An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem

This book approaches the mind-body problem from the perspective of an extended phenomenological analysis of consciousness. Its goal is to show how the very definition of mind involves embodiment. Just as words cannot be defined without syllables, and syllables without the letters composing them, the sense of consciousness includes its embodiment. The two, it is argued, are not definitionally distinct. The emphasis on the point is meant to prepare the reader for the core thesis of this book: This is that the classic statements of the mind-body problem are based on an artificial separation of consciousness and its embodiment. This separation is reflected in the view that associates consciousness with temporal relations and the material world with spatial relationships. James Mansch’s aim is to undercut this view and to show that time and space—and, hence, consciousness and its embodiment—are mutually implicit; it is, further, to propose an explanatory bridge between the two that is based on their mutual implication.



This book explores the mind-body problem through phenomenology, arguing that consciousness is inherently embodied. It challenges the traditional split between mind and body, showing that time and space—and thus mind and body—are mutually dependent.