Environmental Law Regulations of Pesticide Usage: Challenges of Enforcement and Compliance in the Sh

The lack of compliance and enforcement of agricultural chemical use legislation in Tanzania has raised concerns due to the significant environmental and public health threats that result from the unregulated discharge of industrial effluents. The utilization of the ‘Table of Eleven’ tool, a behaviour-analysis model providing insight into the level of legislative compliance, makes it possible to explore motives that encourage farmers to comply with, or violate, the existing agricultural chemical use legislation. This paper discusses how the application of the ‘Table of Eleven’ tool has enabled the government of Tanzania to reveal strong and weak points pertaining to the compliance and enforcement of the agricultural chemical use legislation. As a result, it is clear that more attention is needed to improve comprehension of the legislation and to increase the use of incentives and economic instruments. Future steps should include applying this knowledge to the development of environmental indicators.



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Chapter 3.4, Institutional framework:

Laws generally establish the institutional framework for their own enforcement by describing who will be responsible for implementing them. Without such a framework, it may be difficult to establish who is responsible for ensuring compliance has been achieved. Law makers may also want to give citizens and non-government organizations representing citizens the right to ring a lawsuit for the purpose of enforcing the law. For example, environmental laws can allow citizens to sue polluters for failing to comply with the law, and/or the government agency for failing to fulfil ist duties under the law. James et al., (2007), have argued that one of the most important design elements of any regulatory policy is how compliance with the policy will be enforced.

3.5, Reasons influencing compliance:

One of the primary goals of environmental program is to change human behaviour to that environmental requirements are complied with. Another major goal of an enforcement program is to correct any immediate and serious threat to public health or the environment posed by pollution (e.g., a chemical spill that is contaminating a drinking water supply, discovery of toxic or explosive chemical wastes in an area accessible to the public.

Theories about compliance provide different reasons of why individuals comply with or not comply with environment requirements. Although theories explain target groups’ behaviour and the reasons behind the behaviour from different perspectives, they are derived in similar foot stone and be complementary with each other. These theories can be basically summarized into three categories. First category is rational calculation vs. Underlying norms. Some suggest that groups decide whether comply or not based on rational evaluation of the logical consequences of their actions vis-à-vis the rules in order to maximize payoffs. Other examines a wide range of factors shaping behaviour, including whether behaviour is appropriate vis-à-vis underlying norms (Zaelke et al.2005). This is quite similar as the two categories by which Grossman and other scholars classify the theories of compliance. One is the nationalist’s model that focuses on deterrence and enforcement as a means to prevent and punish non-compliance by changing the actor’s calculation of benefits and costs. Garry Becker (1968) his basic insight is that potential offenders respond to both the probability of detection and severity of punishment if detected and convicted. Therefore deterrence may be enhanced either by raising the penalty, by increasing monitoring activities to raise the likelihood that offender will be caught. Furthermore, deterrence theory extends the Becker model to corporate non-compliance and maintains that there must be a credible likelihood of detecting violations, swift, certain, and appropriate sanctions upon detection and sanction elements represented (Clifford et al. 2003). Stafford (2002) in his study showed that an increase in the maximum possible penalty decreased violations for hazardous waste pollutants. Another is normative model that focus on cooperation and compliance assistance as a means to prevent non compliance. They believe that compliance theories vary according to the degree they disaggregate the targets of regulations, either treating States or firms as unitary entities or recognizing that both are made up of multiple actors (Grossman et al., 2000).

March and Olsen (1998) divide the basic logic of human action into the logic of consequences and the ‘logic of appropriateness’. The logic of consequences views actors as choosing rationally among alternatives based on their calculations of expected consequences, whereas the logic of appropriateness sees actions as based on identities, obligations, and conceptions of appropriate actions. Without mutual exclusion, these broad categories provide a useful starting point for discussing the particular theories of compliance, and the specific approaches that flow from these different logics of action.

Without mutual exclusion, these broad categories provide a useful starting discussing the particular theories of compliance, and the specific approaches that flow from different logics of action.

Second category is given by environmental Protection Administration of United States (1991).Its compliance theory provides a set of detailed accounts of why different target groups or individuals comply or not with laws:

(1)Deterrence:

In any regulatory situation some people will comply voluntarily, some will not comply, and some will comply only if they see that others receive a sanction or any adverse imposed on violators. Enforcement deters detected violators from violating again. It also deters other potential violators by sending a message that they too may experience adverse consequences for non-compliance. This multiplier or leverage effect makes enforcement powerful tool for achieving widespread compliance. Studies on enforcement show that four factors are critical to deterrence:

a. There is a good chance violations will be detected.

B. The response to violations will be swift and predictable.

C. The response will include an appropriate sanction.

D. Those subject to requirements perceive that the first three factors are present.

Shimshack and Ward (2000) also address the function of deterrence. While studying on the impact of environmental fines, they find that the deterrence impact on other paper plants in a state is almost as the impact on the sanctioned plant. Non-monetary sanctions contribute little impact on compliance and the marginal fine induces substantially greater compliance than marginal inspection.

(2) Economics

The regulated community may be more likely to comply in case where enforcement officials can demonstrate that compliance will save money or when the government provides some form of subsidy for compliance. Economic theory has been applied to enforcement as compatible with and indeed could be said to quantify the principles of deterrence theory. It argues that each source calculates whether it is ist economic self-interest to comply or to violate requirements. It calculations compares the cost of coming into compliance with the likelihood of getting caught multiplied by the penalty of violating (Edwards and Kuusinen, 1989).

Correspondingly, to remove economic incentives of violating the law, the monetary penalty for violation would ideally; at least equals the amount a facility would save by violating. This deters deliberate economic decisions on non-compliance. It also helps improve the equity between compliers and non-compliers.

(3) Institutional credibility:

Each country has ist own social norms concerning compliance. These norms derive largely from the credibility of the laws and the institutions responsible for implementing those laws. Weak enforcement implies that compliance is not as it should be. A goal on the part of the government to bring a majority of the regulated community into compliance sends a message that compliance is important and helps build a social norm of compliance.

(4) Social factors:

Personal and social relationships also influence behaviour, successful personal relationships between enforcement program personnel and regulated group may provide an incentive to comply. Molar and social values may inspire or inhibit compliance. For example, in some situations, farmers may voluntarily comply with requirements out of a genuine desire to improve environmental quality. They may comply out of desire to be a ‘good citizen” and maintain the good will of their local communities or their clients. For industries, facility managers may also fear a loss of prestige that can result if information about non-compliance is made public.Conversely,compliance will likely be low in countries where has been little or no social disapproval associated breaking laws and/or damaging environment.

(5) Knowledge and Technical Feasibility:

Besides being motivated to comply, regulated groups must have the ability to comply. This means they know they are subject to requirements, they must know what steps to take to create compliance, they must have access to the necessary technology to prevent, monitor, control, or clean up pollution, and they must know to operate it correctly. A lack of knowledge or technology can be a significant barrier to compliance. The barrier can be removed by providing education, outreach, and technical assistance.



Peter Z. Matata has a B.sc. in Land Use Planning from the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and a M.sc. in Environmental Science with a specialization in planning and management from the University of Delft, the Netherlands.