- Korrespondent.net; Ukrainian internet journal;
- Ukrinform, national Ukrainian news agency
- Interfax-Ukraine (English-language edition); Interfaks-Ukraina (Russian-language edition), news agency;
- Informnapalm.org, Official website of the InformNapalm educational community;
- Novaya Gazeta, Russian daily newspaper; Internet edition: novayagazeta.ru;
- Meduza; Russian internet newspaper (based in Latvia);
- Ukraine Crisis Media Center, (de.presse@uacrisis.org, <https://uacrisis.org/de/>), German edition;

### Periodical German Language Sources

In addition to Internet editions of supra-regional German newspapers and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung): Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt, Die Zeit (weekly), zeit.online, and the weekly news magazine Der Spiegel, Internet edition: Spiegel online:

- Deutsche Welle / DW.DE; Internet edition ([www.dw.com](http://www.dw.com));
- Osteuropa; Journal published by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde (German Society for Eastern European Studies);
- Ukraine-Analysen, published by the Research Centre for Eastern Europe, University of Bremen;