Institutional Engineering and Hybrid Power-sharing in Divided Societies
The Cases of Indonesia and Sub-Saharan Africa
Krzysztof Trzciński

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For Krzysztof Trzciński, ‘the relationship between centripetalism and consociationalism is more than a question of friendship and rivalry; his position is that their combination takes on a life of its own. Identifying both “centripetal-consociational” and “consociational-centripetal” cases, depending on the system’s overarching modus operandi, he takes the comparison one step further and introduces the concepts of “hybrid power-sharing and its ‘own’ institutions.” By this, he means the institutional space in which “consociationalism meets centripetalism.” (…) Importantly, Trzciński theorizes the conditions under which consociationalism and centripetalism can be successfully merged, serving the aim of achieving peace and political stability.’

Allison McCulloch & Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, Territorial and Institutional Settlements in the Global South and Beyond, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (Oxford University Press 2023)
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Introduction


Power-sharing theory relates to the building of institutional infrastructure in societies divided by conflicts based on different identities and interests. Such political engineering aims to enable power-sharing and thus participation in decision-making processes in divided societies by members of different segments (specifically ethnic/national, religious, denominational, racial, and ideological). Consequently, it is intended to limit conflicts between them and (or) between segments and the central government, which in turn should translate into political stability and peace, both crucial to creating the conditions for democratisation and the maintenance of democracy.

For years, two power-sharing models have dominated the literature: consociationalism, conceptualised mainly by Arend Lijphart, and centripetalism, conceptualised mainly by Donald L. Horowitz. In short, these models propose cooperation between members of different segments of society based de facto on opposing assumptions. To greatly simplify, it can be said that consociationalism offers segmental institutions (such as segmental parties, especially ethnic and religious, and territorial and cultural autonomy for segments) and detailed arrangements defending the interests of these segments (such as grand coalitions, proportionality in elections and the division of various positions, as well as minority vetos), which are intended to contribute to building inter-segmental understanding while strongly protecting segmental distinctiveness.

In turn, also simplifying, centripetalism proposes institutions integrating segmental political elites and moderating politics (like cross-segmental parties
and multi-segmental cabinets created by them, a ‘supra-segmental’ president elected with the votes of a significant part of the segments, preferential voting encouraging vote-pooling, a territorial structure creating multi-segmental administrative units and dividing large segments so that they live in several of them) to de facto lead to the creation of a centrist politics, and, over time, to blur segmental differences, and simultaneously to de-ethnicise politics or (and) eliminate its reliance on the influence of religion.

These models seem ideal in nature and are to some extent also quite abstract. One should note that, firstly, each seems to inherently assume superiority over the other, manifested in supposedly greater effectiveness in pursuing goals such as inter-segmental cooperation, limiting conflicts, and building political stability and peace. Secondly, assuming their innate theoretical contradiction, the models do not afford much space for cooperative overlap, including the employment of consociational and centripetal institutions within the same political system. Thus, theoretically, they seem to be little open to the changing reality, including to the addition of another model’s arrangements in power-sharing political systems or even the emergence of hybrid institutions.

Indeed, consociationalism and centripetalism, due to their underlying conceptual assumptions, may seem and often are very difficult to reconcile. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to combine consociational and centripetal institutions in the same political system, or even to create hybrid institutions, i.e. having both consociational and centripetal elements within it.

This book is intended to prove that, in addition to consociationalism and centripetalism, one can now talk about the functioning of empirical cases of power-sharing political systems, which are hybrid in character. Among the major goals of this book are: firstly, the identification and demonstration, through the presentation of the fruits of institutional engineering, of four specific such cases, namely of Nigeria, Kenya, Burundi, and Indonesia; secondly, further conceptualisation of the hybrid institutions, and, more generally, of a hybrid power-sharing model (Trzciński 2018, 2022a), mainly by developing and demonstrating its new conceptual assumptions; thirdly, indicating the existence of various levels of hybridity within hybrid power-sharing, such as the employment of institutions of different power-sharing models, the development of hybrid institutions, or the production by institutions or mechanisms typical of one power-sharing model of effects typical of another power-sharing model or both classic models (‘hybridity of effects’), but also hybrid effects (having both consociational and centripetal features); and fourthly, a broader exemplification of hybrid power-sharing on the selected example of Indonesia, along with an articulation of the processes taking place in the political system of this country, such as, first, creating a power-sharing system and its hybridisation, and then gradual centralisation of power and moving away from various power-sharing arrangements in order to de facto
‘Javanise’ state power, i. e. rebuild and consolidate the political domination of the strongest ethnic segment, the Javanese. Thus, utilising the Indonesian case, this book hopes to better explain and develop a hybrid power-sharing model and its life cycle, i. e. processes that can occur in this system and change it.

Further important issues the book raises include the intentionality of employing consociational and centripetal institutions in the same political system, as well as elements typical of consociationalism and centripetalism within hybrid institutions; asymmetry or dominance of either consociationalism or centripetalism in hybrid power-sharing; the temporariness and erosion of hybrid power-sharing; distinguishing ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power-sharing cases; different perceptions of the essence of power-sharing in the literature, as well as diverse understandings of power-sharing as an empirical political system or conflict management/resolution strategy or a type of democracy, and also as a theory built on empirical examples and normative theory.

My research has been based on two interrelated theses. The first claims that hybrid power-sharing, based largely on a combination of consociational and centripetal elements, exists as a separate power-sharing model founded on empirical cases. Its validity is demonstrated in the first part of the book, mostly theoretical, where the assumptions of the hybrid model are discussed, and corresponding empirical examples are presented. The second thesis states that Indonesia is an empirical example of hybrid power-sharing. Consequently, the second part of the book is devoted to a detailed illustration of hybridity in power-sharing based on the example of the political system of this country.

Hybrid power-sharing assumptions and empirical illustrations are related to issues (treated as research questions during the analysis), the most important of which are: the origins of and the context in which different power-sharing arrangements are implemented; specific segments accommodated by power-sharing arrangements; the ways power is shared or paths power-sharing arrangements allow members of different segments to take part in decision-making processes; kinds of consociational and centripetal arrangements employed; ways of creating hybrid arrangements and the nature of their hybridity; the reasons for the primacy of one power-sharing model or the asymmetry between centripetal and consociational arrangements in hybridity; ways specific power-sharing arrangements (and various blends of them) operate, including, especially, possible collisions between institutions of different power-sharing models; performance (or effects) of specific arrangements and how they are blended, i. e. ways hybrid power-sharing limits specific conflicts and contributes to the stabilisation of the political situation; the beneficiaries and ways specific segments/segmental elites and central authorities benefit from hybrid power-sharing; mechanisms (techniques) of power-sharing arrangements modifications; and coincidence of non-power-sharing factors that may contribute to political stabilisation.
I do not focus on a broader presentation and analysis of the case of Northern Ireland, though it seems to fit at least some of the assumptions of hybrid power-sharing, in the period after the parties to the conflict in the province signed the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. This example, although it has serious problems ‘in operation’ (especially visible in 2017–2020), is very interesting because the establishment of a hybrid system in Northern Ireland was very intentional and well-formalised, with the help of external actors. There are several reasons for my departure in this book from dealing with Northern Ireland’s case. Firstly, it has been widely discussed and analysed in the literature for years by many researchers, including John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (see, e.g. 2009). Secondly, different researchers of power-sharing in Northern Ireland provisionally seem to consider the non-consociational, specifically centripetal, elements introduced into the political system of the province to be so weak alongside the dominant consociational content (see, e.g. Bogaards 2019, who discusses the issue of weak design and effects of vote-pooling) that they do not emphasise the resulting hybridity strongly enough to explicitly recognise Northern Ireland as an example of a hybrid system, specifically a consociational-centripetal one. Consequently, the political system of Northern Ireland could be classified not as an example of ‘hard,’ but rather of ‘soft,’ hybrid power-sharing, a concept I briefly touch upon later in the book. However, this would require further research, including a comparative one, and the further conceptualisation of ‘soft’ hybridity in power-sharing. Currently, many researchers of Northern Ireland’s case simply consider it a variant of consociationalism and classify it as liberal consociationalism (de facto the only ‘mature’ version and thus discussed in-depth in the literature; other ‘cases’ of liberal consociation seem either to have traits of both liberal and corporate consociation logic or, like in the instance of Iraq, are de facto a ‘political prescription’; see McCulloch 2014: 506–507, McGarry and O’Leary 2007). Incidentally, Allison McCulloch (2014: 502) seems to perceive liberal consociation as a strategy for the implementation of consociationalism when she points out that ‘there is more than one way to implement consociational settlements,’ namely ‘two broad strategies of implementation: corporate and liberal, alternatively premised on logics of predetermination and self-determination.’

Thirdly, and most importantly, I consider hybrid power-sharing to be a political system of states, not regions, or provinces, like Northern Ireland. Its ‘hard’ version has been adopted in four countries: Nigeria, Indonesia, Kenya, and Burundi. These cases share the following main traits: 1) concomitant multiple institutions of different power-sharing models with the dominant role of one of them, 2) the development of their own hybrid institutions, 3) a lack of collision between different institutions (i.e. parts of the ‘blend’ are coherent), and 4) the
existence of institutions of different power-sharing models at the state level.\(^1\) Thus, the identified examples show a certain regularity that gives rise to the conceptualisation of ‘hard’ hybrid power-sharing.

In turn, Northern Ireland, like South Tyrol, another example of power-sharing at the regional level, are just parts of states de facto having a special status (other parts of the UK and Italy do not have systems of a power-sharing type). Moreover, Northern Ireland is a relatively small sub-polity, with approximately 1.8 million inhabitants in 2023. And the least populous of the four countries where hybrid power-sharing was adopted, i.e. Burundi, had over 13.3 million people in 2023. The population of other countries where hybrid power-sharing operates is much larger. Thus, in 2023, Kenya had a population of over 55.4 million, Nigeria about 225 million, and Indonesia approx. 278 million (Worldometer 2023). In 2023, the four countries in which hybrid power-sharing has been shaped were inhabited by approx. 572 million people out of approx. 8.1 billion globally (of which 3.2 billion people are residents of the three most populous countries – India, China, and the USA, which do not have power-sharing political systems) (Worldometer 2023). In 2023, every 14th inhabitant of the planet was a citizen of one of the four countries where ‘hard’ hybrid power-sharing operates. There is no other power-sharing model that has such global significance.

Although the population of the countries where hybrid power-sharing functions is extremely large, unlike Northern Ireland, the latter case is, of course, important from the point of view of power-sharing theory, at least because its hybridity has been, to a large extent, consciously planned in detail and formalised (and in this sense it especially resembles the example of Burundi), although the employing of centripetal elements into a largely consociational environment has not yet produced convincing results (from the perspective of the goals that power-sharing aims to serve). And the de facto collapse of power-sharing in 2017–2020 may indicate the fragility of Northern Ireland’s system hybridity.

On the contrary, especially the Indonesian case of hybrid power-sharing, discussed in the second part of this book in detail, not only seems to work well, but is also very atypical, complicated, and sophisticated. At the same time, it occurs in two major dimensions, on the one hand, between ideological sub-segments, liberal and illiberal, within the Islamic segment (recalling to some extent especially the classic example of the Netherlands analysed by Arend Lijphart 1968), and on the other, mainly between different ethnic groups, de facto between the strongest ethnic segment, the Javanese, and the others. As discussed in the latter parts of the book, while the ongoing transformations of the second

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\(^1\) It is likely that in each of these cases, there are also hybrid effects and (or) hybridity of effects (in this book I discuss these phenomena using the example of Indonesia and, to some extent, Kenya), which, however, requires further research.
dimension of hybrid power-sharing lead over time to the de-ethnicisation of politics (and at the same time strengthening the Javanese segment), the first dimension does not lead to a reduction in the political importance of religion and even strengthens the distinctiveness of the illiberal Islamic sub-segment, although, at the same time, it keeps the ideological basis of its existence – political Islam – in check. In turn, hybrid power-sharing in Indonesia basically refers very little to the relationship between the religious segments, i.e., on the one hand, the dominant Muslim one, and on the other, the Christian and Hindu segments. After the de facto liquidation of Christian parties in Indonesia (as demonstrated later in the book), the importance of smaller religious segments within hybrid power-sharing is today visible only in a handful of cases of issues related mostly to territorial structure and decentralisation, although, in some cases like the Balinese, ethnic and religious distinctiveness overlap. In the dimension of racial divisions in Indonesia, the complicated power-sharing arrangements between Papuans distinguished especially as one racial and regional segment (although at the same time divided ethnically and linguistically) are very important, and de facto it is the Javanese who have a significant impact on decision-making in matters regarding Papua and Papuans. The above-mentioned types of divisions and the related power-sharing arrangements or mechanisms that exhibit the effects expected from power-sharing show how multi-faceted the Indonesian hybrid power-sharing is.

Many of my articles and chapters on hybrid power-sharing have already been published, but this book, albeit combining most of the results of my research to date, should be treated not only as a summary of my knowledge on hybrid power-sharing and a most substantial contribution to date to its conceptualisation, but above all as an introduction to further research on the phenomenon of hybridisation of political systems of a power-sharing type. I believe that such research is essential from the perspective of maintaining political stability and peace in multi-segmental societies because the political, economic, and cultural realities of these societies are subject to various processes, and not necessarily positively.

Concerning methodology and limitations to the analysis, firstly I must note that even though I have conceptualised a hybrid power-sharing model based on four cases (of Indonesia, Nigeria, Kenya and Burundi), Indonesia became the most important research laboratory for me. I became interested in the Indonesian political system when I first visited Indonesia in 1996, during the reign of Suharto. Although at that time I was already attracted by Indonesian politics, I did not start systematic research on the Indonesian political system until 2012. At that time, I formulated basic research questions and explored some of the major Indonesian conflict cases by studying various primary sources (especially legal acts) and secondary ones (mostly scholarly monographs and papers). I then identified the various power-sharing arrangements that had been implemented
in Indonesia and conducted a preliminary analysis, formulating basic assumptions about their role in stabilising the political situation. I next carried out a similar analysis regarding the hybridity of Indonesian power-sharing. Employing inductive reasoning, I formulated initial conclusions concerning such issues as the intentionality and origin of the implementation of power-sharing institutions, their blend (hybrid power-sharing) and the asymmetry between centripetal and consociational arrangements; the existence of hybrid institutions; how power-sharing institutions allow members of different segments to take part in the decision-making processes; how specific power-sharing institutions and institutional blends operate, including any possible conflict between institutions of different power-sharing models; the effects the power-sharing institutions produce, their beneficiaries, and, consequently, how and the extent to which the blend itself and specific institutions contribute to reducing conflicts and achieving/maintaining political stability. I included all these topics in the questions I asked during my fieldwork in Indonesia that took place on five occasions between 2015 and 2023. Then I conducted 104 semi-structured and informal interviews with academic researchers of Indonesian politics, mostly political scientists, but also experts in anthropology, law, and sociology. Almost 24% of all interlocutors were former or acting politicians or public officials in addition to being academics. I also participated in seven group discussions at Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada (twice), Universitas Airlangga, Universitas Brawijaya, Universitas Syiah Kuala, and the International Centre for Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies. These experiences were of great scholarly value. Thanks to consulting numerous Indonesian researchers, I verified my initial conclusions, and intuitions resulting from research of the literature. The final in-depth analysis of the overall research material that I collected in Indonesia, and verification of the conclusions I made, also helped to fine-tune my ideas regarding hybrid institutions and the hybrid power-sharing conceptual assumptions that were shaped after researching, also in the field, of different cases of political systems of power-sharing type in Nigeria, Kenya, and Burundi. I discuss this part of my research further at the beginning of Chapter 2 on the hybrid power-sharing model.

The most important issue concerning power-sharing in Indonesia (but also in Nigeria, Kenya, and Burundi) and one that intrigued me from the beginning of my research was the effects (or performance) of the implementation of various power-sharing institutions and the operation of hybrid power-sharing. It was first necessary to assume that the change would bring some tangible effects and then to verify this assumption, among other things, by identifying the causes and putative effects, and assigning them to a given power-sharing model based on their specificity. When investigating the relationship between a given cause and the putative effects, it was essential to use the comparative method in temporal
terms and thus to compare the state before the occurrence of a given cause and the state after. In order to demonstrate a direct cause-and-effect relationship, process tracing was involved, revealing how a given change occurred. In this part of my studies, interviews and group discussions with experts were of crucial significance.

However, I am also aware of the limitations of the analysis. Thus, it is especially necessary to briefly outline here the difficulties associated with explaining the relationship between the implementation of a given power-sharing arrangement and its effects. The effects of the occurrence of a given event belong to the category of causation, which means one of the forms of dependence of phenomena that take place in objective reality. The concept of ‘effect’ is related to the concept of ‘cause,’ which is usually interpreted as an event or state (rather than an idea). In short, an effect is the result of a cause. The cause is, therefore, the first and agential member of the cause-and-effect relationship. The standard view stands that causation is a binary relationship between cause and effect. However, it is not always possible to empirically prove the connection between a given cause and a putative effect. It is usually assumed, with the support of data and rational arguments, that a given effect is due to the occurrence of a certain cause. To enable the verification of such an assumption, the cause should not be too far from the putative effect. Often, a given cause may be partially responsible for the putative effect, and such an effect may be partially dependent on that cause. A cause-and-effect relationship may, therefore, be more complex than that between a given cause and some putative effect. Since it is sometimes difficult to demonstrate a direct cause-and-effect relationship, one can talk about the causal factors of a state rather than one specific cause that generates it (Cartwright 1998, Gallow 2022, Hitchcock 2023).

Since inductive reasoning predominates over deductive reasoning in the social sciences, it is usually safer to say that an effect is more or less likely a result of a given cause. The more identified data and reasonable arguments indicate that a given effect occurred because of a specific cause, the more probable and the closer to the truth one is. Then it can be said that a given cause is highly likely to be responsible for a certain effect or effects. Therefore, the relationship between cause and effect is understood as a probabilistic (and sometimes also statistical) regularity. Importantly, the effect has a similar nature to a cause. Often, by analysing the properties of the effect, one can, to some extent, determine the properties of the cause. This type of cognition, however, is only probable. The effect of a cause may manifest itself as a new thing, but also as a change in the state or the properties of an already existing thing. A given action can cause main effects and side effects. The effect is chronologically later than the cause but may become the cause or causative agent of other effects (Cartwright 1998, Moore 2019).
Since the exact connection of a given effect (or group of effects) with a specific cause (or causes) is sometimes difficult and cannot be entirely certain, it was essential in my research to extensively consult the putative effects of various power-sharing arrangements and mechanisms, which I identified, with Indonesian political scientists. In several cases, in the wake of these discussions, my findings were corrected.

I am also aware that in the event of any modifications to the political system, there may be a coincidence, i.e. the simultaneous occurrence of other factors (phenomena), also with a non-directly political basis, which may influence the performance attributed to these modifications. In the case of Indonesia, these are especially factors such as economic growth and development, which raise the standard of living of the society, pro-state integrationist propaganda in education, increasing effectiveness of coercive bodies (responsible for ensuring security), as well as fatigue with previous conflicts and the desire to live in peace. However, based on numerous interviews and group discussions with Indonesian researchers, I consider these factors as creating a conducive context to the successful transformation of the political system (via the adoption of institutions and mechanisms related to power-sharing and their modifications), contributing to the achievement of an increasing degree of political stability in Indonesia rather than directly being responsible for this process.

Another significant methodological problem refers to the conceptualisation of a new power-sharing model. I explain this issue in the sub-chapter entitled ‘Remarks about conceptualising a hybrid power-sharing model.’ Here I just want to say that I perceive a model as an individual conception, i.e. its basic principles (assumptions) and concepts (understood as mental structures reflecting a particular situation), specific institutions (understood as sets of rules), and the relationships between them.

In turn, about the problem in the conceptualisation of the very term ‘power-sharing,’ its different understanding among political scientists, and its passage from a notion – the stage of imagining and assigning potential meanings – to the stage at which the term has become a bona fide theoretical concept, I investigate at the beginning of Chapter 1.

The book consists of two parts, divided into chapters and subchapters. The first part (entitled ‘Power-sharing and hybrid power-sharing’) discusses the theory of power-sharing and develops the concept of hybrid power-sharing. The second part (entitled ‘Hybrid power-sharing in Indonesia’), using the example of Indonesia, illustrates hybrid power-sharing and the different processes accompanying it in this country.

In the first chapter, definitional issues related to the term ‘power-sharing’ and the understanding of power-sharing in the broad and narrow sense are explained. The first normative model of power-sharing – proposed by Sir W. Arthur Lewis –
is then discussed. The consociational model developed by Arend Lijphart is briefly explored, together with its major institutions, as well as the issues of the potential undemocratic nature of consociationalism and its shortcomings. The main post-Lijphartian developments in the consociational model are then presented.

The essence of the centripetal power-sharing model developed by Donald L. Horowitz, its conceptual basis and institutions compared to consociationalism, the main centripetal mechanisms (techniques) identified by Horowitz, the case of Nigeria as the main laboratory of centripetalism, and major post-Horowitzian developments in the centripetal theory are then synthetically discussed and criticisms and shortcomings of centripetalism presented.

At the beginning of the second chapter, devoted to the hybridity of power-sharing arrangements and the specific hybrid power-sharing model, the discussion on the possibility of creating mixed power-sharing settlements between Philippe Van Parijs and Donald L. Horowitz, and the beginnings of the normative blend of institutions of various power-sharing models within the concept of ‘complex power-sharing’ by Stefan Wolff are presented, as well as topics such as the first developed case of an electoral system combining consociational and centripetal elements, which is a proposal of Laurent de Briey (2005), an example of the Indian political system that could have ‘soft’ hybrid power-sharing features in 1947–1966, and empirical cases of mixing mainly electoral arrangements of different power-sharing models, seen from the ‘friends or foes’ perspective of Matthijs Bogaards (2019).

The issue of conceptualising a hybrid power-sharing model as a new power-sharing model is then discussed, as are the two most important assumptions of this model, i.e. understanding hybrid power-sharing as an amalgam of different power-sharing models’ institutions, with examples from Nigeria, Kenya, Burundi, and Indonesia, and the issue of hybrid institutions in hybrid power-sharing, having both consociational and centripetal content, exemplified with distinctive illustrations of such institutions in these four states. The remaining part of the chapter looks at ‘further’ conceptual assumptions relating to hybrid power-sharing issues such as the absence of conflict between institutions of different power-sharing models and the coherence of a hybrid model, the need for hybridity seen from the perspective of problems in achieving or (and) maintaining political stability, asymmetry between consociational and centripetal content in hybrid power-sharing, limited flexibility of its conceptual assumptions, the relative durability of hybrid power-sharing with a current illustration of the Nigerian hybrid power-sharing erosion, the complexity of effects produced by power-sharing institutions in the hybrid power-sharing environment, with a recent illustration from Kenya, intentionality (and also randomness) in hybrid power-sharing formation and relationship between hybridity and planes of
politics and power, as well as types of divisions. Part of the subchapters regarding further assumptions also present shortcomings and potential threats to the functioning of hybrid power-sharing. Hybrid power-sharing assumptions of an ‘organising’ character are then investigated, covering issues such as the multi-dimensional character of hybrid power-sharing, differentiating ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ hybrid power-sharing, formal and informal institutions, and the significance of institutions of a different power-sharing model added to the dominant power-sharing model.

The second part of the book focuses on the Indonesian case of hybrid power-sharing. The book covers the political situation before the 2024 elections in Indonesia.

In the third chapter, Indonesia is presented as a divided society. Firstly, the types of divisions are discussed, and the key ethnic and religious segments and sub-segments are presented. Secondly, the most important conflicts hindering the integration of Indonesian society, state-building, and achieving political stability are briefly discussed.

The grounds for transformation – after the fall of Suharto’s rule in 1998 – of the Indonesian political system towards a power-sharing type through centripetalisation and then hybridisation, after adding several consociational institutions, is explained. Next, the problem of the revival of efforts by the largest ethnic segment in Indonesia, the Javanese, to centralise and dominate power in this country is addressed.

In Chapter Four, the processes of centripetalisation and hybridisation of the Indonesian political system, as well as centralisation and Javanisation of power are explored at the nationwide level of the operation of political parties, elections, and the legislative and executive powers through a discussion of the various institutions.

Chapter Five is mostly devoted to power-sharing type arrangements referring to the illiberal Islamic sub-segment and their ideological basis in political Islam. Here religious political parties, mostly Islamic, but also Christian, and their role in the political system of Indonesia, important in the first case, and minor in the second, are discussed. Next, the meaningful effects of Islamic parties’ and some other arrangements functioning are elucidated.

Chapter Six is devoted to the reorganisation of territorial structure and decentralisation in Indonesia. These phenomena are also demonstrated in the context of the processes of centripetalisation, hybridisation, centralisation, and Javanisation. The specific centripetal and consociational mechanisms or techniques of transforming the character of the territorial structure and decentralisation are then presented, as well as the effects and beneficiaries of their implementation.
In Chapter Seven the crucial provisions of special autonomies for the Aceh province and the six Papuan provinces are separately discussed and the grounds for their implementation and the main effects and beneficiaries are explored.

In Conclusion, the major planes of hybridisation of power-sharing political systems are clarified, the main findings of the research on the hybrid power-sharing, including some significant processes occurring within it, are demonstrated, and the essential effects of the hybrid power-sharing implementation are discussed in the perspective of the general performance of power-sharing in Indonesia.

Among the primary sources used in my research, the most important were interviews and group discussions with political scientists from countries where hybrid power-sharing operates and various legal acts that regulate different arrangements and mechanisms that relate to power-sharing or whose effects are important from the perspective of power-sharing in these countries. These are above all constitutions, and various laws, especially regulating the operation of political parties, electoral issues, and the functioning and transformation of the territorial structure and decentralisation. Among the secondary sources, monographs, book chapters, and various papers by both founders and researchers of power-sharing theory and scholars in the domain of specific political systems, especially of multi-segmental societies, were of fundamental importance in my research. Reports (especially on election outcomes) and local press sources (e.g. those providing current information about certain developments regarding specific institutions or the changing political situation) were also helpful. Importantly, a large part of the academic works that served as sources were from countries that have power-sharing political systems.

This book is not and cannot be perfect. I am aware that due to the need to focus on those issues relating directly to hybrid power-sharing, I was obliged to somewhat downplay the exploration of some nuances of consociational and centripetal theories, concentrating – in my opinion – on their most significant elements and not referring to the many threads and findings of important authors that differed from the theoretical classics. Similarly, I present the conflicts in independent Indonesia and the essence and constant changes to its political system only synthetically, as much as necessary from the perspective of delivering the background to the implementation of power-sharing institutions and their transformations, which, however, I hope – considering the extensive literature on these topics – will not be misinterpreted as an oversight. I am also aware that some threads regarding hybrid power-sharing itself have not been further evolved in this book, but rather only signalled, which is merely because the development of a hybrid power-sharing model requires further research in the field and in-depth analytical and conceptual work. I hope to continue working on hybrid power-sharing theory and I encourage other researchers to do so.
My research and writing of this book were possible thanks to the help of many people. First of all, I would like to thank the Indonesian, Nigerian, Kenyan, and Burundian researchers and practitioners, over two hundred of them in total, whom I interviewed mostly during my field research. I would certainly never have gained the knowledge that helped me to conceptualise a hybrid power-sharing model without having the opportunity to hold conversations with them. I am grateful to them for not only talking to me and sharing their knowledge about specific power-sharing arrangements but also listening and responding to my opinions during interviews, group discussions, and conferences. This was of crucial importance to me since they come from countries where hybrid power-sharing operates.

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My research and this work itself would never have reached their current form without the understanding and support of my family, to whom I am very grateful for this invaluable help. I ask for their forgiveness for my frequent absences. Last, but not least, when the time came to turn the research results into a book, it was written in several friendly places, for which I am grateful to the people who hosted me.

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Part I: Power-sharing and hybrid power-sharing