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Christopher Gilley

The 'Change of Signposts' in the Ukrainian Emigration

A Contribution to the History of Sovietophilism in the 1920s

With a foreword by Frank Golczewski



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This book is dedicated to my parents, Sheridan and Margaret Gilley, who encouraged my love of the past through repeated day trips to Hadrian's Wall.

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Glossary

Borotbisty – the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries.

Central Rada – a body set up in 1917 which brought together different nationalist organisations in the Ukraine and developed into a form of revolutionary parliament.

ChUHA – Red Ukrainian Galician Army: made up of members of the UHA who crossed over to the Bolsheviks during the civil war.

GPU – State Political Directorate: the Soviet secret police; after the creation of the USSR, the GPUs in the republics were brought under the central control of the OGPU (Unified State Political Directorate).

KP(b)U – Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine.

KPSH – Communist Party of Eastern Galicia: precursor to the KPZU.

KPZU – Communist Party of Western Ukraine.

korenizatsiia – policy of 'indigenisation', whereby the Bolsheviks sought to garner support among the non-Russian peoples by promoting non-Russian cultures and increasing the number of non-Russians in party and state structures.

NEP – New Economic Policy: the economic policy which replaced 'War Communism' and aimed to improve the economic situation of the peasants.

Nezalezhnyky – Independentists: the left wing of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, which later formed the UKP.

OUN – Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists: right-wing nationalist organisation active in Poland and the emigration.

POW – prisoner of war.

RKP(b) – Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).

RSFSR – Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

RUP – Revolutionary Ukrainian Party: the first significant Ukrainian political party created in the Russian-ruled Ukraine.

Selrob – Ukrainian Peasant-Worker Union: Communist front organisation in the Western Ukraine.

Selsoiuz – Ukrainian Socialist Peasants' Union: West Ukrainian socialist party.

Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh) – Ukrainian scholarly society founded in the nineteenth century in Galicia.

smenovekhovstvo – the movement in favour of supporting the Soviet regime among former opponents of the Bolsheviks; its adherents were known as *smenovekhovtsy* (the singular noun being *smenovekhovets*), and the associated adjective was *smenovekhovskii*.

Socialists-Federalist – members of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists, a liberal, democratic party which had no interest in socialism.

Socialists-Independentists – members of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Independentists, a small, nationalist party set up during the revolution.

Sovnarkom – Council of People's Commissars: the highest executive and administrative body in the Ukraine.

Spilka – the Ukrainian Social Democratic Union, which was formed by Marxists disenchanted with the nationalist line of the RUP.

SUHUF – Union of Ukrainian Citizens in France.

TsK – Central Committee.

UHA – Ukrainian Galician Army: the armed forces of the ZUNR.

Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party – a conservative, democratic and nationalist party founded in 1917 in the Eastern Ukraine.

UKP – Ukrainian Communist Party: also known as the *Ukapisty*.

UNDO – Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance: a conservative, democratic party founded in 1925, which became the main legal Ukrainian party in inter-war Galicia.

UNDP – Ukrainian National Democratic Party: Ukrainian nationalist party formed in Galicia before the First World War.

UNR – Ukrainian People's Republic: the Ukrainian state created from the Ukrainian lands ruled by the Romanovs.

UNTP – Ukrainian National Labour Party: the successor to the UNDP formed in 1919.

UPP – Ukrainian Party of Work: breakaway group from the UNDO of supporters of Ievhen Petrushevych.

UPSR – Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries: peasant populist party in the Eastern Ukraine.

USDP – Ukrainian Social Democratic Party: the Social Democratic Party in Galicia.

USDRP – Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party: the Social Democratic Party in the Eastern Ukraine.

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

UVO – Ukrainian Military Organisation: the Ukrainian terrorist organisation which fought against the Poles in the 1920s.

VUAN – All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: the highest academic institution in the Soviet Ukraine.

Vukopspilka – All-Ukrainian Association of Consumer Cooperative Organisations: Soviet central association of Ukrainian cooperatives.

ZUNR – West Ukrainian People's Republic: the Ukrainian state created in Eastern Galicia following the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy.

Foreword

Christopher Gilley's doctoral thesis – upon which this monograph is based – fills a gap in the existing research on the history of the Ukraine in the interwar period. Whereas *smenovekhovstvo* is a well-known and thoroughly researched topic in Russian history, the subject of the return (or immigration) of Ukrainians into the USSR has received barely any attention, despite the prominence of the individuals involved.

Dr. Gilley achieves this not only by looking at the groups of 'returners' but also the general history of Sovietophilism. The Ukrainian historiography has often brushed over this latter aspect. Following the Second World War, in response to the Russification in the Ukraine and the persecution of nationalists, the Ukrainian emigration refused even to consider the possibility of a pro-Soviet position; they declared that only those on the 'right' were 'genuine' Ukrainians. In doing so, they succumbed to the comprehensive 'turn to the right' (Alexander Motyl) of the 1930s and failed to see that, until its revision in 1929, the Soviet policy of *korenizatsiia* really was attractive for Ukrainian émigrés and inhabitants of Polish Eastern Galicia. After all, those who went back could not have foreseen that almost all the Ukrainian returnees to the USSR would be killed in the 1930s.

Dr. Gilley divides the thought of the pro-Soviet émigrés into two periods. During the first phase (from 1919 to 1923), he argues that those who supported the Soviet version of a Ukrainian republic justified their position with ideological arguments based on a socialist or socialist-revolutionary worldview. The early returnees did not believe that social and national demands conflicted with one another. During the second stage, which began with the Entente's recognition of Polish sovereignty over Eastern Galicia and the introduction of *korenizatsiia* (i.e. from 1923 to 1933, the year in which the last returnee considered here went back), Sovietophilism became more widespread among Galicians, who saw a Ukrainian national state being created under Soviet aegis. They returned to the Soviet Union not due to 'ideological' but rather 'national' reasons. Because the USSR did not understand itself as a federation

of nation states, this motivation diametrically opposed the political perspective of the Soviet Union itself. Through this interpretation, Dr. Gilley implies that the Soviet classification of the returnees as dangerous – a fact which led to their murder in the 1930s – was entirely 'logical'.

Of equal importance to these chronological distinctions is the geographical differentiation. Through his research in the Kyivan archives and above all his sophisticated reading of the journals and internal arguments of the 'left-wing' émigrés, Dr. Gilley has made an important contribution to the historical literature of a subject that has until now received insufficient consideration. In addition, he corrects the view that Prague was the centre of Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*, arguing instead that Vienna occupied this position.

Finally, Dr. Gilley successfully substantiates his initial thesis that the Ukrainian version of this movement differed from its Russian counterpart in that the Ukrainians found it easier to accommodate themselves to the Soviet form of statehood. The Ukrainians had no experience of an alternative that had survived in the past. He argues convincingly that the Ukrainian returnees deserve far more attention than the Russians, suggesting that the role of the former in the early Soviet Ukraine requires further investigation.

In doing so, Dr. Gilley's doctoral dissertation – which at first glance only presents an additional aspect of Soviet history – in fact serves as a further indication of the differences between Russian and Ukrainian perspectives in the Soviet period.

Frank Golczewski
University of Hamburg

Introduction

Ukrainian Sovietophilism and the Problem of *Smenovekhovstvo*

The Ukrainian émigré community which emerged in Central Europe from 1918 onwards was a society created by defeat: most of its members had left their homeland following the failure of one or other of the Ukrainian states created between 1917 and 1921; the rest had found themselves stranded abroad, unable to return to a home which had been occupied by a hostile power in their absence. For some, especially those from the Western Ukraine, this enemy was the Poles; for others, above all those from the East Ukrainian lands, it was the Bolsheviks. For this reason, many Ukrainians felt themselves to be among the losers of the post-1918 reordering of Europe. Consequently, the Ukrainian emigration exhibited characteristics common to many of those European communities in the 1920s which believed that they had lost out through the Paris peace treaties: liberal ideas of parliamentary democracy and individual rights were abandoned in favour of a corporatism which fused elements of both right- and left-wing thought; the politics of moderation were replaced with a willingness to inflict or excuse horrendous suffering for the sake of a utopian vision. For many in the Ukrainian emigration this meant the rejection of peaceful agitation and moderate socialism in favour of a doctrine of integral nationalism, which subordinated personal, party and class interests to the cause of the achievement of a united, independent Ukrainian nation state. The intellectual developments within the Ukrainian emigration between the two world wars were therefore characterised by Alexander Motyl as a 'turn to the right'.[1]

1 Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right*, New York: East European Monographs, 1980. See also Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte des ukrainische nicht sozialistischen Exils (Petljura-Lypypnskyj-Donzow)', in Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler (eds.), *Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, pp.100-117 (pp.100-1).

There were, however, other intellectual seductions present in inter-war Europe. Following the Bolshevik revolution, many on the left, even those who condemned aspects of the ideology and practice of Bolshevism, were filled with enthusiasm at the prospect of the creation of the first socialist society. As the leading British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm wrote in 1969, for those 'whose political memories go back no farther than Kruschev's denunciation of Stalin or the Sino-Soviet split, it is almost impossible to conceive what the October revolution meant to those who are now middle-aged and old. It was the first proletarian revolution, the first regime in history to set about the construction of the socialist order, the proof of both the profundity of the contradictions of capitalism, which produced wars and slumps, and of the possibility – the *certainty* – that socialist revolution would succeed'.[2] More than thirty-five years later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union proved finally the tenuousness of this 'certainty', Hobsbawm's words are an important reminder of the hopes which the events of 1917-21 had awakened.

Hobsbawm's comment also holds true for some parts of the Ukrainian emigration. Despite the fact that they had actively struggled against the establishment of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic, and witnessed the ruthlessness of Bolshevik rule at first hand, many Ukrainian émigrés also began to express support for the Soviet regime and actually returned to the country ruled by their former enemies. Among those who went back was Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, who is regarded by many Ukrainians as the father of modern Ukrainian historiography and the head of the first independent Ukrainian state. With him went a section of his party, the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries. Another key figure to go back, if only for a short while, was Volodymyr Vynnychenko, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Workers' Party, who led two of the governments set up during the revolution. Although Vynnychenko himself became disillusioned with the Soviet regime after a visit to Moscow and Kharkiv, many of his followers, for example the economist Vasyl Mazurenko, maintained their pro-Soviet position and returned to their homeland. Other prominent returnees who had served the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) created during the revolutionary years included Andrii Nik-

2 Eric Hobsbawm, 'Problems of Communist History', in id., *Revolutionaries*, London: Abacus, pp.3-12 (pp.3-4).

ovskyi, who had been UNR foreign minister and vice prime minister, and Iurii Tiutiunnyk, the commander of the last Ukrainian raid against the Bolsheviks in 1921, who in emigration wrote for the far-right journal *Zahrava*.[3] In addition to these members of the intelligentsia and the political classes, several thousand UNR soldiers, who had been interned in Poland, also went back to the Ukraine.

At the same time, the Soviet Ukraine exerted a strong attraction for Ukrainians from the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia. Ievhen Petrushevych, who had headed the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR), adopted a pro-Soviet position – although he remained in Germany. Many Galician intellectuals and academics, who had left Galicia following the Poles' occupation of the province, immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine. These included Iuliian Bachynskyi, who is often accredited as writing the first call for Ukrainian independence, the geographer Stepan Rudnytskyi, the writer Antin Krushelnytskyi and the publicist Mykhailo Lozynskyi. A number of soldiers who had served in the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), the armed forces of the ZUNR, also applied for entry into the Soviet Ukraine. One cannot describe these individuals as 'returnees' because they had not lived in the Eastern Ukraine before the First World War, although the UHA had fought there during the Civil War. However, it is very possible that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic appealed to both East and West Ukrainian Sovietophiles in similar ways.

A third group of Ukrainians to support the Soviet regime existed in Northern America. In 1924, Ukrainian immigrants to Canada founded the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association to spread pro-Communist ideas among the Ukrainian workers and farmers in the country, many of whom had been economic migrants from the Western Ukraine who had left their homeland before the First World War. The Association set up several satellite organisations

3 The Socialist Federalist and literary scholar Serhii Iefremov, who is often described as a returnee (see Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996, p.542), is not dealt with here as it seems that he never in fact emigrated. Rather, following the withdrawal from Kyiv of Polish and UNR troops in June 1920, he adopted a false name and went to ground in Prevarka, a suburb of Kyiv. He was able to resurface after the Bolsheviks issued an amnesty for members of the Academy of Sciences; however, he had to pretend that he had been abroad. His diary entry for 15th February confirms that he spent 1920 near Kyiv and that he had too much time on his hands. See Serhii Iefremov, *Shchodennyky 1923-9*, ed. O.I. Putro et al., Kyiv: Gazeta Rada, 1997, pp.14, 29, 73.

and published a number of pro-Soviet newspapers; by the end of the 1920s the latter had a combined circulation of over 25,000.[4] Some Ukrainians in Canada even immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine, for example the writer Myroslav Irchan.[5]

There has been very little research on pro-Soviet movements in the Ukrainian emigration. In the West, Ukrainian history in general is understudied. There have been a few surveys of the inter-war Ukrainian emigration published in the West. Those that have been written have tended to concentrate on the right-wing movements which appeared in the émigré community at this time.[6] The ideology of the far right came to dominate the political thought of the Ukrainian emigration. This laid the foundations for the collaboration between Ukrainian nationalists (for example the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) and the German National Socialists during the Second World War. In contrast, by the beginning of the 1930s Sovietophilism was a spent force in the emigration; it therefore appeared to be only a temporary phenomenon. The right-wing organisations caught the attention of Western historians first because their impact was more immediately apparent. This was especially true for those historians whose interest in the Ukraine was sparked by an interest in the Second World War – although this is not to say that the historians writing on the OUN and the Ukrainian right were unaware of the importance of the Sovietophiles.[7]

In addition, for a long time most of those writing on Ukrainian history in the West were themselves members of the Ukrainian diaspora.[8] One of the strongest self-images of the diaspora was that it was a society living in opposition to the Soviet Union: its central tasks included the preservation of Ukrainian culture at a time when it was under attack by Russifiers in the

4 John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion. The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada*, Toronto: Peter Martin, 1979, pp.3-6.

5 Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p.79.

6 See Motyl, *Turn to the Right*; Frank Golczewski, 'Die Ukrainische Emigration', in id. (ed.), *Geschichte der Ukraine*, Göttingen, 1993, pp.224-40 (pp.235-40) and id. 'Politische Konzepte'.

7 Motyl and Golczewski both make references to them. See Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.57-60 and Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte', p.101.

8 Mark von Hagen, 'Does Ukraine Have a History?', *Slavic* Review, Vol.54, 1995, No.3, pp.658-73 (pp.658-9).

Ukraine, and spreading knowledge in the West of Soviet human rights abuses.[9] The call on émigrés to return to their country undermined the justification for the preservation of the community in which the diaspora writers lived. The debates of the 1920s about the statehood of the Ukraine and the emigration's proper relationship to the Soviet Union were still part of the political discussion within the diaspora community even as late as the 1980s. It should, therefore, be no surprise that it was a topic which diaspora historians were not keen to cover. The importance of many of the returnees to the development of a Ukrainian national consciousness meant, however, that it was impossible to avoid the matter entirely. Biographical studies of these people appeared in the diaspora, but were tentative when dealing with the return of their subject to the Ukraine.[10]

In the Ukraine itself, the neglect of this topic is a symptom of wider trends in Ukrainian historical writing. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet historiography dismissed the Sovietophiles as bourgeois nationalists who wanted to subvert the Soviet system to their own ends.[11] Following the attainment of Ukrainian independence, according to Mark von Hagen, many Ukrainian historians, freed from the official injunction to conform to the Marxist scheme of history, simply replaced the materialist dialectic with a nationalist teleology. This new dogma posits an eternal and unchanging nation, whose history was defined by the struggle against a 'national oppressor' for Ukrainian independence and unity. Those historical figures who did not see the fate of their country in this way, for example in that they advocated federation with Russia, are either ignored, rejected as collaborators or incorrectly presented, in contradiction to their own writings, as separatists.[12]

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9 Satzewich, *Ukrainian Diaspora*, pp.150-8.

10 On Hrushevskyi see Thomas M. Prymak , *Mykhailo Hrushevsky. The Politics of National Culture*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987, pp.197-207. For Vynnychenko, see Melanie Czajkowskyj, 'Volodomyr Vynnychenko and his Mission to Moscow and Kharkiv', *Journal of Graduate Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 3, 1978, No.2, pp.3-24, and Hryhorii Kostiuk, 'Misiia V. Vynnychenka v Moskvi i Kharkovi 1920 roku', in Hryhorii Kostiuk, *Volodymyr Vynnychenko ta ioho doba*, New York, 1980, pp.210-225.

11 For example, see V.A. Chyrko, 'Krakh ideolohii ta polityky natsionalistychnoi partii Ukapistiv', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1968, No.12, pp.24-35 (pp.30-2).

12 von Hagen, 'Does Ukraine Have a History', pp.665-6.

This also applies to the treatment of those Ukrainians who returned during the 1920s. For the Ukrainian nationalist understanding of history, the return of émigrés to the Soviet Union appears to be a compromise with the twin enemies of the Ukraine, Russia and Bolshevism. Ukrainian writers dealing with this period have preferred to concentrate on the right-wing nationalist organisations like the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN was unquestionably a separatist movement in favour of an independent Ukrainian state and for this reason it passes much more comfortably into the paradigm of nationalist historiography. Because it cooperated with the German National Socialists during the Second World War, the OUN, like the Sovietophiles, carries the taint of collaboration with a foreign regime which was responsible for millions of deaths. However, the OUN's separatism redeems it in the eyes of the nationalist historiography, which has done its best to argue that the collaboration of the OUN with the Nazis was not based on ideological affinity but rather purely tactical, geo-political considerations.[13]

One must add that, almost without exception, the Sovietophiles became victims of Stalinist repression in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Their works were banned for a long time in the Soviet Union and their memory subjected to official abuse. For this reason they had the reputation among Ukrainians as opponents of the Soviet regime and their writings possessed the subversive attraction of forbidden fruit. Serhii Plokhy, for example, tells how he first had the chance to read a whole book by Hrushevskyi when one of his professors, who feared a search of his flat because he was under investigation for anti-Stalinist remarks, asked Plokhy to look after some banned books until the danger was over. One of these was Hrushevskyi's *Illustrated History of the Ukraine*, which, wrote Plokhy, 'struck me as a revelation about the Ukrainian past – a truth hidden from us by official Soviet historiography and the regime that it supported'.[14] Plokhy himself wrote a very accurate account of Hrushevskyi's Sovietophile period, but his feelings about Hrushevskyi show how difficult it might be for some Ukrainian scholars, who grew up with the

13 For a recent expression of this argument, see I.K. Patryliak, 'Do pytannia pro vnesok OUN ta UPA u borotbu proty natsystskykh okupantiv na terytorii Ukrainy', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2004, No.5, pp.81-95.

14 Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia. Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005, p.ix.

prohibitions on the words of the former Sovietophiles, to accept that these martyrs for the Ukrainian cause had actually supported the regime which imprisoned or killed them.

Consequently, the Ukrainian literature on Sovietophilism is rather limited. What has been written deals mainly with the personal fates of prominent individuals in the emigration, most notably Volodymyr Vynnychenko[15] and Mykhailo Hrushevskyi,[16] but also Ukrainians from the Western Ukraine such as Ievhen Petrushevych,[17] Iuliian Bachynskyi[18] and Mykhailo Lozynskyi.[19] Beyond these biographical studies, there are broader accounts of those members of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia who immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine[20] and the émigré political groups led by Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyi.[21]

15 S.V. Kulchytskyi, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko: svitohliadna evoliutsiia', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2005, No.4, pp.47-70; Mykola Sappa, 'Vynnychenko i Rakovskyi', *Vitchyzna*, No.11, 1990, pp.131-143; V.F. Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b) 1920r. pro V. Vynnychenka', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2005, No.4, pp.70-89 and id. 'Evoliutsiia suspilno-politychnykh pohliadov V.K. Vynnychenka v doby ukrainskoi revoliutsii', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1994, No.6, pp.15-26 and 1995, No.1, pp.13-22.

16 Valentyna Piskun, 'Povernennia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho v Ukrainu iak zvaba bilshovyzmom i spodivannia na dii', in *Mykhailo Hrushevskyi – naukovets i polityk u konteksti suchasnosti*, Kyiv: Kyivskyi Natsionalnyi Universytet Imeni Tarasa Shevchenka, 2002, pp.45-54; V.A. Potulnytskyi, 'Naukov diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho v emihratsii (1919-1924)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1992, No.2, pp.48-57; Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevskyi i GPU-NKVD. Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924-1934*, Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 1996; R.Ia Pyrih, 'M.S. Hrushevskyi: mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu (1924-1934rr.)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1991, No.4, pp.54-66 and id. 'Ideino-politychni pidstavy kompromisu Mykhaila Hrushevskoho z Bilshovytskoiu vladoiu', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2006, No.5, pp.4-19; Arkadii Zhukovskyi, 'Politychna i publitsystychna diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho na emihratsii 1919-1924 rr.', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2002, No.1, pp.96-125.

17 O.V. Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petreushevycha: perekonannia chy vymushenist ?', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, No.3, pp.109-18 and No.4, pp.95-102.

18 Ihor Behei, *Iuliian Bachynskyi: sotsial-demokrat i derzhavnyk*, Kyiv: Osnovni Tsinnosti, 2001.

19 O.S. Rublov, 'Shliakhamy na Solovky: radianske desiatyrichchia Mykhaila Lozynskoho', *Ukrainiskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, No.4, pp.103-135; Oleksii Sukhyi , *Mykhailo Lozynskyi: vchenyi, hromadskyi diiach, polityk*, Lviv, 1995.

20 O.S. Rublov and Iu.A. Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi intelihentsii. 20-50ti roky XX st.*, Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1994.

21 *Politychna istoriia Ukrainy XX stolittia. Tom 5. Ukraintsi za mezhamy URSR (1918-1940)*, Kyiv: Heneza, 2003, pp. 176-90 and pp.213-225, which largely draws on V.P. Troshchynskyi, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia v Ievropi iak istorychne i sotsialno-politychne iavyshche*, Kyiv: Intel, 1996, pp.99-121.

Nevertheless, a synthesising overview of the different groups which adopted a Sovietophile position does not exist. Moreover, with some exceptions, the existing research fails to do justice to the Sovietophilism of its subjects: some authors, following the paradigm used in the historiography of the OUN, dismiss the pro-Soviet stance as a purely tactical, pragmatic choice;[22] others excuse it by writing off the Sovietophiles as politically naïve;[23] yet others have argued that the Sovietophiles were actually opponents of the Soviet regime, sometimes backing up their claims with selective quotations from the Sovietophiles' written works.[24] Those Ukrainian historians who have written about the returnees have often preferred to concentrate on the persecution of the émigrés by the Bolsheviks after their arrival in the Ukraine, thereby changing a story of collaboration into one of national martyrdom.[25] There has also been a tendency to assume that the movement appeared in response to two events in 1923, the March decision on the future of Galicia and the introduction of Ukrainianisation in the Soviet Ukraine, and thus that the Sovietophiles had national, rather than social or socialist, motivations.[26]

Clearly, there is a need for more research in this area which brings together and compares the different arguments put forward by those émigrés who settled in the Ukraine and which does not seek apologies in naivety or political necessity. The first task of this book, therefore, is to give an account of the different Sovietophile individuals and groupings, analyse and compare their

22 See, for example, O.V. Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petreushevycha', No.4, pp.99-100.

23 See the quotations from Pritsak and Vynar in Zhukovskyi, 'Politychna i publitsystychna diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho', p.98.

24 An example relating to Iuliian Bachinskyi can be found in O.I. Saltovskyi, *Kontseptsii ukrainskoi derzhavnosti v istorii vitchyznianoi politychnoi dumky (vid vytokiv do pochatku XX storichchia)*, Kyiv: Parapan, 2002, p.289.

25 See, for example, the works by Pyrih and Prystaiko and Shapoval.

26 The March decision and Ukrainianisation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. Both were events which promoted a pro-Soviet sentiment among Ukrainians for national reasons. For historians who describe Sovietophilism as a response to these developments, see: Jarosław Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy. 1772-1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu*, Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2000, pp.174, 196-7; James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation. National Communism in Soviet Ukraine*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Insitute, 1983, pp.63-4; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, p.92; Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, pp.19-20; I.A. Soliar, 'Radianofilstvo u zakhidnii Ukraini (1920-ti rr.), *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2009, No.1, pp.55-67 (p.56); Iurii Shapoval, *Liudyna i systema (shtrykhy do portretu totalitarnoi doby v Ukraini)*, Kyiv: Instytut Natsionalnykh Vidnosyn i Politolohii NANU, 1994, p.120.

political thought, and chart the emergence and decline of this movement. It will investigate whether Sovietophilism was simply a response to the March decision and Ukrainianisation in 1923, or whether it appeared earlier and had deeper roots in pre-war Ukrainian political thought. Connected to this, it will ask whether Ukrainian Sovietophiles only had national motivations, or whether they were driven by social goals, in particular the desire to reconstruct society through socialism. Because some historians have been so reluctant to recognise the Sovietophilism of these figures, and indeed in the worst cases have given a distorted account of their political writings, it is necessary to conduct a detailed exposition of the political ideas of the Sovietophiles which makes clear how their Sovietophilism worked as a coherent argument.

Given the lack of research on the subject, it is useful to find a point of comparison which could suggest an approach to the topic. One candidate is the *smenovekhovstvo* movement in the Russian emigration of the 1920s. In September 1921, a collection of articles appeared in Prague, written by six Russian émigrés, five of whom had taken part in the White struggle against the Bolsheviks. Its authors called upon the Russian émigrés to end their opposition to the Bolsheviks. They argued that the new government in Moscow represented Russian national interests. For this reason, the émigrés should go back to their homeland and help the Soviets in the reconstruction of the land devastated by war and revolution. The title of the book was *Smena vekh*, or 'Change of Signposts'. This position became known as *smenovekhovstvo* and its adherents as *smenovekhovtsy* (singular – *smenovekhovets*). The title was a reference to the *Vekhi* (Signposts) collection which appeared in 1909 as a response to the 1905 revolution. *Vekhi* sought to reassess the intelligentsia's proper relationship to the people and the idea of revolution after the events of 1905 had revealed the violence which the Russian people and revolution could unleash. Similarly, the *smenovekhovtsy* sought to understand the role of the intelligentsia in the light of the October revolution and the civil war; they believed that they were responding in the tradition of the *Vekhi*, hence the title of their book. The collection was followed by two regular publications, a weekly, also called *Smena vekh*, which appeared in Paris 1921-2, and the

Soviet-funded Berlin daily, *Nakanune* (On the Eve), which came out between 1922 and 1924.

The *Smena vekh* collection and the ensuing publications were part of a much larger phenomenon. As early as January 1920, a group of Russian prisoners of war set up the group *Mir i trud* (Peace and Work) in Berlin, which argued for a cessation of the attempts to overthrow the Bolsheviks and called for reconciliation with Russia's current rulers. Early in 1921, soldiers of the defeated White Army began returning to their country. In Bulgaria this took on greater proportions with the creation of the Soviet-backed Union for Return to the Motherland in the spring of 1922. Within Russia there was also a movement in favour of reconciliation with the country's new rulers. Many former tsarist officers served in the Red Army, some due to coercion, but others out of a feeling of national duty. Most importantly, General Brusilov, a general in the imperial army and the supreme commander under the Provisional Government, had offered his support to the Bolsheviks following the Polish invasion of the Soviet Ukraine in April 1920. There were also members of the intelligentsia who quickly came to accept the Bolsheviks. One such was the anti-clerical populist Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz, who praised the October revolution for bringing about a regeneration in Russian life.

The group which published the original *Smena vekh* collection has been thoroughly and comprehensively investigated by Hilde Hardeman.[27] Hardeman aimed to put an end to the inflation of the term '*smenovekhovstvo*' in academic writing. In Soviet works the word had been used to refer to all sorts of movements which the communists claimed hoped to turn the Soviet Union into a 'bourgeois capitalist' state. Even individuals who explicitly condemned *smenovekhovstvo* had been described as *smenovekhovtsy* by Soviet historians.[28] The main western work, by the Russian émigré Mikhail Agursky, imitated this tendency; Agursky used the phrase loosely, lumping a whole range of groups together.[29] This approach was highly problematic. Because a single

27 Hilde Hardeman, *Coming to Terms with the Soviet Regime. The "Changing Signposts" Movement among Russian Émigrés in the Early 1920s*, Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994.

28 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.14-5.

29 Mikhail Agurskii, *Ideologiia natsional-bolshevizma*, Paris: YMCA Press, 1980, repr. Moscow: Algoritm, 2003. A revised and expanded version of this work was pub-

term was applied to several individuals, organisations and publications, there was an assumption that these groups were all part of a single movement, possessing organisational links and a common ideology.[30] Hardeman brought attention back to the group which produced *Smena vekh* and the publications which they later founded. She denied that many émigrés who returned to Russia did so under the influence of the *Smena vekh* group.[31] In this way, she performed an important service to the history of *smenovekhovstvo* by reintroducing clarity to an understanding of the origins behind the term.

However, as Hardeman herself says, the terms *smenovekhovets* and *smenovekhovstvo* 'entered the Russian vocabulary and were widely used to describe any readiness on the part of non-communists to accept the new regime'. For example, in a survey of engineers in Moscow conducted by the Soviet institutions in autumn 1922, nearly half of those interviewed, when asked about their political position, described themselves as *smenovekhovtsy*.[32] In the political language of the time, therefore, *smenovekhovstvo* referred to a much larger section of Russian society than the group investigated by Hardeman. Indeed, it was for this very reason that the word *smenovekhovstvo* has been bandied around so indiscriminately in the historical literature, especially that produced by Soviet historians. Because *smenovekhovstvo* acquired this broader meaning within the terminology of the time, it seems perfectly acceptable to investigate *smenovekhovstvo* in its more general sense. This must be done with the knowledge that in writing the history of *smenovekhovstvo* as the term was used in the 1920s, many of those who were referred to as *smenovekhovtsy* did not accept the label or possess any ideological affinity with 'fellow' *smenovekhovtsy*.

Consequently, this book posits two understandings of the word *smenovekhovtsy* and *smenovekhovstvo*: the first, the 'narrow definition', uses the words as Hardeman does, to refer to those involved in the *Smena vekh* collection and weekly journal, and the daily *Nakanune*; the second, the 'broad definition', uses the words as they entered the political language of the 1920s, to

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lished in English as Mikhail Agursky, *The Third Rome. National Bolshevism in the USSR*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987.

30 See, for example, Agursky, *The Third Rome*, pp.255-7.

31 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.166.

32 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.174-5. The quoted passage is from p.175.

describe any individual or group willing to contemplate reconciliation with the Bolsheviks or return to the Soviet republics.

The Bolsheviks used the terms *smenovekhovtsy* and *smenovekhovstvo* to describe those members of the Ukrainian emigration who had advocated reconciliation with the Soviet Ukrainian government and return to the Ukraine. Terry Martin, who in his book on the Soviet nationalities policies in the 1920s and 1930s devotes particular attention to the role of the returnees in the implementation of these policies, offers many examples of this. For example, in 1926 the then first secretary of the KP(b)U, Lazar Kaganovich, wrote that Mykhailo Hrushevskyi had 'legalized himself as a *smenovekhovets*'.[33] Similarly, a circular published by the Soviet secret police, the GPU, from the same year described those Ukrainian émigrés who reassessed their relationship with the Bolsheviks as having undergone a 'Change of Signposts'.[34] Chapter Five will show that most of the Bolsheviks dealing with the Ukrainian Sovietophiles referred to them as *smenovekhovtsy*. Indeed, when the Bolsheviks decided to set up a pro-Soviet, non-Bolshevik émigré publication they took *Nakanune*, the Berlin daily run by the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, as their model and spoke of the desire to create a Ukrainian *Nakanune*. For this reason, the use of the phrase 'the Change of Signposts in the Ukrainian Emigration' in the title of this book is a reference to the context in which many of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles' contemporaries understood Ukrainian Sovietophilism.

Most Ukrainian historians have not looked at Ukrainian Sovietophilism within this framework. One reason for this is that opponents of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles also referred to them as either *smenovekhovtsy* or the Ukrainianised version of the word, *zminovikhivtsy*, thereby tainting the word with the accusation of national betrayal.[35] Rublov and Cherchenko, in their book on the West Ukrainian intelligentsia, only draw the comparison between the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and the Sovietophile Ukrainians in order to deny that there was such a thing as Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*. They argue that the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* saw the Soviet Union as a revival of the tsarist empire.

33 Quoted in Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp.223-4,

34 Yuri Shapoval, ' "On Ukrainian Separatism" A GPU Circular of 1926', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol.18, 1994, No.3/4, pp.275-302 (p.292).

35 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.59.

The Ukrainians had been oppressed under the tsars and therefore could feel no sympathy for the old regime. Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* was therefore impossible.[36] As we will see in the next chapter, Rublov and Cherchenko's argument rests partially on a distorted view of Russian *smenovekhovstvo*; the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* themselves did not necessarily pine for the tsarist regime. More importantly, the claim that it is necessary to look at Ukrainian Sovietophilism within the context of *smenovekhovstvo* is not an attempt to suggest that the Ukrainian and Russian *smenovekhovtsy* possessed the same reasons for their stance. The political opinions of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles and the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* differed greatly in many areas, and the pro-Soviet Ukrainian émigrés explicitly rejected the label *smenovekhovtsy* to describe themselves.[37] However, despite all the differences, the Ukrainian Sovietophiles and the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* shared one fundamental characteristic: they both advocated reconciliation with their former enemy, the Bolsheviks, and return to their homeland in order to help the Soviet state reconstruct their country.

Clearly, the relationship between the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and Ukrainian Sovietophiles requires greater clarification. The second task of this book will be to look at how Ukrainian Sovietophilism fitted into the broader movement of *smenovekhovstvo*. It will compare the ideas of the Ukrainian and Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, and relate any differences to their nationality and the character of émigré communities from which they emerged. It will ask whether *smenovekhovstvo* was more significant for the Ukrainian or Russian émigré community, and whether collaboration with the Bolsheviks forced the Russian and Ukrainian groups to adopt a similar stance, thereby reducing the intellectual differences between them. It will also examine the Bolshevik response to Russian and Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*, and study the role the movements played in Soviet politics.

In order to effect such a comparison, the Chapter One draws a brief sketch of the *Smena vekh* group, highlighting the central aspects of its ideology, the

36 Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, pp.14-5.

37 The Russian academic Doronchenkov claims that the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* influenced, for example, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, gives no evidence for this. As Chapter Three will seek to show, such a claim is preposterous. Askold I. Doronchenkov, *Emigratsiia "pervoi volny" o natsionalnykh problemakh i sudbe Rossii*, St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2001, p.71.

setting in which it appeared and the place it occupied within émigré and Soviet politics. Because a solid body of literature already exists in this area, the aim of the chapter is to provide the context for the primary research later in the book. Taken individually, it does not claim to possess a high degree of novelty; rather, the originality lies in looking at the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* at the same time as the Ukrainian Sovietophiles. Chapter Two provides further background information by giving an overview of the Ukrainian national movement, the Ukrainian revolution and the Ukrainian communities in the 1920s, that is those developments which determined the conditions for the emergence of Ukrainian Sovietophilism. It presents the central question asked during the analysis of the political thought of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles, namely whether they were more attracted to the Soviet Ukraine on national or social grounds.

The next five chapters deal with the Sovietophile groups in roughly chronological order. Chapters Three and Four describe the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries respectively. The similar patterns of the groups' names hint at the parallels in their origins: both were the émigré offshoots of parties which played a leading role during the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1921 – the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party for the Foreign Group, and the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in the case of the Foreign Delegation. Both of these chapters concentrate on the period before the appearance of the *Smena vekh* collection, and as a result the term '*smenovekhovstvo*' hardly appears in these two chapters. Chapter Five gives an account of the emergence of pro-Soviet sentiment in the Ukrainian emigration on a larger scale and the attempts by the Bolsheviks to develop a response to this. It then portrays the result of this response, the journal *Nova hromada*, a Soviet-funded émigré publication whose aim was to spread Sovietophilism in the Ukrainian emigration. By and large, these three chapters are concerned with émigrés originally form the parts of the Ukraine ruled before the First World War by Russia, although there are Eastern Galicians present, especially in Chapter Five. By way of contrast, Chapters Six and Seven look at Ukrainians from the lands ruled by Poland in the 1920s, above all Eastern Galicia. Chapter Six discusses the emergence of Sovietophilism

among the East Galician emigration and in the lands ruled by Poland. Chapter Seven analyses the immigration of East Galician intellectuals to the Soviet Ukraine.

These five chapters constitute the main body of the thesis. They are chiefly based on primary sources. These include the published journals of the émigrés themselves, and their published letters, memoirs and diaries. Three archives in Kyiv were also used: the *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy* (TsDAHO – the Central State Archive of Public Organisations of the Ukraine), which was the archive of the Bolshevik party, the *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukrainy* (TsDAVO – the Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of the Government and Administration of the Ukraine) and *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, Kyiv* (TsDIA – the Central State Historical Archive of the Ukraine, Kyiv). These archives contain the resolutions of the higher organs of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine (KP(b)U) and the Soviet Ukrainian Republic, the letters and reports of the Soviet Ukrainian representatives based abroad, and the unpublished letters of some of the émigrés. In addition, TsDAHO also has the minutes of the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Many earlier accounts have been based on only archival sources or émigré writings. This mix of sources has enabled the author to build up a broad picture of the Sovietophile émigré groups and their relationship to the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, there are other sources which were not used due to financial and time constraints, but would have been beneficial. Most notably, it was not possible to use the Russian archives, or the papers of Volodymyr Vynnychenko held at Columbia University in New York. In addition, there are collections in the Ukraine which are not yet open to the public, for example the papers of Ievhen Petrushevych. Like all historical works, the conclusions of this book are provisional, subject to revision once these other sources have been studied.

These final thoughts are presented in Chapter Eight and the Conclusion. The eighth chapter starts with a review of the responses to the emergence of Ukrainian Sovietophilism among the rest of the Ukrainian émigré community. This is used as a basis to examine the place of Ukrainian Sovietophilism within the ‘turn to the right’, that is the triumph of the doctrine of integral na-

tionalism within Ukrainian political thought between the two world wars. The Conclusion continues this theme by showing how this research on Ukrainian Sovietophilism changes the present understanding of the inter-war Ukrainian emigration and Ukrainian intellectual history in general. It then draws some final comparisons between the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and the Ukrainian Sovietophiles. In this way, it argues that is valid to talk of a 'Change of Signposts' in the Ukrainian emigration.

(Note: Many of the Ukrainian national figures discussed in the book may not be familiar to some readers. Short biographical notes on those individuals who appear several times in the text have been provided in the appendix. For those who only appear once, this information has been provided in the footnotes).

1 Russian *Smenovekhovstvo*

Overview

In order to understand the context in which the Ukrainian emigration and the Ukrainian Bolsheviks responded to the emergence of Ukrainian Sovietophilism, it is first necessary to give a short overview of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*. This summary does not aim to provide a comprehensive picture of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, for a great body of research already exists on this topic and the main subject of this book is the Ukrainian rather than the Russian emigration. Nevertheless, it is one of the arguments of this book that, despite the ideological differences between the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and the Ukrainian Sovietophiles, they were part of the same historical phenomenon.

The original *Smena vekh* collection appeared in response to the faltering campaign of the White movement against the Bolsheviks – over the course of 1920 the anti-Bolshevik forces had experienced defeat after defeat, as a result of which thousands of the Bolsheviks' opponents, including those who had not participated in the White movement but simply feared persecution at the hands of the Red Army, streamed across Russia's borders to Central and Western Europe, and Northern China (mainly to the city of Kharbin, which was the centre of the Russian-Chinese railroad). The émigré community which this movement created was not only made up of aristocrats, but in fact included all classes, from urban professionals to Cossack farmers, and members of the intelligentsia to skilled workers. With the exception of the Bolsheviks, all the political parties and tendencies of the revolutionary period were present: the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the many different shadings of monarchist. Against the background of such political diversity, and with the wounds of the revolution and civil war still open, émigré hopes that a common ground could be found on the basis of opposition to the Bolsheviks were soon shown to be illusory. In fact, the impotence of emigration increased political fragmentation: in the course of the decade the Constitutional Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries were riven by disagreements and splits, while the monarchists ar-

gued over who was the rightful heir to the murdered tsar, and whether the future monarchy should be constitutional, absolutist or something in between.[38] Meanwhile, in Russia the Bolsheviks sought to step back, at least publicly, from some of the bloodier policies of the civil war. In March 1921, they introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP), which included economic measures more favourable to the peasants such as ending requisitioning and forced collectivisation, and allowing peasants to sell their produce. In addition, small-scale, private manufacturing was made legal, as was the activity of commercial middle-men.[39]

In response to the failure to defeat the Bolsheviks, the impossibility of the emigration ever exercising political power and the hope that the Bolshevik regime would take on milder forms, a group of Russian émigrés started to argue in favour of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. The major document of this change of heart was a collection of articles, *Smena vekh*, or the 'Change of Signposts'.

The organiser of the collection was Iurii Kliuchnikov, a Kadet who before the revolution had taught international law at Moscow University. During the revolution, he had served as Admiral Kolchak's[40] foreign minister, but had been sidelined in the government's conduct of its foreign policy, and travelled to Paris in order to take part in the peace conferences there.[41] The second most important contributor was Nikolai Ustrialov, who like Kliuchnikov had taught in the law department of Moscow University and been a member of the Kadet

38 On the creation and composition of the Russian emigration see Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad. A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939*, Oxford: OUP, pp.21-7. The best account of the political differences in the Russian emigration is still to be found in Hans von Rimscha, *Russland jenseits der Grenzen*. *Ein Beitrag zur russischen Nachkriegsgeschichte*, Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1927. Also very useful is Claudia Weiss, *Das Rußland zwischen den Zeilen. Die russische Emigrantenpresse im Frankreich der 1920er Jahre und ihre Bedeutung für die Genese der "Zarubežnaja Rossija"*, Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz, 2000.

39 Robert Service, *A History of Twentieth Century Russia*, London: Penguin, 1997, pp.124-7

40 Aleksandr Kolchak (1873-1920): a tsarist admiral, who joined the anti-Bolshevik Ufa Directory. In winter 1918, he overthrew the Ufa Directory, and proclaimed himself supreme ruler of the Russian state, establishing a dictatorship over Siberia, the Urals and the Far East centred in Omsk. His government was forced further eastwards by the Red Army, and in January 1920 he was captured and executed. *Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v SSSR: entsiklopediia*, Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1987, ed. S.S. Khromov, p.269.

41 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.61-4.

party. He had also served in Kolchak's government in Omsk, where he had been director of the press bureau. Ustrialov was one of the first émigrés to argue openly that only the Bolsheviks could save Russia, in articles in the newspaper *Novosti zhizni* (News of Life), which was published in Kharbin, the northern Chinese town to which Ustrialov had emigrated. Ustrialov did not write an article for *Smena vekh*; rather Kliuchnikov compiled a piece faithfully based on the writings of Ustrialov which he included under Ustrialov's name.[42] The other contributors were, like Kliuchnikov, all based in Paris. They included Sergei Lukianov, who had little political experience and had emigrated following a failed attempt to join Wrangel's[43] government in southern Russia; Iurii Potekhin, a friend of Ustrialov and Kliuchnikov and fellow Kadet, who had served as Denikin's[44] vice-minister of industry and trade; A.V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, a joint founder of the Party of Legal Order and one of the Octobrists' leading publicists, who had worked in Denikin's propaganda office during the revolution, and Sergei Chakhotin, a prominent bio-physicist who had worked as a publicist for the Denikin government and the United Military Government of the Don.[45]

The title chosen by Kliuchnikov, *Smena vekh*, referred to *Vekhi* ('Signposts'), a collection of articles which appeared in 1909 and sought to question the fundamental axioms held by the intelligentsia in the light of the 1905 revolution. The contributors to the volume had all, albeit for different reasons, come to abhor the intelligentsia's subordination of the absolute values of nation, state, law, religion and truth to the political goal of revolution and a naïve devotion to the people. This misplacement of values, they argued, had been re-

42 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.29-57. Less useful are the recent Russian studies of Ustrialov. See L.A. Bystriantseva, 'Mirovozzrenie i obshchestvenno-politicheskaia deiatelnost N.V Ustrialova (1890-1937), *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 2000, No.5, pp.162-190; V.K. Romanovskii, 'Nikolai Vasilevich Ustrialov', *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 2002, No.4, pp.79-99.

43 Petr Wrangel (1878-1928): succeeded Denikin as commander of the anti-Bolshevik forces in southern Russia in April 1920. He fought the Bolsheviks in Crimea and the south of the Ukraine until defeat forced him and his army to evacuate Sevastopol in November 1920. *Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia*, p.122.

44 Anton Denikin (1872-1947): leader of the Volunteer Army which fought the Bolsheviks in southern Russia. Despite threatening Moscow in a campaign of summer-autumn 1919, by spring 1920 his forces had been defeated. He and the remnants of his army were evacuated from Crimea and in April 1920 he proclaimed Wrangel as his successor. *Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia*, p.183.

45 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.73-5, 78-9.

sponsible for the descent into violence of the 1905 revolution. They were in favour of cooperation with the tsarist regime, and called on the intelligentsia to turn to their own spiritual renewal. *Vekhi* was subjected to vicious attack by all sides of the Russian intelligentsia, but it also represented a basic reinterpretation of the role of the intelligentsia in Russian society.[46] Kliuchnikov hoped in *Smena vekh* to emulate the role played by the *Vekhi*. He saw himself responding to the 1917 revolution in the spirit of the *Vekhi*'s reaction to the upheaval of 1905. His opening article discussed *Vekhi* and its legacy in the light of the Bolshevik's takeover of power.[47]

Though on certain issues there were differences of opinion between the six articles, the arguments put forward by the contributors in favour of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks were very similar. *Smena vekh*'s starting point was that the struggle against the Bolsheviks was lost; to prosecute it further would only inflict more harm on Russia.[48] However, the collection sought to convince the émigrés that there were grounds for consolation. Despite the Bolsheviks' outwardly internationalist ideology, the Soviet government was restoring Russia's great power status. Although the Bolsheviks had recognised the right of nations to self-determination up to independence, this had been merely a tactical concession which they would not honour; rather, 'the Soviet regime will try by all means to reunite the border countries with the centre – in the name of the idea of world revolution'.[49] Several contributors contrasted the Whites' betrayal of Russian national interests with the 'patriotic' actions of the Reds; whereas the Whites had colluded with the Allies' and Poland's attacks on Russia, the Reds had defended the country from foreign invasion.[50] Indeed, for a number of the *Smena vekh* group, Poland's attack on Russia had been one of the key turning points in their conversion to a pro-Soviet position.[51] Moreover, the slogan of world revolution was a powerful tool for Russian foreign policy: it gave Russia the sympathy of the workers of the world

46 On *Vekhi* see Aileen M. Kelly, *Toward Another Shore. Russian Thinkers Between Necessity and Chance*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998, pp.154-200, and Leonard Schapiro, 'The *Vekhi* Group and the Mystique of Revolution', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol.34, 1955, pp.58-76.

47 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, Prague: Nasha rech, 1921, pp.3-51.

48 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.33-4, 47-8, 91-6, 142-3, 154-8, 161.

49 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.58-9. The quotation is on p.59.

50 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.59, 137-41, 175-6

51 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.188.

and the colonial peoples of Asia. Western workers were unwilling to support their governments' wars against Russia and Moscow's influence on the working class compelled the governments of the West to listen to Russia's voice. The support for the Bolsheviks in Turkey, India, Persia and Afghanistan was enabling the Soviet state to realise traditional Russian interests in these areas.[52]

The Bolsheviks, according to *Smena vekh*, had also strengthened the Russian state internally. All the contributors to the collection decried the anarchy created by the civil war and praised the Bolsheviks for bringing order back to the country. Bobrishchev-Pushkin pointed to the irony that the Whites applauded anarchic events, such as the Kronstadt rising and Makhno's revolts, in the hope that it would bring about the collapse of their enemies.[53] Moreover, *Smena vekh* argued that the revolution was overcoming the age-old failure of the people to identify with the state, which the *Smena vekh* group, under the influence of the *Vekhi*, had identified as one of Russia's greatest problems. Under the aegis of the Soviet regime, the peasants and proletariat had come to see the state as their own and to identify their fate with its fate. In this way, the people had matured by acquiring a political consciousness.[54]

A further argument common to all the articles in the *Smena vekh* collection was that the Soviet regime was becoming more moderate. As the Ustrialov article put it, 'obeying the voice of life, the Soviet regime, clearly, is deciding on a radical tactical change in the direction of the renunciation of a Communist position'. He argued that it must be apparent to the Bolsheviks that socialism meant economic suicide; they had realised that they must abandon it in the name of self-preservation and the future of the world revolution, and that they must cooperate with world capitalism and introduce bourgeois economic measures. He recognised that the Bolsheviks described this as a purely tactical, temporary change, but replied that 'a fact remains a fact': he was convinced that the policy was now irreversible.[55] Other contributors pointed to developments which indicated that the change would become es-

52 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.41, 59, 133, 136, 176-7.
53 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.89-90, 97-100, 179-80
54 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.88-9, 109, 174-6.
55 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.62-5. The quotations are on p.62 and p.63 respectively.

tablished. Both Chakhotin and Potekhin argued that the participation of the intelligentsia in the reconstruction of Russia would strengthen the evolution taking place.[56] Lukianov and Potekhin spoke of the Bolsheviks' success in overcoming the utopianism of the masses.[57] For the *Smena vekh* group, the moderation of Bolshevism was not only evident in economic policy; Lukianov, for example observed a reduction in the use of terror.[58]

Although they all hoped for changes in the Bolshevik state, most of the contributors, with the notable exception of Chakhotin, rejected a return to parliamentarianism. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, for example, believed that the developments witnessed during the nineteenth century had left parliamentary democracy hopelessly outdated, unable to deal with the economic and social questions thrown up by capitalism. He thought that the idea that people's opinions were represented in parliaments was a fiction; rather, parliaments were farces through which politicians used the people's hopes to get into power.[59] For him, it was too early to judge what form the reformed state would take; however, he identified decentralisation as one of the defining aspects of the Soviet structure and argued that by transferring power to the cities and regions of Russia, the people would be drawn into the state structure and freedom guaranteed.[60]

Underlying all these arguments was the belief that history was a conscious agent, determining the course of events, driving human behaviour. The form in which history expressed itself in the world was the exact opposite of the inner meaning which the events possessed. Thus, according to the 'Ustrialov' article, 'the odd dialectic of history' had bestowed upon the internationalist Bolsheviks the role of the defender of Russian national interests.[61] Similarly, Chakhotin wrote that 'history compelled the Russian "Communist" republic, despite its official dogma, to take upon itself the national cause of reuniting

56 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.161-2, 164-5, 173.
57 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.87-8, 180.
58 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.87.
59 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.102-6. See also p.48 and p.172, in which Kliuchnikov and Potekhin respectively reject Western parliamentary democracy as inappropriate for Russia.
60 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.116.
61 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.59.

Russia, which was disintegrating'.[62] This view of history convinced the *smenovekhovtsy* that the result of the revolution had been inevitable. 'There was nothing accidental', wrote Potekhin, 'in the inevitable development of the Russian revolution'.[63] Similarly, Lukianov described the question of whether it could have been different as 'pointless': the revolution 'had to take such an extreme character, which in turn, with exactly the same necessity, had to find its leader in the person of Russian Bolshevism'.[64]

At the same time, all of the arguments in the *Smena vekh* collection were an attempt to find sense in the bloodshed which Russia had experienced over the last four years. Kliuchnikov attacked the idea of returning to the old regime as this would deny the agony of the civil war any meaning: 'We are criminals if we defile and destroy our suffering country, only to return to the old […]. After the terrors of the revolution, a period of happiness must come'.[65] However, this desire to elevate the catastrophe which had befallen the country into something transcendent seduced the contributors to *Smena vekh* into becoming apologists for violence. Both 'Ustrialov' and Lukianov excused the crimes of the Bolsheviks by arguing that all great historical events were accompanied by destruction.[66] Bobrishchev-Pushkin wrote that there were two types of terror, that which has a purpose, is used to build, and therefore is historically justified, and that which is mere bloodlust and therefore futile; the red terror, of course, fell into the first category, which put it alongside the brutality of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Cromwell and Robespierre.[67]

Some of the contributors argued that the revolution was an event of importance not only for Russia, but also for the whole world. Bobrishchev-Pushkin described the revolution as a new dawn for the world: what had happened in Russia would be repeated in the rest of Europe. He clearly felt that the meaning of the revolution emanated from the agony which it had involved. 'The Russian people', he wrote, ' "in the guise of slaves", in the pangs of countless

62 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.160.
63 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.168.
64 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.89-90.
65 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.36.
66 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.54-6, 89.
67 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.121-3.

sufferings, will carry universal ideals to their exhausted brothers'.[68] The theme of suffering also appeared in Kliuchnikov's article, which stressed that the Russian people were attracted by the Bolsheviks because it gave them the opportunity 'to suffer for the workers and peasants, for the oppressed and abused of the world', 'to kill evil in the word and replace it with eternal justice'.[69] Potekhin described the revolution as the opening of a new era, and compared its significance to the emergence of Christianity and the discovery of America.[70]

Above all, the *Smena vekh* collection was an appeal to the Russian intelligentsia. As mentioned above, Kliuchnikov's opening article, with the title 'Smena vekh', sought to analyse the intelligentsia's response to the October revolution, just as the original *Vekhi* had examined its relationship with the 1905 revolution. He believed that the intelligentsia was a class created to bring about the revolution. However, it had acquired a number of bad characteristics as a result, which the *Vekhi* had identified: it had failed to understand the importance of the state and the nation in the country's life, and accordingly lacked an understanding of the 'mystique of the state'; it was isolated from the people whom it claimed to represent; rather than seeking to achieve the possible, it made maximal demands, and as a result it worshipped destruction and was incapable of construction. At the same time, Kliuchnikov also criticised the failure of the original contributors to *Vekhi* to accept the new revolution: through the revolution, the 'mystique of the state' was being realised in Russia, bringing about a fusion of the state and revolution and offering the chance for the emergence of a new intelligentsia, which had overcome the defects highlighted by the *Vekhi*. He therefore called on the intelligentsia to accept the revolution.[71] The other contributors to the collection also addressed themselves to the intelligentsia in the Russian emigration, albeit in more practical tones. Chakhotin and Potekhin called on the intelligentsia to return to Russia and take part in the reconstruction of the country.[72] In contrast, Bobrishchev-Pushkin wanted pro-Soviet émigrés to remain abroad in

68 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.147-8. The quotation is on p.148.
69 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.40-1.
70 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.173.
71 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.9-10, 15-8, 37-8, 49-50.
72 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.162-5, 172-3.

order to counter the propaganda of the anti-Soviet emigration, while Lukianov spoke more vaguely of reaching out one's hand to help one's homeland.[73]

The *Smena vekh* collection was followed by the *Smena vekh* weekly, which appeared in Paris from October 1921 to March 1922. With the exception of Chakhotin, all the original contributors played a role in the new publication; a number of new people also became involved, the most prominent of whom was V.N. Lvov, the former chief procurator in the Provisional Government.[74] Of later importance was B.V. Diushen, who had been a Socialist Revolutionary and had served on the staff of *Svoboda Rossii*, the organ of General Iudenich's[75] government. After February 1921, he had started moving away from the SRs. He argued that one should differentiate between the Communist party, which he believed would soon fall, and the Soviet system, much of which he found praiseworthy. Like the *Smena vekh* group, he praised the Red Army as a truly national force, hoped that the revolution was awakening the peasants and workers of Russia and believed that the intelligentsia had an important role to play in the future Soviet state.[76]

Whereas the Prague collection had been programmatic, stating the fundamental ideology of the group, the Paris weekly had the more practical goal of convincing the émigré community that conditions were improving under the Bolshevik regime.[77] The paper described improvements in both the material and intellectual conditions in the country. *Smena vekh* hailed the New Economic Policy (NEP) for the changes it had brought about in the economic situation in the country. It tried to explain the intentions of the NEP to its readers, presenting it as a form of economic organisation halfway between the free market and state intervention, bringing together the different interests of peasants, workers and entrepreneurs for the good of the whole country's economy. This, claimed *Smena vekh*, was already showing positive results. The contributors believed that the Bolsheviks might make further concessions

73 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.90, 145.
74 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.111-2.
75 Nikolai Iudenich (1862-1933): commander of the Russian army in the Caucuses during the First World War; between October and November 1919 he led a campaign to take St. Petersburg from the Bolsheviks, but was defeated and at the beginning of December retreated into Estonia. *Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia*, p.693.
76 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.115-6.
77 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.119-20.

to private capital, but the permanence of the NEP would rest on the West's willingness to cooperate with Russia and reduce international tension.[78]

Even more important for the intelligentsia audience, at which the Paris *Smena vekh* was aimed, was the question of Russian intellectual life. *Smena vekh* believed that Russian culture under the Bolsheviks was blossoming. Articles enthusiastically described a renaissance in theatre, art and literature in the Russian Soviet Republic, which was raising the cultural level of the people.[79] At the same time, *Smena vekh* observed a resurgence in interest in intellectual matters, for example describing a budding intellectual life in the universities, which, unlike the old regime, reached out to the working classes and sparked within them an interest in the life of the mind.[80] The journal also dealt with the issue of intellectual freedom. It admitted that for the time being freedom of opinion was impossible to introduce, but absolved the Soviet government of blame by claiming that conditions in the country, above all the danger posed to Russia, necessitated the restriction of individual freedoms. However, *Smena vekh* assured its readers that once the threat had gone away, these freedoms would be restored. They saw the replacement of the Cheka by the GPU as the Soviet secret police in February 1922 as an indication of this new direction.[81]

Another significant change was the move in the original *Smena vekh*, in which the contributors had acknowledged that Bolshevism was not as bad as had at first seemed, to the weekly journal's exultation in the future which the revolution promised for Russia and the whole world.[82] The weekly *Smena vekh* argued that Europe was undergoing a crisis similar to that to which Russia had been subjugated, and that the continent would soon descend into revolution. This could only be avoided if the Western powers were willing to accept the new Russia into the international arena and lessen international tensions: for example, improved relations with Russia would help placate the

78 *Smena vekh*, No.3, 12 November 1921, pp.4-6, 16-9; No.5, 26 November 1921, pp.11-4, No.9, 24 December 1921, pp.22-3; No.17, 18 February 1922, pp.21-2.
79 *Smena vekh*, No.2, 5 November 1921, pp.7-9, 17-24; No.7, 10 December 1921, pp.21-4; No.8, 17 December 1921, pp.23-4; No.13, 21 January 1922, pp.20-1.
80 *Smena vekh*, No.4, 19 November 1921, pp.22-4; No.17, 18 February 1922, p.22.
81 *Smena vekh*, No.5, 26 November 1921, pp.13-4; No.12, 14 January 1922, pp.21-3; No.15, 4 February 1922, 9-11; No.18 25 February 1922, p.9.
82 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.121-2.

anger of workers in those countries which were prepared to compromise. The *Smena vekh* group sought to contribute to the integration of Soviet Russia into the world order by calling on other powers to recognise her. For Kliuchnikov, the highpoint in this campaign was his participation in the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference of April/May 1922, at which Soviet Russia discussed her economic relationship with the Western countries, as a specialist for international law. Lenin, who had been impressed by one of Kliuchnikov's articles, had himself suggested that Kliuchnikov take part.[83] Though the contributors to *Smena vekh* welcomed the Bolsheviks' abandonment of the idea of world revolution for the immediate future, they also felt that Russia's leading role in world politics rested on its status as the leader of the international revolution, to which the proletariat in other countries looked for leadership. Consequently, they argued that the Bolsheviks must continue to express revolution as a long term aim; the evolution away from pure Communism should not go too far.[84]

As Kliuchnikov's presence at Genoa attests, in the first months of 1922 the *smenovekhovtsy* were adopting an increasingly cosy relationship with the Bolsheviks. A further sign of this was the publication by the *smenovekhovtsy* of the first issue of a Soviet-funded daily, called *Nakanune* (On the Eve), in Berlin in March 1922. Indeed, uniquely for an émigré publication, the paper was distributed within Russia, and it had its own office in Moscow. Kliuchnikov became the editor-in-chief, and most of those who had worked on both the Prague and the Paris *Smena vekh* were also involved in *Nakanune*. However, those who had worked on the original collection of essays were increasingly pushed into the background and newer converts to *smenovekhovstvo* such as B.V. Diushen came to play a more prominent role. As a consequence, the ideological position of *Nakanune* was being determined more and more by men with a socialist background. Most importantly, Grigorii Kiredtsov became joint editor-in-chief of the new daily. Kiredtsov was an economist who, before the First World War, had written for liberal and socialist newspapers, and in 1919 headed the press and propaganda department

83 *Smena vekh*, No.5, 26 November 1921, pp.8-10, 13-7; No.9 24 December 1921, pp.1-4. On Kliuchnikov's participation in the conference see Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.135-7.

84 *Smena vekh*, No.2, 5 November 1921, p.1; No.5, 26 November 1921, pp.9, 13.

of General Iudenich's government. At the same time, the paper's political line was also closely supervised by the Soviets.[85]

These facts were evident in the tone of the paper. For example, in *Nakanune* the *smenovekhovtsy* increasingly adapted their analysis of the NEP to the official understanding of the policy. The editorial of the 9th issue warned that one 'cannot see in the New Economic Policy a renunciation by the Soviet regime of the final ideals put forward by the October revolution and all of Russian and world history'; rather the final victory of labour would have to be achieved in steps. This gradualism had been made necessary by peasant dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime, and the NEP had been introduced to overcome this. The article concluded that the 'interests of Russia, indissolubly connected with the interests of the revolution, demand that the reduction in revolutionary needs does not outstrip the demands of life, so that the achievements of the revolutionary wave are maintained at the highest point allowed by real conditions'.[86] This was not a complete departure from the group's previous arguments: the *Smena vekh* weekly had already claimed that the Soviet regime should not lose its revolutionary character if it was to serve Russian national interests. As Hardeman argues, the decisive ideological shift had taken place in the Paris *Smena vekh* when the *smenovekhovtsy* 'moved from accepting that the October revolution was not exclusively a destructive phenomenon, to hailing it as an event that heralded a better future for the whole of mankind'.[87] Nevertheless, in this case, the emphasis had moved from the desire to prevent a complete loss in revolutionary fervour to a call to maintain it at the highest level practicable. Thus, though no fundamental change had taken place in the group's thinking with the foundation of *Nakanune*, it represented a further step in the reduction of the intellectual independence of the *smenovekhovtsy* from the Bolsheviks.

The content of *Nakanune* also closely reflected the aims of the Bolsheviks. Moscow hoped that the paper would destroy the influence of the émigrés on foreign governments. At the same time, it would campaign for the international recognition of the Soviet republics.[88] Consequently, international politics

85 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.137-41, 145.
86 *Nakanune*, No.9, 5 April, 1922, p.1.
87 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.153.
88 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.176.