

TRACKING THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT GLOBALLY

William Allchorn (ed.)



William Allchorn (Ed.)

Tracking the Rise of the Radical Right Globally

CARR Yearbook 2018/2019

William Allchorn (Ed.)

TRACKING THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT GLOBALLY

CARR Yearbook 2018/2019

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

Cover illustration: © copyright 2019 by Tea Jahrehorn

ISBN-13: 978-3-8382-7326-6

© *ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart 2019

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und elektronische Speicherformen sowie die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronical, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

Contents

List of Figures	13
List of Tables.....	13
Preface by William Allchorn	15
 1. IDEOLOGY AND THE RADICAL RIGHT	
‘Pinkwashing’ And Homonationalism In The Radical Right <i>Megan Armstrong.....</i>	19
Islamophobia Is Not Fiction Or A Harry Potter Fantasy: It's Racism And It's Time We Accepted That <i>Imran Awan</i>	23
The Radical Right And Its Faith In Ethnic Nationalism <i>Tamir Bar-On</i>	27
What's Wrong With Antisemitism? <i>Roland Clark</i>	33
Anti-Muslim Hate: The Definition Problem <i>Sadie Chana</i>	37
The Return Of Nationalism And The Rise Of The Radical Right <i>Maureen A. Eger</i>	41
Concept Structures And The Far-Right <i>Andreas Dafnos</i>	45
Islamophobia, Racism And The Far-Right ... And The Right ... And The Left ... <i>Aristotle Kallis.....</i>	49
Right? Left? Neither? Why Radical Right Parties Reject The Politics Of Left And Right <i>Marta Lorimer</i>	53
Right-Wing Nationalism Has Become A Collaborative International Enterprise <i>Paul Stocker</i>	57

2. HISTORICAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE RADICAL RIGHT

Eugenics: White Nationalists Continue To Turn To The False Theory Of Genetic Supremacy

David Barnes 63

Searchlight On Bulldog: A Historical Case Study In UK Anti-Fascist Practice

Paul Jackson 67

The British Radical Right's Connection To The Past

Daniel Jones 75

From Imperialism To Transnational White Nativism: The Context Of The Radical Right Reaction To The “Rivers Of Blood” Speech

Liam Liburd 79

The Anti-Democratic Faces Of Modernism—Part One

Henry Mead 83

The Anti-Democratic Faces Of Modernism—Part Two

Henry Mead 87

The Postwar Radical Right, British Decline And Conspiracy Theory

Paul Stocker 91

Remembering The ‘Battle of Stockton’

Dan Stone 95

Trump And Mussolini

Leonard Weinberg 99

Babi Yar: Mass Murder In Kiev

Chris Webb 103

3. EUROPE'S RADICAL RIGHT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, POLITICAL PARTIES & DRIVERS

Is A New Style Of Politics Coming To Spain?

Carmen Aguilera-Carnerero 109

Towards A New ‘Populist’ Party? UKIP's Interim Manifesto And The Future Of The UK Radical Right

William Allchorn 113

“Hipster Fascists”: The Normalization Of The Radical Right Isn't Just Happening In America

Chris Allen 117

Gender, Identity, And The Radical Right <i>Megan Armstrong</i>	121
Are Right-Wing Voters Being Duped? Or, Why Sane People Voted Fascist <i>Roland Clark</i>	125
The Decline Of The Left And The Populist Radical Right Surge In The Refugee Crisis <i>James F. Downes</i>	129
The Sweden Democrats Remain Deeply Unpopular Despite Making Gains <i>Maureen A. Eger & Mikael Hjerm</i>	135
Europe Is Caught In A Wheel Of Xenophobia <i>Valery Engel</i>	139
Practicing The Radical Right Exit: The Case Of The Völkisch Settlers <i>Maik Fielitz</i>	149
Fancy A Show? Neo-Nazi Concerts In Germany <i>Bernhard Forchtner</i>	153
Voting Radical Right In Western Europe “Rules Of The Game” <i>Terri E. Givens</i>	157
What's The Matter With Saxony? <i>Hans-Georg Betz</i>	161
Why We Shouldn't Call The Far-Right An Unpopular Minority <i>Julian Göppfarth</i>	165
Scenes Of ‘Civil War’? Radical Right Narratives On Chemnitz <i>Barbara Manthe</i>	169
The Rise Of Fascist Fashion: Clothing Helps The Far-Right Sell Their Violent Message <i>Cynthia Miller-Idriss</i>	175
Myths Of National Rebirth: The Case Of Alternative Für Deutschland <i>Özgür Özvatan & Bernhard Forchtner</i>	179
The Appeal Of Populist Nationalism In The Age Of Accelerated Change <i>Cathrine Thorleifsson</i>	183

Norway Has Failed To Combat A Climate Of Hate <i>Mette Wiggen</i>	187
PEGIDA Turns 4—Will AfD Be Among The Well-Wishers? <i>Manès Weisskircher</i>	191
“Driving On The Right”—The Austrian Case <i>Ruth Wodak</i>	195
 4. THE US ALT-RIGHT AND RADICAL RIGHT UNDER TRUMP	
From The Plantation To The Caravan: America's History Of White Nationalism <i>David Barnes</i>	203
Reintroducing Dugin To The Alt-Right: Lauren Southern And Brittany Pettibone's Recent Interview <i>Bharath Ganesh</i>	207
This Flag Is Your Flag, This Flag Is My Flag: The Alt-Right's Appropriation Of The American Flag <i>Bethan Johnson</i>	211
The Far-Right's Transatlantic Money Train <i>Daniel Jones</i>	219
Revisiting Some Recent Literature On The Alt-Right <i>Rob May</i>	223
The Curious Case Of Daryl Davis, The Black Man Befriending Members Of The KKK <i>Mark Potok</i>	227
The Traditionalist Workers Party: It's Not All Tweets And Likes <i>Lella Nouri</i>	233
Donald Trump Declares Himself A “Nationalist” <i>Cathrine Thorleifsson</i>	237
Donald Trump: The Odd Link Between American Jews And The Alt-Right <i>Leonard Weinberg</i>	241

5. THE RADICAL RIGHT BEYOND WESTERN EUROPE AND THE US

Brazil's Bolsonaro Is The Latest Incarnation Of The Radical Right In Latin America

Tamir Bar-On 247

When Liberals Have Had Enough: A New Wave of Protests In Romania

Roland Clark 251

Bolsonaro: Radical Right-Wing Populism Reaches Brazil

Juliana Chueri 257

Right-Wing Radicalism In The Post-Soviet Space

Valery Engel 261

Hungary's Population Crisis: More Babies And Less Migrants

Katherine Kondor 265

Marching With Dabrowski: What The Centenary Of Polish Independence Can Tell Us About The Radical Right?

Balsa Lubarda 251

Is Poland The New Hub For The Radical Right?

Rob May 273

Hungary And The End Of Democracy

Samuel Salzborn 277

Is He A Fascist? The Election Of Jair Bolsonaro

Louie Dean Valencia-García 281

Hindutva's Fascination With Cattle Science

Palak Rao 285

They're Not All White, But All Alt-Patriots

Jade Hutchinson 289

6. RADICAL RIGHT TERRORISM, VIOLENCE & COUNTER-TERRORISM

The National Action Trial, Nazi Fetishism, And The Neo-folk Conundrum

Benjamin Bland 297

German Right-Wing Terrorism

Samuel Salzborn 301

The Radical Right's Legitimisation Of Vehicle Ramming <i>Yannick David Veilleux-Lepage</i>	305
Reciprocal Radicalisation—Practical Examples Of Prevent Support <i>Sean Arbuthnot</i>	309
Here's How We Should Combat Radical Right-Wing Terrorism <i>William Baldet</i>	313
Time To “Wake Up” To The Threat Of The Radical Right <i>Craig McCann</i>	317
Mapping The Malleability Of British Values <i>Natalie James</i>	321
The Role Of Ideology In Radical Right Violence: Lessons From America <i>Katherine Parsons</i>	325
The Under-Discussed Recent History Of The Radical Right Terrorism In Germany <i>Barbara Manthe</i>	331
Greece's Problem With Radical Right Violence And The Politics Of History <i>Maik Fielitz</i>	335
 7. SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE RADICAL RIGHT	
I Was Blocked On Social Media By Tommy Robinson: Now Twitter Are Removing His Hate <i>Imran Awan</i>	341
Catalyst Or Catharsis: Inside The DFLA Secret Facebook Groups <i>William Baldet</i>	345
Automated Event Extraction Tools For The Study Of The Far-Right <i>Andreas Dafnos</i>	349
The Ramifications Of The #IAmSoldierX Campaign <i>Jacob Davey</i>	355
“Just Joking” Is No Joke: How The Alt-Right Really Communicates Online <i>Matthew Feldman</i>	359

Tech That Counters Online Islamic Extremism Must Also Focus On Right-Wing Extremism	
<i>Bharath Ganesh</i>	363
Analyzing YouTube “Rekt” Videos As A Vector For Radicalization	
<i>Brian Hughes</i>	369
Far-Right Hate Group ‘Britain First’ (That Trump Retweeted) Joins Gab	
<i>Lella Nouri & Amy-Louise Watkin</i>	373
‘Finspång’—An Execution Meme Of The Swedish Radical Right Ignites The Political Discourse	
<i>Andreas Önnersfors</i>	379
Women Of The Radical Right On Facebook	
<i>Megan Squire</i>	385
 8. CARR 2018 BIBLIOGRAPHY	
Books.....	395
Articles	411

List of Figures

Figure 1:	Nationalism in Western European Party Politics by Party Family, 1970–2015	43
Figure 2:	Conceptualising the Far Right	47
Figure 3:	Searchlight Magazine, February 1975.....	68
Figure 4:	Bulldog Magazine, August 1983.....	69
Figure 5:	Battle of Stockton, North-Eastern Daily Gazette, 11 September 1933	96
Figure 6:	How many Muslims (%) are in the Voluntary Ghetto?	140
Figure 7:	The Wheel of Xenophobia.....	144
Figure 8:	KKK Parade Washington D.C. 1925.....	213
Figure 9:	The Conceptual Components of Alt-Patriotism	290
Figure 10:	Expansion of the Radical Right Identity	291
Figure 11:	Perpetrators of VRA by ideology.....	306
Figure 12:	Screenshots taken from DFLA secret Facebook group, September 2018	346
Figure 13:	Volume of Twitter traffic engaging with the #IAmSoldierX campaign.....	356
Figure 14:	‘Pepe the Frog’ Wearing Swastika T-Shirt.....	360
Figure 15:	‘Pepe the Frog’ Carrying Mein Kampf.....	360
Figure 16:	Gender of first names of Facebook users, by ideology	388
Figure 17:	Five ideologies with “wheat fields” for women	389
Figure 18:	Four ideologies without “wheat fields” for women	391
Figure 19:	Some radical right anti-government/militia groups attract women but are not designed for women	392

List of Tables

Table 1:	Statements Representative of Nationalist or Globalist Sentiment	42
Table 2:	“Which political party do you like LEAST?”	136
Table 3:	“Which political party do you like LEAST? by vote in previous national election”	137
Table 4:	Radical Right Facebook groups, divided by primary ideology	386
Table 5:	Results of gender resolution process	387
Table 6:	Error estimation for gender guessers	387

Preface

This volume wouldn't have been made possible without a consortium of over sixty senior and early career fellows who have been diligently submitting blogs as part of a new academic initiative to provide serious analysis on a serious world issue. The Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR) was officially launched in April 2018 and is chaired by a group of researchers (Professor Matthew Feldman, Professor Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Dr William Allchorn, Dr Archie Henderson and Ms Eviane Leidig) who grapple with the issue of radical right from many complementary and different geographical angles. The blogs selected to form the essays you see before you come from several hundred available at the CARR website (www.radicalrightanalysis.com) and comprise the most read articles in the year 2018. The level of uptake and readership of these articles are in no small part down to our Centre's media partners where many of these blogs were first published, including Rant Media, Fair Observer and Open Democracy. Special thanks goes to Ahmed Baba, Anna Pivovarchuk and Rosemary Bechler for their diligent work in posting these.

This Yearbook therefore pulls together the best commentary and analysis from an international consortium of expert scholars examining the ebb and flow of radical right movements from around the world. Starting with a concise analysis of the current ideological currents present within the radical right, the volume then looks at the historical precursors of the present moment—taking in historical events and movements crucial to understanding contemporary manifestations of radical right politics. It then takes the reader on an international journey into the key happenings in the year 2018—both in the Western European context of the UK, Germany, Scandinavia and Austria, but also the Americas and finally through non-Western manifestations of the radical right. This de-centred approach to radical right scholarship is increasingly important as we see the spread of the phenomena outside of the European context and into South Asia and America.

The book ends with a thematic analysis of key tactics and issues related to the radical right that continue to prey on the minds of researchers and academics. What are the challenges of radical right terrorism and counter-terrorism in the present moment, and how are radical right movements using the online space in order mobilize and attract support away from the mainstream? The penultimate two sections therefore contain articles that focus on these key challenges—noting key developments in the

fields of radical right terrorism, counter terrorism and the radical right's use of social media.

Such a survey therefore provides a unique snapshot of global developments in 2018 that shows a serious and sustained engagement with trends shaping and reshaping the politics and societal attitudes of many voters, citizens and private individuals in the contemporary moment. This collection will be useful to scholars and practitioners grappling with the phenomena as well as providing a useful introduction to students and interested members of the public alike. Given the explosion of scholarship on the radical right in recent years, such a collection provides a useful roadmap of trends that should concern us all.

Returning to the start of this preface, a dictum commonly used in military parlance—but also hijacked by the radical right—might be a useful entry point to this volume for the reader. Hailing from the Latin *prae-monitus praemunitus*, the phrase ‘forewarned is forearmed’ seems relevant as ever when engaging with the radical right. Examining the radical right, both exposes the pathologies of this phenomenon but also the pathologies of our politics and society—namely the lack of integration of certain members of society into the political system and the persistence of racial prejudice. This volume therefore should provoke in us a great deal of introspection about the radical right but also how certain legitimate demands can be integrated back into formal politics and how—as a society—we can combat discrimination of all kinds. It is to these challenges that the following contributions speak.

Dr William Allchorn
Leeds, United Kingdom
January 2019

1. Ideology And The Radical Right

‘Pinkwashing’ And Homonationalism In The Radical Right

Megan Armstrong

Queer politics and queer interests occupy different, dynamic, and tense spaces in the radical right. LGBTQ+ issues have been consistently part of the conversation, sometimes through blatant homophobia, sometimes through accusations of “their” homophobia. The former speaks to the conservative roots of radical right groups, and reflects what is ultimately nostalgia, and a desire for a mythic past of nuclear and (preferably) nativist families who are headed by heterosexual couples. This nostalgia produces some common ultra-conservative social policies and a virulent form of anti-liberal politics, including anti-feminism, anti-migrant, and ultimately a default anti-LGBTQ+ position with regards to minority rights.

But, and somewhat paradoxically, there has recently been an attempt to bring LGBTQ+ people into the fold of radical right groups. While surprising on the face of it, it reflects in many respects the differences between the old radical right (or classical fascism) and the new. To be sure, there are similarities, including a belief in (or nostalgia for) a mythic and homogenous national character that is extremely exclusionary. But the new radical right appears focused on new targets that reflect the contemporary political landscape—the formation of the EU, the global threat of terrorism, and the digital age.

The UK-based anti-Islam movement, the English Defence League, for example, had its own LGBTQ+ division, and of course Milo Yiannopoulos was once the darling of the American alt-right. A claim to being pro-gay and pro-lesbian is important for groups that want to appear palatable to mainstream society where mainstream society has at least some outward-facing acceptance of equality, or where appearing anti-LGBTQ costs politically. To understand how this (at least) pro-gay and pro-lesbian rhetoric emerges from otherwise virulently exclusionary movements, it’s useful to turn to the concepts of homonationalism and pinkwashing.

Homonationalism And Pinkwashing

Jasbir K. Puar (2007) coined the term ‘homonationalism’ to capture how tolerance and acceptance for LGBTQ+ citizens has become a benchmark against which states are measured in positive or negative lights.¹ In simple terms, homonationalism can be understood as bringing LGBTQ+ people into liberalism and into the national conversation—the Obama administration in the United States, for instance, made gay rights a central pillar of its foreign policy. Homonationalism brings (at least some) LGBTQ+ people into the fold of citizenry, in a departure from historic exclusionary practices. Puar argues that this stands as evidence of social progression and modernity. “Gay rights”, then, are used as a way of demonstrating Western superiority over the backwards ‘others’ of the world. Homonationalism, according to Puar, makes pinkwashing possible. ‘Pinkwashing’ can refer to specific tactics, policies, or practices by states or groups that use gay-rights or LGBT-friendly policies to mask or to draw attention away from violent, exclusionary, or otherwise negative policies and practices. If homonationalism refers to the large-scale, historical and global processes at play, pinkwashing refers to the specific practices and policies of governments and groups.

In addition to potentially masking the many ways in which LGBTQ+ people (and quite notably transpeople) are still vulnerable in Western European countries, homonationalism and pinkwashing have been carried into the discourses of the radical right in Western Europe. Interestingly the reverse is true in some countries such as Poland, where equality is held up as a dividing line between a stridently socially conservative and Catholic East vs. a socially liberal and Protestant West.

Liberal Illiberalism In The Radical Right

Writing for the *Gay and Lesbian Review Worldwide*, Robert Deam Tobin (2017) argues that: “[the] acceptance of sexual minorities [by the radical right can be] seen as a triumph of liberal ideas from the Enlightenment, demonstrating the superiority of Western culture.”² Tobin refers to this as the “right-wing liberal approach to homosexuality”, which celebrates “the

1 Puar, J.K., *Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2017).

2 Tobin, R., ‘Gays for Trump? Homonationalism Has Deep Roots’, *The Gay and Lesbian Review*, 2017, <https://glreview.org/article/gays-for-trump-homonationalism-has-deep-roots/>

liberty of gays in a pluralistic society". This is picked up in the work of Benjamin Moffitt (2017) and what he calls a "liberal illiberalism" of, in particular, populist radical right (PRR) groups.³ He uses this term to highlight how these parties selectively reconfigure traditionally liberal defences of discriminated-against groups—such as homosexuals or women—to attack elites and the supposedly illiberal Muslim "Other". Bringing in more socially liberal ideas is good strategy, particularly for groups that are trying to put distance between themselves and negative associations.

In Western Europe (and for good measure the United States), homonationalism has become a racialised concept. Quoting *Vice* quoting Owen Jones: "Far-right groups ... try to cynically appropriate gay rights for Islamophobia."⁴ Here in the United Kingdom, the rights of LGBTQ+ people are something the radical right declares is in need of protection against the backward foreign cultures that have "invaded" Britain. In France, Marine Le Pen made similar claims that the FN would protect the LGBTQ+ community from "Islamist violence" in a reversal of her father's position.⁵

Why This Matters

To be clear, the problems of homonationalism and pinkwashing are the use of the LGBTQ+ community as a smokescreen to mask the radical right's violent exclusionary rhetoric against other marginalised groups, such as Muslims and migrants. Queer people of colour, queer migrants, and queer Muslims can still be, and often are, targets of the radical right. The pinkwashing of the radical right is, like the homonationalism of the United States post-9/11, complicated and problematic, often occurring at the expense of other marginalised groups even within the LGBTQ+ community. Violence against trans people, including lethal violence,⁶ is on the rise, with trans women of colour particularly at risk of violence and death.

3 Moffitt, B., 'Liberal illiberalism? The reshaping of the contemporary populist radical right in Northern Europe,' *Politics and Governance*, 5 no.4 (2017), pp. 112–122.

4 Wilkinson, S., 'Is It Okay to Be Gay (and in the Far-Right)?', *Vice*, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/ywqd55/is-it-okay-to-be-gay-and-in-the-far-right.

5 Wildman, S., 'Marine Le Pen wants to protect France's LGBTQ community—but opposes same-sex marriage,' *Vox*, 2018, <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/5/5/15542242/marine-le-pen-french-elections-gay-outreach>.

6 Human Rights Campaign, 'Violence Against the Transgender Community in 2018,' <https://www.hrc.org/resources/violence-against-the-transgender-community-in-2018>.

It should raise questions of how far the support for LGBTQ+ people actually runs in these groups. For example, who are “the people” that need protecting from the “Others”? And, according to different contexts, who is in need of protection in one space may be different from those who needs protection in another. Across Western Europe, gay rights have become a banner of superiority in radical right nationalism, where the inclusion of some minorities has become a justification for the exclusion of others. We also need to be aware of the trend of faux homonationalism outside the radical right, and to not be complacent in the progress that has been made already when equal rights for the LGBTQ+ community is still far off.

Dr Megan A. Armstrong is a Senior Fellow at CARR, and is a Fellow in Gender and Security in the Department of Gender Studies at the London School of Economics.

Islamophobia Is Not Fiction Or A Harry Potter Fantasy: It's Racism And It's Time We Accepted That

Imran Awan

As I sat down this morning and switched on my computer. I couldn't help but notice the headline in the Spectator, '*The Islamophobia' problem*. I probably shouldn't have been surprised that the author was Douglas Murray.⁷ In his latest tirade of anti-Muslim scaremongering, Murray was contemplating the roots of Islamophobia. For Murray, Islamophobia—in his words—was created by *fascists*. I've been called a lot of things but never a fascist.

It's hard however to be critical of Murray since he only seems to follow the right-wing script. Another Spectator author Rod Liddle, for example, has questioned how moderate Muslims really are?⁸ And, to reach for a more far-fetched example, Melanie Phillips believes Islamophobia is part of the Harry Potter fantasy franchise,⁹ i.e. it is all fiction or as Harry Potter would say it's part of a magical spell called Animagus—where academics like myself have the ability to change ourselves from a human being to a rabbit. At Hogwarts, they may be able to cast such spells, but in reality victims of Islamophobia just want to break the spell and be treated equally and fairly.

So as the detractors start to come out and begin whipping up fear, let's remember that this is a momentous occasion in the history of British politics. After giving evidence to the All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims about the need to forget semantics and start defining what we mean by Islamophobia, I was thrilled to see their *Islamophobia Defined* report—published on Monday—stated that:

"Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness."¹⁰

7 Murray, D., 'The 'Islamophobia' problem', *The Spectator*, November 2018, <https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2018/11/the-islamophobia-problem/>.

8 Liddle, R., 'How moderate are moderate Muslims?' *The Spectator*, April 2016, <https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/04/how-moderate-are-moderate-muslims/>.

9 Phillips, M., 'Islamophobia is a fiction to shut down debate,' *The Times*, May 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/islamophobia-is-a-fiction-to-shut-down-debate-wwtzggnc7>.

10 All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 'Islamophobia Defined,' December 2018, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/599c3d2febdbd1a90cfe8da9/t/5bfd1ea3352f531a6170ceee/1543315109493/Islamophobia+Defined.pdf>.

On a personal note this definition is significant, because it resonates with research that Dr Irene Zempi and I have published into the effects of Islamophobia on those people with a perceived Muslim identity, i.e. individuals from the Sikh community.¹¹ It also represents another important milestone, in that it interprets Islamophobia as a 'new' form of racism, whereby Islam, tradition and culture are seen as a 'threat' to the British/Western values.

Islamophobia is the umbrella concept used—in its broadest sense—to describe incidents motivated by hate, hostility or prejudice towards an individual's identity.¹² Despite the rise of Islamophobic attacks across Europe, from being verbally and physically attacked, threatened and harassed as well as their property being damaged.¹³ These incidents usually happen in public spaces, on trains, buses, and shopping centres, our research has shown that the impacts upon victims include physical, emotional, psychological, and economic damage.¹⁴

Despite all this, there are still those who wish to crush any mention of the word Islamophobia in the English lexicon. Indeed, Tommy Robinson, the former leader of the English Defence League and someone who openly holds anti-Muslim views, recently told the media he did not care if he incited fear of Muslims.

In light of popular debates about British values and national identity, immigration and community cohesion, biological racism has ceased to be acceptable; nevertheless, a racism which emphasises the 'Other', alien values of Muslims has increased. Moreover, this shows us that the notion of racism is largely rooted in frames of inclusion and exclusion, specifying who may legitimately belong to a particular national, or other community whilst, at the same time, determining what that community's norms are; thereby justifying the exclusion of those who's religion or culture assign them elsewhere. From this premise, there is such a strong attachment to 'our' way of life that creates boundaries between 'them' and 'us' founded upon difference rather than inferiority.

11 Osborne, S., 'British men suffering Islamophobic abuse because they 'look Muslim', reveals research,' *The Independent*, 18th October 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/muslim-hate-abuse-racism-uk-verbal-physical-emotional-look-beards-islamophobia-research-a8005156.html>.

12 Awan, I. & Zempi, I., *Islamophobia: Lived Experiences of Online and Offline Victimization*, (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016).

13 Marsh, S., 'Record number of anti-Muslim attacks reported in UK last year,' *The Guardian*, 20th July 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/20/record-number-anti-muslim-attacks-reported-uk-2017>.

14 Awan, I. & Zempi, I., *The Routledge International Handbook of Islamophobia*, (London: Routledge, 2019).

As the latest hate crime statistics show us, Islam and Muslims find themselves under siege.¹⁵ Muslim men have emerged as the new ‘folk devils’ of popular and media imagination, being portrayed as the embodiment of extremism and terrorism, whilst Muslim women have emerged as a sign of gender subjugation in Islam, being perceived as resisting integration by wearing a headscarf or face veil. Such stereotypes provide fertile ground for expressions of Islamophobia in the public sphere. Following this line of argument, Islamophobia manifests itself as an expression of anti-Muslim hostility towards individuals identified as Muslims on the basis of their ‘visible’ Islamic identity.

Following trigger events such as Brexit, we commonly find Muslim individuals and communities being the victims of racist attacks. In the UK, this was often described by perpetrators as ‘Paki-bashing’ in the 1980s and part of the global war on terror post 9/11. Islamophobic victimisation, however, quickly became understood as a ‘new’ form of cultural racism on the basis that there was a shift from race to religion. While the ‘old’ racism was based on an explicit belief in biological superiority, the ‘new’ racism is based on notions of religious and cultural superiority. ‘Paki-bashing’ has been replaced by ‘Muslim-bashing’ as a new dangerous street phenomenon.¹⁶ Whereas ten years ago perpetrators might have focused on black and Asian people as potential targets, now their sole focus for attack are Muslims. In light of the recent racist attacks, experiences of Islamophobic victimisation feels like ‘history repeating itself’.

Vocabulary is important and the consequences of not having a definition can have direct impacts on those who are deemed vulnerable. Using the correct terminology is important and being able to absorb and use this within the framework of racism allows this to be merged alongside freedom of speech. In essence, it requires that language and behaviour that display hatred against Muslims and those that are perceived to be Muslim are now taken much more seriously. The *Islamophobia Defined* report therefore helps us arrive at a new national understanding of how to identify anti-Muslim hatred in our midst in twenty-first century Britain.

Professor Imran Awan is a Senior Fellow at CARR and Professor in Criminology at the Centre for Applied Criminology in Birmingham City University.

15 Home Office, ‘Hate crime, England and Wales, 2017 to 2018,’ 16th October 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2017-to-2018>.

16 Mughal, F., ‘THE ‘PUNISH A MUSLIM’ LETTERS WERE TARGETED TO CAUSE MAXIMUM FEAR, BUT THEY HAVE BROUGHT COMMUNITIES TOGETHER,’ CARR Insight’s Blog, 6th April 2018 <https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2018/04/06/the-punish-a-muslim-letters-were-targeted-to-cause-maximum-fear-but-they-have-brought-communities-together/>.

The Radical Right And Its Faith In Ethnic Nationalism

Tamir Bar-On

The Radical Right Marches On

The radical right is on the march throughout Europe. In France, Marine Le Pen's *Front National* (FN—National Front) gained 33.9 % of the popular vote (10,638,475 votes) in the second round of the French presidential election in 2017. The FN had doubled its vote total compared to Jean-Marie Le Pen's presidential run in 2002. The Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) was invited into the Conservative-led coalition government in 2017 and its presidential candidate gained a stunning 46 % of the popular vote in 2016. Railing against immigrants and refugees, the EU, and the financier George Soros, Victor Orbán was recently re-elected prime minister in Hungary. Two scholars of the radical right, Pytlas and Mudde, insist that Orbán's government is ideologically on the radical right (like *Jobbik*, the Movement for a Better Hungary,¹⁷ the country's second most popular party).¹⁸ In 2015, Orbán even called for internment camps for illegal immigrants. After the 2017 federal election in Germany, the anti-immigrant Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD) became the third largest party in the country, gaining 94 seats in the *Bundestag*. This was the first time the party won any seats in the *Bundestag*.

Yet, it should be pointed out that the early successes of one radical right-wing party, the French FN, could be dated back to the 1980s. Under the charismatic leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FN gained seats in local, regional, national, and EU elections by 'focusing on immigration—the bread and butter of the contemporary radical right.'¹⁹ The FN thus built the template for the successes of all radical right-wing parties from the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) to the Swiss People's

17 The full name in Hungarian is *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*.

18 Mudde, Cas., *On Extremism and Democracy in Europe*, (New York: Routledge, 2016). Pytlas, Bartek, (ed.), *Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Mainstream party competition and electoral fortune*, (New York: Routledge, 2016).

19 Bar-On, Tamir, *The Radical Right and Nationalism*, In Rydgren, Jens. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 20.

Party²⁰: Play the anti-immigration card. De Lange notes how by the 1990s and the new millennium radical right-wing parties joined coalition governments in Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.²¹

The Radical Right's Ethnic Nationalism

I recently penned a piece called 'The Radical Right and Nationalism' in Jens Rydgren's edited volume called *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*.²² The book contains a whopping 760 pages. It is an overview of the latest scholarship on the radical right. The early chapters are an intriguing read, including pieces on the radical right and Islamophobia, antisemitism, populism, fascism, and Euroskepticism by leading intellectuals studying the radical right.²³ It also includes case studies on Russia, the USA, Australia, Israel, Japan, and various countries in Europe. Chapters on a number of countries in Latin America would have been useful. After all, the eminent historian of fascism, Stanley Payne, suggested that Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina was one of the few fascists outside of Europe after World War Two.²⁴

Interestingly, it was a year earlier that *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (2017) was released. It is edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. This work is divided into themes rather than country-based case studies. Differing from *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, this edited volume saw populism as *the* defining feature of the new radical right-wing parties.

In contrast, I suggest that populists come in many ideological stripes from the radical right to radical left and beyond. Moreover, the defining

20 German: *Schweizerische Volkspartei*, SVP; Romansh: *Partida populara Svizra*, PPS, also known as the Democratic Union of the Centre; French: *Union démocratique du centre*, UDC; Italian: *Unione Democratica di Centro*, UDC.

21 De Lange, Sarah L., *Radical Right-Wing Parties in Office*. In Backes, Uwe and Moreau, Patrick. (ed), *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives*, (Göttingen, Niedersachsen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2018), p. 173, 192

22 This piece is adapted from Bar-On, Tamir, *The Radical Right and Nationalism*. In Rydgren, Jens. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

23 These include the following: Aristotle Kallis, Ruth Wodak, Hans-Georg Betz, Nigel Copsey, and Sofia Vasilopoulou.

24 Payne, Stanley G., *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 347.

feature of political parties (such as the FN, FPÖ or Jobbik) is *ethnic nationalism* rather than populism. That is, these parties privilege ethnic as opposed to more liberal, civic variants of nationalism.²⁵ Ethnic nationalists valorize tribal solidarity, an emotional and mystical connection to an idealized past, and national development. In contrast, civic nationalism focuses on liberal universalism, rationality, individual rights and self-transcendence, and a community of numerous sovereign states living in harmony. Civic nationalists stress the unity of all social and ethnic groups born on the national territory. In theory, they provide members of dominant and non-dominant ethnic groups with access to citizenship, welfare benefits, and government jobs. In contrast, ethnic nationalists promote *national preference*, which allows the state to privilege nationals or ‘pure nationals’ above non-nationals.

Discourses Of The Radical Right

In my piece, I examined seven of the most common discourses used by the radical right linked to *ethnic nationalism*—the key animating feature of this radical right family.

1. The first discourse I identified linked to ethnic nationalism were fears of threats to cultural and national identity and even ethnic survival stemming from: capitalist globalization, Americanization, terrorism, and especially pro-immigration ‘demographic swamping’ and cultural ghettos created through the growing presence of non-white and Muslim immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.
2. The second discourse I identified at the heart of the radical right's ethno-nationalist conception was a perception that established national political parties and the EU ‘collude’ to create a permissive immigration regime and support multiculturalism, which in turn leads to the ‘destruction’ of the nation and ultimately a ‘one-world civilization’.²⁶

25 Kohn, Hans, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2008), p. 574.

26 Faye, Guillaume, *Le système à tuer les peuples*. (Paris: Copernic, 1981). Faye, Guillaume, *La colonisation de l'Europe: discours vrai sur l'immigration et l'Islam*. (Paris: Encre, 2000).

3. The third discourse was centred around the idea that various EU states spend too much money on a welfare state designed for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers to the detriment of 'original' European nationals.
4. The fourth discourse was about the notion that government jobs, citizenship laws, state support for corporations, or educational curricula discriminate against nationals and favor 'foreigners.'
5. In the fifth discourse, I noted that foreigners are equated with rampant criminality, the breakdown of law and order, and unemployment (of European nationals) and an excess of foreigners. During the 1984 European elections, the FN used the slogan 'Two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work.'²⁷
6. The sixth ethno-nationalist discourse identified was the idea that the EU causes the loss of national sovereignty because it leads to the 'impotence' of national parliaments, and undermines popular, democratic participation. The EU, here, is viewed as anti-democratic and contrary to the will of the dominant ethnic majority, as a threat to the existence of homogeneous nations and sovereign states, and as steps toward a universal, 'totalitarian' world order in which equality and cultural sameness reign.²⁸
7. The final element of radical right ethno-nationalist discourse is the tendency towards conspiracy theories, scapegoats, and 'the politics of fear'²⁹ directed against 'enemies' whether internal (e.g., liberals, socialists, Muslims, Jews, Roma, etc.) or external (e.g., Zionists, the EU, the United States, capitalism, etc.). Ultimately, the radical right wants to make the boundaries of the state equivalent with those of the titular and dominant ethnic group,³⁰ as well as to cleanse the nation of these internal and external 'enemies'.

27 Chebel d'Appollonia, Ariane, *Frontiers of Fear Immigration and Insecurity in the United States*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), p. 241.

28 Griffin, Roger, Interregnum or endgame? The radical right in the 'post-fascist' era, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 5, no. 2, (2000): 163–178.

29 Fennema, Meindert, Populist Parties of the Right, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series 04/01, 2000, pp. 10–12.

Wodak, Ruth, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, (London: Sage, 2015).

30 Bar-On, Tamir. The Front National and the 'Religion' of Ethnic Nationalism, *Sightings*, April 20th 2017, <https://divinity.uchicago.edu/sightings/front-national-and-religion-ethnic-nationalism>.

Conclusion

For the radical right-wing parties, we can confidently posit that the true faith is not Christianity, but rather the ‘sacred’ nation and ethnic nationalism. This ethnic nationalism favors ‘natives’ above foreigners in society and the state. It complains that the ‘true racism’ is the liberal state’s pro-immigration, pro-minority, and pro-multiculturalism regime, which ‘discriminates’ against ‘natives’.

The ethnic nationalist core of the radical right therefore raises three questions: Are they fascists? Are they populists? Or, are they the true democrats? While it is out of the scope of this article to suggest answers to all three, the ethno-nationalist core of radical right parties does pose a challenge to mainstream democrats of all political stripes. The radical right has brought issues to the forefront, particularly in relation to immigration, sovereignty, and national identity. How established parties of the left and the right respond will determine the amount of oxygen such ideas receive. Are we, as mainstream democrats, up to this challenge?

Professor Tamir Bar-On is a Senior Fellow with CARR and Professor-Researcher in the School of Social Sciences and Government at Tecnológico de Monterrey.

What's Wrong With Antisemitism?

Roland Clark

Antisemitism is dangerous because of what it reveals about people and systems, not just in and of itself. In 2010, a British journalist born in Poland, Ewa Jasiewicz, spray-painted the words, “Free Gaza and Palestine” on part of the wall of the old Warsaw Ghetto, together with Yonatan Shapira, a former captain in the Israel Defense Forces.³¹ She has since apologized for her “lack of awareness” and the pain she caused the survivors of the Holocaust and their families—some 300,000 people lost their lives 75 years ago, after an uprising in April 1943.³² However, Jasiewicz insists that this was not a Warsaw Ghetto memorial but a “pre-existing and regularly used site of free expression and artwork in the territory of the old ghetto which covers a substantial area of the city of Warsaw.”³³

Nonetheless, it is hard to believe that she did not know that the wall had historical significance. Despite being involved in anti-racist and anti-fascist activism, this is not the only time Jasiewicz has been accused of being “insensitive” in her struggle to stop the suffering and death caused by the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.³⁴

The scandal has re-emerged now, eight years later, because Jasiewicz was invited to speak alongside UK Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn and others at a “fringe festival” organized by Momentum, a left-wing organization affiliated with Labour.³⁵ (She has since withdrawn from the event.)³⁶ In an attempt to discredit Corbyn as an antisemite, *The*

31 “Ewa Jasiewicz,” *Red Pepper* [online], <https://www.redpepper.org.uk/by/ewa-jasiewicz/>.

32 Ewa Jasiewicz, 12 September 2018, https://twitter.com/ewa_jay/status/1039953505652559873.

33 Ibid.

34 Henry Zeffman, “Momentum speaker Ewa Jasiewicz: Bump off Israeli MPs,” *The Times*, 11 September 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/momentum-speaker-ewa-jasiewicz-bump-off-israeli-mps-670vbvrnh>.

35 Benjamin Bland, “The Wider Repercussions of Labour's Anti-Semitism Crisis,” *Fair Observer*, 4 September 2018, <https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/labour-party-jeremy-corbyn-anti-semitism-zionism-uk-politics-headlines-71621/>; “The World Transformed (TWT),” *Momentum*, 2nd November 2018. <https://peoplesmomentum.com/2018/02/11/twt/>.

36 Jenni Frazer and Justin Cohen, “Activist who daubed ‘Free Palestine’ at Warsaw Ghetto quits Momentum panel event,” *Jewish News*, 12 September 2018, <https://jewishnews.timesofisrael.com/activist-who-daubed-free-palestine-at-warsaw-ghetto-quits-momentum-panel-event/>.

Times warned that “Warsaw ghetto vandal to speak at Momentum’s Corbyn festival.”³⁷ This was followed by articles in populist tabloids such as *The Sun* and *The Daily Mail*, describing Corbyn’s support for an activist who “desecrated the last remaining walls of the Warsaw ghetto” accompanied by a photograph of Jasiewicz wearing a Palestinian kaffiyeh.³⁸

None of Jasiewicz’s actions have been antisemitic as the term is defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.³⁹ But the slur is effective. There is a strong and well-merited consensus in our society that you cannot be both a good person and an antisemite. Corbyn’s opponents presume that demonstrating his antisemitism is the same as proving him unfit for British politics. Corbyn and Jasiewicz both refuse to admit that they are antisemitic, clarifying that they oppose the Israeli occupation and are not hostile to Jews in general.

According to their argument, criticizing Israeli policy is no more antisemitic than criticizing Theresa May is anti-British. But antisemitism is dangerous because of what it reveals about people and systems, not just in and of itself, and in this instance it is those who have been the quickest to throw stones who are perhaps most guilty.

Antisemitism is a problem because it is a way of perceiving reality that structures the way adherents engage the world. It operates with simplistic, black-and-white categories, sees connections between people and events that are not really there, and encourages knee-jerk reactions that involve scapegoating and unequivocal condemnation. The term “anti-Semitism” was popularized in 1881 by a German politician named Wilhelm Marr, who fought to exclude Jews from German social, economic

37 Andrew Gilligan and Anna Gizowska, “Warsaw ghetto vandal to speak at Momentum’s Corbyn festival,” *The Sunday Times*, 9 September 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/warsaw-ghetto-vandal-to-speak-at-momentums-corbyn-festival-0rr8m7wqb>.

38 Jay Akbar, “‘VERY GOOD FRIEND’ Jeremy Corbyn praised activist who vandalised Warsaw ghetto where 92,000 Jews died and called for Israeli MPs to be killed,” *The Sun*, 12 September 2018, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/7236132/jeremy-corbyn-praised-activist-who-vandalised-warsaw-ghetto-where-92000-jews-died-and-called-for-israeli-mps-to-be-killed/>;

Jake Wallis, “Jeremy Corbyn praised activist who smeared pro-Palestine graffiti on walls of Warsaw ghetto where 92,000 Jews died and called for Israeli MPs to be assassinated as his ‘very good friend’,” *Mail Online*, 11 September 2018, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6156275/Jeremy-Corbyn-praised-activist-smeared-pro-Palestine-graffiti-walls-Warsaw-ghetto.html>.

39 “Working Definition of Antisemitism,” *International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance*, 26th May 2016, <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/working-definition-antisemitism>.

and political life.⁴⁰ The implication was that there are such people as “Semites” who pursue particular agendas that are detrimental to the rest of the world.

Today, scholars talk about “antisemitism,” removing the hyphen to minimize the sinister aspersions embedded within Marr's term. Antisemitism assumes that nations exist and that individuals can represent whole groups of people they have never met and have little in common with—such that all Jewish people can be considered guilty because of the wrong actions of a handful of individual Jews. At the same time, it employs a double standard and refuses to accept responsibility for crimes committed by members of its own group, such as the horrors of British colonialism or the dependence of contemporary capitalism on modern-day slavery.

It assumes the worst of people and stereotypes entire groups as exhibiting negative character traits. It justifies or minimizes the importance of excluding, persecuting and even murdering people just because they are associated with one group or another. It focuses on one group or country (such as Netanyahu's Israel) as being particularly blameworthy to the exclusion of other, equally culpable parties (such as Assad's Syria). And, through its monolithic outlook, it marginalizes the contributions of individuals and groups to collaborative endeavors, such as by ignoring the Jewish elements in Christianity or by focusing exclusively on British activists such as Jasiewicz and ignoring her Jewish accomplice.

Jeremy Corbyn may indeed be an antisemite, but before we start trying to remove the speck from his eye, we need to think about what the term means, and make sure that we do not embody the very problems we are seeking to solve in the world.

Dr Roland Clark is a Senior Fellow at CARR and a Senior Lecturer in History, University of Liverpool.

40 “Wilhelm Marr,” *Wikipedia*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Marr.

Anti-Muslim Hate: The Definition Problem

Sadie Chana

The terms ‘Islamophobia’ and ‘Anti-Muslim hate’ are used regularly in news coverage of certain events. These have most recently involved incidences of a car ram-raiding worshippers outside a mosque in London⁴¹, and in the depiction of Muslims⁴² in the press more generally. However the definition of ‘Islamophobia’ is contested within academic literature. The term entered contemporary public discourse in a 1997 Runnymede Report, titled “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All”⁴³. Academic definitions vary from a fear of Muslims and the faith of Islam⁴⁴, to a more substantial definition that includes “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims”⁴⁵. This CARR blog will outline that these terms and their definitions however provide a simplistic account of the incidents that they aim to explain. Of particular concern is that whilst Muslim communities and individuals are victims of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate, so too are those who are *deemed* to be Muslim; these could be non-religious, Hindu or Sikh individuals and communities.

An example of this is that how—in the aftermath of high profile events perpetrated by Islamic extremists—there is a spike in incidences of anti-Muslim hate. Examples of this include 9/11 attacks in America, the 7/7 attacks in London⁴⁶, the murder of Lee Rigby⁴⁷, the Charlie Hebdo

41 Sky News, “Police investigate possible anti-Muslim attack after car hits pedestrians outside mosque,” 19 September 2018, <https://news.sky.com/story/police-investigate-possible-anti-muslim-attack-after-car-hits-pedestrians-outside-mosque-11502063>.

42 Versi, Miqdaad, “Islamophobia not an issue in the British press? You’ve got to be kidding,” *The Guardian*, 27 April 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/27/islamophobia-not-british-press-issue-got-to-be-kidding>.

43 Conway, G., *Islamophobia: A challenge for us all*, (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997).

44 Sherman A. Lee, Jeffrey A. Gibbons, John M. Thompson & Hussam S. Timani, The Islamophobia Scale: Instrument Development and Initial Validation, *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 19, no.2, 2009, 92–105.

45 Bleich, E., Defining and researching Islamophobia. *Review of Middle East Studies*, 46, no. 2, 2012, pp. 180–189.

46 Hanes, E., & Machin, S. Hate Crime in the Wake of Terror Attacks: Evidence From 7/7 and 9/11. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 30(3), 2014, pp. 247–267.

47 Evening Standard, “Anti-Muslim hate crimes ‘soared’ after murder of soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich” 27 December 2013, <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/anti-muslim-hate-crimes-soared-after-murder-of-soldier-lee-rigby-in-woolwich-9026977.html>.

attacks in France⁴⁸, and most recently the Manchester Arena⁴⁹ bomb which saw a significant increase in the crimes committed towards Muslim communities and individuals. In each of these incidences, the Muslim community is considered to be responsible for the extremists who claim to have perpetrated these acts in the name of Islam. Therefore, in the minds of those who perpetrate these acts of physical violence, intimidation, or vandalism against the Muslim community, they feel justified—aiming their anger at a larger community based on the actions of a few.

However, it has to be taken into consideration that many acts of anti-Muslim hate are directed towards those who the perpetrator *believes* to be Muslim. For instance the first retaliatory death for 9/11 was that of Balbir Singh Sodhi⁵⁰, a Sikh man who owned a gas station in Arizona. This was followed by the arson of a Sikh temple in New York by teenagers who mistakenly thought that the temple chief, Gobind Sadan, was named after Osama Bin Laden. There is a growing literature on the experience of hate crime by Muslim women⁵¹ due to the visibility of their hijabs, niqabs or coverings⁵². Sikh men can also be understood as being highly visible due to their wearing of the dastar, the turban, which many perceive as being as sign of terrorism due to the head covering worn by Osama bin Laden in many of his videos from the 2000s⁵³. This misguided connection has resulted in a number of Sikh men being targeted⁵⁴.

Moreover, it is not exclusively Sikh men who are victims of this type of Islamophobia, it is all those who are believed to look Muslim in the

48 Chazan, David, "Hate crimes against Muslims and Jews soar in France," *The Telegraph*, 30 December 2015, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/12075018/Hate-crimes-against-Muslims-and-Jews-soar-in-France.html>.

49 Halliday, Josh, "Islamophobic attacks in Manchester surge by 500 % after arena attack," *The Guardian*, 22 June 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/22/islamophobic-attacks-manchester-increase-arena-attack>.

50 Huffington Post, "History of Hate: Crimes Against Sikhs Since 9/11," 8 July 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/07/history-of-hate-crimes-against-sikhs-since-911_n_1751841.html?guccounter=2.

51 Barbara Perry, *Gendered Islamophobia: hate crime against Muslim women*, *Social Identities*, 20:1, 2014, pp. 74–89.

52 Mason-Bish, H., & Zempi, I., *Misogyny, Racism, and Islamophobia: Street Harassment at the Intersections*, *Feminist Criminology*, 2018.

53 Davies, Will, "In the U.S., Associating Sikhs With Terrorism," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 September 2013, <https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/09/24/in-the-u-s-associating-sikhs-with-terrorism/>.

54 Bachelor, Tom, "Sikh man has turban ripped off in racist attack while waiting to meet MP outside Parliament," *The Independent*, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/sikh-man-turban-ripped-off-parliament-hate-crime-police-london-portcullis-house-a8222376.html>.

minds of the perpetrator as they believe all those who are Asian, are also Muslim⁵⁵ and therefore a valid target of anti-Muslim hate⁵⁶. Whilst the perpetrators of these hate crimes believe they are justified in their acts of retribution, they have limited knowledge about the group they believe they are targeting. The result of this lack of knowledge is that instead of the Muslim community being considered responsible for the acts of terror, all those who fit the 'idea' of what a Muslim is becomes individually and collectively responsible, and therefore is a legitimate target for these acts of hate.

This victimisation of non-Muslims creates a discrepancy in the initiatives used to tackle hate crime. Within the Sikh and Hindu communities, the comparative lack of resources or initiatives to promote awareness of hate crime, or to cope with victimisation is a key issue—with some feeling that their community is invisible⁵⁷. Whilst there have been a handful of government and council-lead projects which have aimed to address this imbalance, they have not trickled down to the community level, as many within the communities are unaware of them. Many consider these efforts to be tokenistic, especially when they involve superficial meetings of different congregations, or projects such as Hate Crime Awareness Week as they have no lasting impact and are one off events. This claim is validated in the minds of these communities as even the governments' Hate Crime Action Plan omits any clear focus or recommendations for the Sikh or Hindu communities, as the focus remains on the Abrahamic faiths: Islam, Judaism and Christianity.

The result of this is that the Hindu and Sikh communities, as well as those who are non-religious within the Asian community, are unsupported in their hate crime victimisation, and increases the sense of alienation. Their places of worship are not as connected with local hate crime initiatives, and are not covered by the Muslim organisation TellMAMA, or the Jewish Community Security Trust (CST), both of which deal with hate

55 Awan, Imran, "The non-Muslims experiencing Islamophobic attacks," *New Statesman*, 18 October 2017, <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/10/non-muslims-experiencing-islamophobic-attacks>.

56 Hopkin, Peter; Sanghera, Gurchathen; Botterill, Katherine; and Arshad, Rowena, "Young non-Muslims face Islamophobia too," *The Conversation*, 2 March 2017, <http://theconversation.com/young-non-muslims-face-islamophobia-too-72302>.

57 Sherwood, Harriet, "Sikhs in UK are 'invisible to government' despite hate crime increase," *The Guardian*, 25 November 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/25/sikhs-in-uk-are-invisible-to-government-despite-hate-increase>.

crime victimisation and awareness within their communities. This disparity between the resources given to these different religious communities creates a level of resentment between them. The Muslim communities are seen in some areas as receiving a far greater level of assistance by the council and government, and expect assistance from the Sikh and Hindu groups when they are targeted by acts of anti-Muslim hate. However the resentment continues when Sikh or Hindu individuals or groups are targeted by the same hate, and receive no assistance by the council, government, or their Muslim counterparts.

The issue of non-Muslim victimisation of anti-Muslim hate has significant repercussions for community cohesion between different ethnic groups, and also between the different religious communities. The belief that all those who fit the idea of what a Muslim looks like is a valid target for acts of Muslim hate creates tensions between the white and ethnic minority communities, and the lack of hate crime awareness resources within the non-Muslim communities creates tension between them and the Muslim communities. Better then to resource and spread awareness of an all-encompassing understanding of anti-Muslim hatred that effectively binds communities together against prejudice, than tear them apart.

Ms Sadie Chana is an Early Career Fellow at CARR and a Doctoral Candidate at Rutherford College, University of Kent.

The Return Of Nationalism And The Rise Of The Radical Right

Maureen A. Eger

What animates the politics of the radical right today? My colleague Sarah Valdez and I identify neo-nationalism as the common denominator of contemporary radical right parties.⁵⁸ Nationalism is a political ideology concerned with congruence between the nation (people) and the state (government).⁵⁹ Real or perceived threats to this principle may mobilize nationalist sentiments to advance or defend a nation-state. We define neo-nationalism as a form of nationalism occurring within a context where national boundaries are settled and accepted domestically and internationally but are nevertheless perceived to be under threat. Thus, neo-nationalism is a subset of nationalism aimed at boundary-maintenance rather than nation-building.

The issues most important to contemporary radical right parties are consistent with the notion that the sovereignty and autonomy of modern nation-states are under threat from external forces. When framing their opposition to globalization, supranational organizations, and multiculturalism, radical right parties cite negative economic, socio-cultural, and political consequences for the nation-state.

For example, opposition to immigration is consistent with the idea that diversity erodes the traditional national culture of a country or undermines an ethnic conception of nationhood (versus one that is based on citizenship). However, parties also frame opposition to immigration using economic arguments about immigrants either taking jobs from native-born workers or abusing the welfare state due to long-term unemployment. Radical right parties also articulate opposition to the European Union, citing the supranational body as a threat to member states' political sovereignty, ethnic and cultural homogeneity, and national economies. Parties argue that membership weakens the capacity of nation-states to control its own borders and preserve national institutions, such as welfare states.

58 Eger, Maureen A., and Sarah Valdez, "Neo-nationalism in Western Europe," *European Sociological Review* 31(1), 2015, pp. 115–130.

59 Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism, 2nd Edition*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

In a recently published article in *European Political Science*⁶⁰, we show that nationalism not only increasingly characterizes these parties but also increasingly distinguishes them from other major party families. We rely on data from the Manifesto Project⁶¹, which uses content analysis to code and report political parties' policy positions as a percentage of space in electoral manifestos. This data allows for comparisons of party positions and their salience over time. Our sample includes election manifestos from all party major families between 1970 and 2015 in 18 Western European countries. Most of these countries have had electorally successful radical right parties during this period (exceptions being Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). In total, our sample consists of 1497 party manifestos in 225 elections. 134 of these are radical right party manifestos.

From the dataset, we identify issues theoretically indicative of nationalism or globalism:

Table 1: Statements Representative of Nationalist or Globalist Sentiment

	Nationalism	Globalism
<i>Social</i>	National way of life: positive statements	National way of life: negative statements
	Multiculturalism: negative statements	Multiculturalism: positive statements
<i>Economic</i>	Protectionism: positive statements	Protectionism: negative statements
<i>Political</i>	Internationalism: negative statements	Internationalism: positive statements
	European Community/Union: negative statements	European Community/Union: positive statements
	Military/defense: positive statements	Military/defense: negative statements


To generate a nationalism score for each party in each election year, we subtract the sum of globalist statements from sum of nationalist statements made in a party's election manifesto. A positive number, therefore, indicates that a larger share of the manifesto is devoted to nationalist statements than those consistent with globalism. A negative number means that a larger share of the manifesto is devoted to positions consistent with globalism.

60 Eger, Maureen A., and Sarah Valdez, "From radical right to neo-nationalist," *European Political Science*, 2018, Online First, DOI: 10.1057/s41304-018-0160-0.

61 Volkens, Andrea, Lehmann, Pola, Matthieß, Theres, Merz, Nicolas, Regel, Sven, *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)*, Version 2016b, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), <https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpd.2016b>.

The figure below, which is adapted from figure 7 in the original article, shows the average score by party family by decade. In every time period, radical right parties have made, on average, more nationalist than globalist claims. However, the size of this difference has grown substantially over time. (The article reports in greater detail changes in the social, economic, and political dimensions of nationalism.) It is clear that nationalist sentiments increasingly characterize radical right platforms and increasingly set them apart from all other major party families. While most other party families make some nationalist claims, on average, globalist positions make up a larger proportion of their manifestos.

Figure 1: Nationalism in Western European Party Politics by Party Family, 1970–2015



We argue that contemporary radical right parties are best conceptualized and described as neo-nationalist. First, this label recognizes these parties as fundamentally nationalist. Contemporary radical right parties cite external threats to the sovereignty and autonomy of nation-states to frame their policy positions and garner electoral support. “Neo” implies a form of nationalism occurring within the context of settled boundaries. Unlike earlier

nationalist movements in Europe, these parties operate within the framework of consolidated nation-states. Thus, this term identifies them as different from nationalist parties that promote state-building.

Second, the label helps make clear how these parties are similar and/or different from other party families, including radical right parties from earlier decades. Although the descriptor “right-wing” may be used to refer to authoritarian or conservative social positions, it is more traditionally used to indicate placement on an economic scale, where right-wing means economically liberal or neoliberal. The label neo-nationalist is consistent with the nativist, anti-immigrant policy preferences of both contemporary and early radical right parties, but, since it does not label them “right,” it distinguishes them from the parties of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s that were actually economically right-wing.⁶²

The term neo-nationalist is also consistent with welfare chauvinism, or the notion that welfare benefits should be restricted to native-born, while distinguishing these parties from traditional left-wing parties that favor inclusive or universal social policies. Neo-nationalist parties do not seek to dismantle national welfare states or minimize the role of government in the economy. Instead, they campaign to defend the institution from outsiders. For example, they often seek to increase spending on pensioners while decreasing benefits to asylum seekers.

We find neo-nationalist a more accurate descriptor for the radical right parties of today. Advocating for a change in terminology is not to divorce these parties from their historical context, but understanding the underlying ideology of contemporary parties is important if one wants to understand their recent electoral gains. Because different constellations of policy preferences imply different political ideologies (not to mention the capacity to compete for different types of voters) it is important to clarify the nature of this message and how it has changed over time.

Dr Maureen A. Eger is a Senior Fellow at CARR and an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Umeå University in Sweden.

62 Eger, Maureen A., and Sarah Valdez, “Neo-nationalism in Western Europe.” *European Sociological Review* 31(1), 2015, 115–130.

Concept Structures And The Far-Right

Andreas Dafnos

The far-right has often been described as a concept that is hard to define. Although there is still controversy around its three basic components, i.e. the intension (number of defining attributes), the extension (number of empirical phenomena), and the term (the label) that best characterises it, we should not neglect the fact that much progress has been made over the last two decades in clearing this conceptual muddle to some extent. This is a welcome development, of course, because concepts play an important role in research and determine the quality of outcomes. However, taking into consideration the current volatile global political environment and the tendency of academics to—rightly—immerse in dialectical battles with the aim to ‘order reality,’ as Max Weber⁶³ would probably reiterate today, it is wishful thinking to expect a unanimous agreement on the meaning of the far-right. What we should expect instead is more transparency with regard to the process of knowledge production and the logic of concept structures, in particular.

The existing literature identifies several approaches to concept formation. In his influential book *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide* (2006), Gary Goertz discusses two main diametrically opposed approaches: 1. the necessary and sufficient condition structure, and 2. the family resemblance structure. The former assumes that concepts can be defined by individually necessary and jointly sufficient attributes, while the latter is anchored in the idea that a concept comprises only sufficient attributes; this means, in short, that some of its instances do not share the same sets of elements. Alternatively, if there are valid ontological reasons to believe that the previous two structures cannot reflect the internal composition of the concept accurately, there are more options that can be of use such as the oft-cited radial category.⁶⁴

63 Weber, M. (1949). *The methodology of the social sciences*. (E. A. Shils & H. A. Finch, Trans.). Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.

64 Collier, D., & Mahon, J. E. (1993). Conceptual “stretching” revisited: Adapting categories in comparative analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 87(04), 845–855. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2938818>. Also, if you are interested in fuzzy logic and the radial category structure: Quaranta, M. (2013). Fuzzy set theory and concepts: A proposal for concept formation and operationalization. *Comparative Sociology*, 12(6), 785–820. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341283>

In the field of far-right politics, what appears to be the most suitable approach is the classical ‘necessary and sufficient condition’ structure. To quote the words of renowned scholar of the radical right Elisabeth Carter,⁶⁵ this happens ‘because the properties that make up the concept’s intension can be hierarchically ordered, boundaries can be drawn (albeit with care), and all the referents do share the concept’s defining features.’ However, from the discussion so far, it is not clear how we can differentiate between varying types of far-right organisations. It is now widely accepted, for example, that we should not subsume the contemporary variants of the far-right under the label of fascism, as it would be misleading and would distort our understanding of the reasons why this phenomenon occurs. Thus, in order to organise our thoughts methodically and at the same time enhance transparency with regard to the logic of concept structures, we should briefly familiarise ourselves with the notion of the ‘ladder of abstraction’ (or ‘ladder of generality’) that has been examined extensively in the pioneering work of Giovanni Sartori.⁶⁶

The ladder of abstraction can be viewed as a hierarchical, taxonomic system that orders the constitutive elements of concepts into categories that differ in their extent of empirical coverage. More precisely, at the top of the ladder stands the category that has both the lowest intension and highest extension (according to the classical view of concepts, this is an inverse relationship). Since intension determines extension, when adding new attributes we move down the ladder to sub-types of the primary category that have more elements and cover fewer empirical cases. In doing so, we achieve conceptual differentiation. On the other hand, if the aim is to avoid conceptual stretching, we have the option to move up the ladder of abstraction, reaching levels with broader empirical coverage.

Having said this, the ladder of abstraction is a useful conceptual schema that helps us to better comprehend ideological variation within the far-right family. To give an example from my research on reciprocal radicalisation in the UK, I define the far-right as the amalgamation of three ideological characteristics: nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism.⁶⁷ In this view, informed by Cas Mudde’s book *Populist Radical Right*

65 Carter, E. (2018). Right-wing extremism/radicalism: Reconstructing the concept. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 23(2), 157–182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2018.1451227>

66 Sartori, G. (1970). Concept misformation in comparative politics. *American Political Science Review*, 64(04). <https://doi.org/10.2307/1958356>

67 Similarly, Ravndal and Bjørge have defined the far right as ‘acceptance of social inequality, authoritarianism, and nativism.’ In my research, the first ideological criterion,